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Abstract 
 
One of the main concerns and challenges of modern society is the level of 
equality of opportunity members of populations can enjoy. That becomes 
particularly important in societies where there is high income inequality. This 
research investigates the level of education and earnings mobility in Chile, 
finding relatively low intergenerational schooling dependency, but high in terms 
of intergenerational earnings compared to other countries. Schooling mobility 
seems to be lower than earnings mobility, which is opposite to what was 
expected in Chile. Considering this result, this research also analyses the effect 
of competition between schools on their average academic performance in the 
context of the Chilean educational reform implemented in the 1980s. In this 
respect, it is found that a larger number of public schools positively affects the 
quality of education of other schools located in an area, with the effect 
particularly pronounced amongst middle-class families and in middle-ranking 
schools. However, the number of voucher schools decreases the performance of 
neighbouring schools. The results are confirmed whilst ruling out endogenous 
location of voucher schools in areas with bad quality public schools, suggesting 
that sorting of students is driving the results. Finally, considering the possibility 
that schools might be a segregationalist environment, this investigation analyses 
the effects of assortative mating on the level of intergenerational earnings 
dependency in the country. It is found that assortative mating in terms of years 
of schooling explains around 20% of the intergenerational earnings dependency 
levels and that the educational reform increased the levels of assortative mating 
due to potential student sorting and a general increase of the educational 
attainment of the whole Chilean population.  
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the central aims of social policy makers is to promote 
opportunities for new generations, in particular for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. It is expected that increasing their educational achievement will 
not only give them hope, but also the necessary tools to have higher earnings in 
the future and have a better life than their parents. Education is therefore 
understood as a promoter of openness in society giving everyone the possibility 
to live a life independent of their initial condition. Nevertheless, educational 
systems in many parts of the world seem to reproduce inequality (Lannelli and 
Paterson 2005), or to create a deeper chasm between those who can achieve a 
good education and high quality of life and those who seem to be destined to 
remain less educated and, as a consequence, poor and socially excluded. 
Education can therefore be consideredas one of the main factors that promotes 
social mobility, but it is also the main factor that influences social reproduction 
(Hertz et al., 2007). In Britain, for example, there is no evidence that income 
social mobility has increased over time, even though there has been an increase 
of educational provision during the last few decades of the twentieth century 
(Goldthorpe, 2004).  
 
One explanation is that education challenges the process of social fluidity, 
but it does not generate mobility by itself. Behrman et al. (1999) have 
suggested what kinds of educational policy enhance social mobility in Latin-
America, claiming that higher spending on primary education and better quality 
primary and secondary schooling are positively associated with intergenerational 
mobility, but that relatively greater public spending on tertiary education would 
reinforce the impact of family background and increase inequality reproduction. 
Hence, the role of educational policies seems to be important and it has been 
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suggested that, in terms of mobility, the way the resources are spent is clearly 
more important than how much is spent (OECD, 2005). 
 
In addition, in many countries, for example Panama, Peru and Ecuador 
(Parrado and Salvador, 2011), the lack of a fair process of selection in jobs 
makes it difficult to achieve meritocracy and makes social progress difficult 
because those who get a job might not be the best candidate, but the one with 
wider and stronger social networks. Also, many of those who have the 
intellectual capacity to study, but come from poorer backgrounds do not believe 
in the system, thereby education is, for them, largely a waste of time and 
potentially important resources are not used. Within these countries, even 
though many enjoy relative economic and political stability, only a small 
proportion of the population has access to the benefits that development and 
growth. The educational system is suffering a serious crisis and a meritocracy is 
far from existing (Brezis, 2010).  
 
Therefore, the inequality of educational opportunities and the effect of 
parental background on children’s educational attainment plays a very important 
role in the intergenerational reproduction of socio-economic status. Schooling is 
considered one of the main mechanisms through which intergenerational social 
mobility is affected. If schooling plays an important role in the generation of 
income and assuming that schooling is strongly influenced by family 
characteristics, the intergenerational mobility would be low. On the other hand, if 
family characteristics are not very important in determining schooling, then 
social income mobility should be high (Birdsall and Szekely, 1999). In addition, it 
has been suggested that because education plays an important role in explaining 
individual income, the reforms which alter total spending on education may have 
aggregate effects not only on intergenerational income mobility, but also on 
income distribution and growth (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1994). 
17 
 
Chile is an interesting case study because together with Mexico, they are 
the only Latin-American countries that are members of the OECD. Chile has 
experienced a general economic and political stability together with economic 
openness and enormous advances in terms of health, educational attainment, 
etc. Chile also presents low levels of unemployment and a GDP growth above the 
OECD average (OECD, 2014). Nevertheless in Chile, the process of development 
has not brought only benefits, in fact the country has the highest Gini Coefficient 
among OECD countries (OECD, 2012). Moreover, Chile has an educational 
system which is strongly market-based with a highly developed voucher 
programme. A voucher is a coupon that a student carries with them to school 
which they or their parents choose for them to attend. When the students enrol, 
the school gets the cash value of the voucher (Hoxby, 2003). Such a programme 
has, in other contexts, been shown to increase the educational efficiency and 
growth rate of a country (Cardak, 2001), but also increase its level of inequality 
(Chen, 2005). The Chilean voucher system was implemented nationwide during 
the early 80s, and has been very controversial, with some promoting the idea of 
expansion of choice and efficiency and others claiming that education should be 
public and with high standards and stating that educational market privatisation 
only creates segregation. In fact, Chile experiences high income inequality, and 
in particular, it has been suggested that inequality in the country can mostly be 
explained by a huge concentration of economic resources in the top income 
decile (Torche, 2005) and that its level of inequality could be correlated with the 
high levels of intergenerational earnings dependency. Therefore the Great 
Gatsby Curve becomes relevant (Corak, 2012), where the relationship between 
intergenerational mobility and income inequality is seen. Chile, together with 
Peru, Brazil and Argentina are examples of countries with high levels of 
inequality and high levels of intergenerational earnings dependency. On the 
other hand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland are examples of countries 
with low levels of inequality and intergenerational earnings dependency. The 
18 
 
Chilean situation seems to be contrary to high levels of educational attainment 
(at least compared to their neighbours) which could indicate that the 
transmission to equality in terms of income through education has not been very 
effective. 
 
Hence, if voucher schools are associated with higher sorting and peer 
effects have some influence, it is likely that the distribution of educational 
benefits would not be particularly egalitarian (Epple and Romano, 2000). For 
example, high poverty levels seem to have increased the demand for voucher 
schools, because most of the poorest students are located in public schools; and 
higher income families are driven out of public schools into voucher schools 
(Winkler and Rounds, 1996). In this respect, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) show 
that in municipalities where voucher schools have grown in number, the 
socioeconomic condition in public schools decreased. Furthermore, segregation 
would be reproduced athigher levels of education. In the Chilean case, in order 
to access tertiary education, students need to get good results in the PSU 
(Prueba de Seleccion Universitaria - University Selection Test), in this way they 
can have the opportunity to have higher earnings and increase upward social 
mobility in the case of poorer families.  
 
Therefore the results of that test must be very important, and in order to 
pass it, the quality of education that students will receive will help equalise the 
opportunities of a better future. In Chile, only 15% of students at university 
come from the poorest 40% of families of the population, which is mainly 
explained by the selective process to access university. From the total number of 
students that take the PSU only 40% of them are accepted, only 25% of the 
accepted join the ‘Consejo de Rectores’ (Vice-Chancellors Council) Universities, 
and only 5% are accepted into the 2 most prestigious institutions: Universidad 
de Chile and Pontificia Universidad Catolica (Contreras and Macias, 2002). 
19 
 
On the other hand, publicly funded education is in general associated with 
equity. To increase intergenerational income mobility during the development 
process, the proportion of resources destined to public spending on education 
should be enough to offset the relative advantages that children with better 
educated parents have (Lyigun, 1999). However, the evidence is diverse, for 
example even though the Italian public system is egalitarian and provides a 
standardised quality, it does not attract the expected educational investment 
from poorer families, probably because the returns to schooling are also low and 
higher levels of education offered to the poorest families is meaningless to them 
(Checchi et al.,1999). Therefore, taking account that arguments in favour and 
against voucher and public educational systems are varied, it seems necessary 
to analyse the ideas behind the privatisation reforms of educational systems 
more closely. 
 
Voucher systems may change the stratification of social patterns and the 
direction of the effect would depend on the characteristics of the voucher system 
that has been implemented (Epple and Romano, 2002). It is difficult to 
determine the causes of why a free market educational system would create 
social segregation, but they are probably related to: the design of the voucher 
programme (if the programme is focused on low income children, or just on 
girls, for example), the possibility for schools to select students, the limitations 
on attending a school outside the district of residence (which is not the case in 
Chile), the difference in parental preferences, or the demographic characteristics 
of children or school’s reputation (Mickelsonet al., 2008). For the Chilean case, it 
has been claimed that the voucher system has been segregating the population 
and schools have become centres of social inequality reproduction where richer 
children do not have the opportunity to interact with poorer children, and where 
social networks and friendship are established, and even more where individuals 
could find their future spouses. The effect of ‘assortative mating’ therefore 
20 
 
potentially seems relevant, understanding it as a high correlation of members of 
married couples in terms of education, which could reinforce the transmission of 
socioeconomic conditions from parents to childreneven more. In this respect, 
Weil (2005) suggests that the level of economic mobility in a society depends, 
among other things, on the nature of marriages, as when people get married to 
others that are part of their same social class or economic condition this limits 
the social flux in society. Therefore, if assortative mating is high, social mobility 
will be low.  
 
For an analysis focused on Latin American countries, Torche (2010) finds 
that educational homogamy appears to be the rule in many of these countries. 
The proportion of couples with the same level of education corresponds to 60% 
in Brazil, 48% in Chile, and 50% in Mexico. These figures are even more 
significant if they include the proportion of couples where one of the individuals 
has a university degree and the partner only has some studies at university (but 
maybe did not finish), i.e., 81% for Brazil, 84% in Chile, and 86% in Mexico. At 
the other extreme, the proportion of couples that have one partner with 
university education and the other with no education is almost zero in all the 
countries mentioned above.  
 
1.1 Motivation and Aims 
 
The main motivation of this research is to face the high levels of 
inequality in Chile which have been historical and increased during the 80s 
(Torche, 2005), signalling a persistent intergenerational reproduction of the 
socioeconomic condition of individuals. This unfairness in society is believed to 
have been associated with old elitism originating in colonial times (De Ferrati et 
al., 2004) or with the economic progress that Chile has experienced during the 
last two decades and that even though this has brought benefits, it has also 
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created significant social segregation with people that have been left behind, 
without opportunities and without hope. The idea that education could be the 
main tool that individuals could use in order to have a better life in terms of 
potential future incomes is essential for this research, but it is also scrutinised, 
as education could generate even more segregation in society if children from 
poorer backgrounds are always carrying an extra weight that hampers their 
educational attainment. Education could become differential between those that 
can access it and those that cannot. In particular, peer effects could not only 
have an effect decreasing the performance of pupils, but also influence the way 
individuals meet and match as couples. Therefore, education could reproduce 
inequality, and could effectively be an elitist stamp that describes and 
determines the future of people regardless of who is more able in academic 
terms. It is believed that this project is particularly exciting since it would raise 
the opportunity to tackle the problem of inequality in relation to education, 
considering that it should, one hopes, be an important channel in improving 
social mobility. 
 
This research proposes to answer the question of whether or not 
education promotes or limits social mobility in Chile, considering first of all that it 
is necessary to measure the levels of intergenerational mobility on earnings and 
education (Chapter 2), which by itself is a controversial topic due to the lack of 
available data and life cycle effect issues. Secondly, the school competition 
effects must also be analysed (Chapter 3) as potential sorting among pupils is 
expected. Finally, the impact of assortative mating on the level of 
intergenerational earnings dependency seems necessary to research (Chapter 
4), as an educational system that encourages socio-economic pupil segregation 
could affect the marriage structure in society.  Chapters 2, 3, and 4 separately, 
but not independently analyse issues related to the main aim mentioned above. 
In addition, Chapter 5 includes a final discussion and conclusion of this thesis, 
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providing a summary of the results and their implications, as well as mentioning 
the limitations of the thesis, and suggestions for further research. 
 
Hence, education becomes of particular interest as it could be a promoter 
or a barrier to enhance socio-economic mobility in society. The initial ideas 
behind the current Chilean educational system and a brief description of its main 
characteristics and criticism are presented below. 
 
1.2 The Chilean Educational Reform of the 1980s 
 
In Chile, the need to increase the provision of education, increase 
efficiency of the public sector and increase the quality of the educational service 
was planned through reforms regarding school choice, a kind of reform that was 
intended to increase the quality and efficiency of the service by increasing the 
competition among schools through privatisation of the educational market 
(OECD, 2003). The benefits of increasing school choice were promoted by 
opening the supply side provision to non-governmental institutions. This was 
intended to reduce the barriers to entry for organisations that can focus on 
students with different preferences and needs. 
 
Since 1981, a voucher system was implemented on a large scale 
nationwide, influenced by Friedman’s ideas1 about choice and freedom, and in 
the context of a market-oriented transformation of the country, Chile’s non-
democratic military government decentralised public schools and started 
financing some private schools with a voucher system for each student. Private 
school vouchers were seen as one of the main solutions to low quality public 
education - they would offer education in a more efficient manner at a lower cost 
                                                          
1
 See Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman, 1962). 
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than public schools. After the reform, the enrolment into private subsidised 
(voucher) schools increased rapidly, mostly for non-religious and profit-
maximising schools and to a lesser degree, an increase in Catholic schools, even 
though Chile is mostly a Catholic country (McEwan and Carnoy, 2000).  
 
The rationale behind the reform is based upon five important points: 
First, the idea that increased school choice means that families that have 
children attending a school will be better off in terms of overall welfare. Second, 
social costs associated with increasing choices through privatisation of public 
schooling are very little. Third, the idea that subsidised privately-operated 
schools are more effective in terms of the cost and the quality offered, as public 
provision of education is seen as bureaucratic and wasteful. Fourth, competition 
between subsidised private and public schools for students (and their vouchers) 
will encourage schools, especially the latter, to offer a better service because 
privatisation involves funding according to the number of students enrolled in 
the school, and this funding would act as a way to pressure schools to perform 
better. In addition, the idea that privatised and competitive educational systems 
would likely allow more social mobility, especially for children from poorer 
backgrounds was also a motivation behind the reform (Carnoy, 1998).  
 
The fact that funding is not guaranteed for the school and is tied to 
students, who  decide where to attend, should motivate schools to compete for 
these students, increase the pressure to be more responsive to the requirements 
of parents and to use their resources in a more efficient way (Ladd and Fiske, 
2003). On the other hand, efficiency would improve because of decentralisation 
due to the better use of information at the local level. Public service 
decentralisation has been generally claimed as a way to increase citizen 
participation, a way to improve resource allocation and a way to improve the 
equity in the distribution of services provided. In particular, “decentralisation 
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refers to a variety of administrative, fiscal and political changes that involve the 
transfer of some combination of resources, responsibilities, or decision-making 
authority from the central government to lower-level units, being the sub-
national governments, units of the central government, or state owned 
enterprises” (Kubal, 2006, p.108). This is why the decentralisation reform was 
considered an example of one of Pinochet’s main government priorities, in order 
to decrease the public spending on social services.  
 
However, it could be relevant to notice that in some respects 
decentralisation was not (and is not) a complete process as the operation and 
finance comes from the local government, but the main pedagogical aspects of 
education are still centralised.It is important to notice that because the two main 
reforms, decentralisation through municipalisation (local governments or 
municipalities were responsible for the provision of education in their area, 
including financing it) and privatisation (to distinguish their potential effects 
separately through vouchers) were implemented simultaneously, their separate 
effects are not obvious. 
 
Before the reforms, Chilean governments traditionally provided a partial 
economic funding to some non-public schools - almost all of them were Catholic. 
However, the reforms extended the support to all other schools, independent of 
religion and increased the resources destined to non-public schools which started 
being called voucher schools. In practical terms, public and voucher schools 
receive the same voucher amount and it is unrestrictive so every student can 
participate. Voucher schools only receive students that want to make use of it; 
they are unlikely to accept students where parents want to pay the full extent of 
their education (these parents will likely send their children to private, fee paying 
schools).  
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The amount of the voucher received by the school is calculated as the 
value of the USE (Units of Educational Subsidy) and the average attendance of 
the last 3 months before the payment2. The value of USE varies depending on 
the level of education and the type of school (primary, secondary, vocational, 
adult, special needs, etc.) and considering if the school is an all-day school or 
not.  
 
In addition to the reform itself, the teachers’ union contracts were 
cancelled, therefore schools got more flexibility in terms of hiring and firing 
teachers. In particular, public school teachers lost their for-life contracts and 
were not considered public employees anymore. Moreover, national curriculum 
standards were relaxed, giving schools more flexibility about the topics they 
teach. Hence, the main idea was that competition would create more quality for 
fewer resources, and that was all that was necessary in order to improve the 
service provided. Therefore, the spending on education fell in the decade 
following the reform (see Graph 1.1), with the deepest fall for secondary 
schools. Chile then became, “a virtual laboratory for a relatively unregulated, 
decentralised, competitive market in primary and secondary education” (Bravo, 
et al., 2010, p. 2), where parents could choose between public, voucher or fee-
paying (private) schools. Finally, private and voucher schools could be selective, 
but public schools had the choice of being be selective only if there is an excess 
of demand
3
 (mostly applying entry tests and considering past academic 
performance). 
 
The educational reform mentioned above was not reversed by the 
government in the return to democracy in 1990, which was a political strategy to 
                                                          
2 Teachers’ salaries are totally independent of this funding. 
3 The only constraint for public schools is that the number of students per class cannot be more than 
45. 
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sustain the volatile ‘ceasefire’ between the left and the right in the country 
(OECD, 2004). However, successive changes have been implemented by the 
subsequent democratic governments (including increasing the available 
resources to spend on education). In 1991, a special labour code was established 
for public teachers, which gave them more stability in terms of salary, contract 
hours, holidays, benefits, etc., which in a way limited the efficiency of the 
system but helped get support from the teaching union for the whole process of 
transition to democracy (Cox, 1997). The number of textbooks available for each 
school was also increased as were the teachers’ salaries by around 54.4% 
compared to 1990, among other improvements.  
 
Graph 1.1: % Private and Public Spending on Education as a Proportion 
of GDP (1990-2008) 
 
Source: Ministry of Education (2008) 
 
Until 1994, voucher schools and public schools were financed mostly by 
the government budget. Subsequently, “topping up” was introduced which 
meant that the voucher schools were allowed to charge students tuition fees on 
top of the voucher value for students
4
.  
                                                          
4 Public schools were also allowed to top up their public funding but only at the level of secondary 
education. 
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The maximum amount allowed to charge parents is 0.5 times the public-
financed original voucher. A progressive discount is applied to schools if they 
charge more than that amount
5
. It has been suggested that this decision 
increased the segmentation by income levels because those who can pay fees 
are accumulated in certain institutions where the poorest cannot go (Narodowski 
and Nores, 2002). To try to alleviate this effect, scholarships were given to the 
best students in voucher schools that cover their fees, in order to support 
students with fewer economic resources. These scholarships are financed by the 
government and by the schools’ owners.  
 
In 1995, with an already stable democracy established in the country, the 
government decided that schools should use more technology, in particular 
computers, and the increase of spending on education became the priority in 
terms of social policy, including increasing the value of the voucher, which in 
1990 was 23% lower than the value in 1982, and creating a higher value 
voucher for rural areas (in order to cover fixed costs).  From 1996 a new explicit 
reform started being implemented, including the ‘Jornada Escolar Completa’ (Full 
Day School) and a curriculum reform, to support the poorest schools and a 
programme to increase quality and equity in the education provided.  
 
In 2008, the government realised that it was more expensive to educate 
disadvantaged students (before that, there was no higher value voucher to 
compensate poorer children, in fact the only compensation up until that point 
was through free school meals). Therefore an increase of 50% of the value of 
                                                          
5 If a voucher school decides to charge a fee per student, they can charge a maximum of 4 USEper 
month. If the fee corresponds to less than 0.5 USE, then the value of the original  voucher given 
from the government does not decrease, for values between 0.5 and 1 USE there is a decrease of 
10% of the voucher, between 1 and 2 USE, the decrease is 20%, and for between 2 and 4 USE, the 
decrease is 35%.  
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the voucher per students classified as vulnerable by the Ministry of Development 
and Planning was agreed (this decision was based on individual and household 
surveys collected by the Chilean government)
6
. Schools can opt for this benefit if 
they apply with a programme of improvement and a financial plan for spending 
the extra money with the only condition that the schools receiving differential 
vouchers are not allowed to select or expel their students based on interviews 
with their parents. It is possible that this could mitigate the stratification effects. 
 
In terms of the consequences of the reform implementation, one of the 
immediate effects of the privatisation was the increase of education coverage 
(although an increase in educational coverage could have of course multiple 
causes), for example, in 2006, 1 in 3 children between the ages of 0 and 5 
attended a nursery or similar in contrast to 1990 when only 1 of 5 were 
attending. In secondary school only 50% of the children of the respective age 
were attending secondary school in 1990, but by 2006, 7 out of 10 were 
attending. In terms, of tertiary education, 7 out of 10 students are the first in 
their families to attend university in 2006 (nevertheless, there are some issues 
related to over-education in this respect)
7
. In addition, Graph 1.2 shows the 
completion rates of students for the years 1990, 2006 and 2009 which have 
been increasing over time, especially for poorer children. 
 
The second effect was that more than a thousand new voucher schools 
were opened in the first five years after the reform. In 1980 there were 1,627 
                                                          
6 Vulnerable children are those that are defined as members of families that face socioeconomic 
problems, which make it difficult for them to participate in the educational process (Darville and 
Rodriguez, 2007). 
7 Understanding over-education as a positive difference between the actual education of an individual 
and the mean level of education among workers in the individual occupation (Lindley and McIntosh, 
2009). 
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voucher schools and by 1985, there were 2,643 schools of the same kind (Hsieh 
and Urquiola, 2006). Enrolment in Catholic voucher schools increased from 
around 5% before the reform to around 14% in 2002
8
 and in 10% of the 
municipalities there were more than 50% voucher schools
9
. In fact, there was a 
general increase in voucher school enrolment, which overtook public school 
enrolment in 2008 (see Graph 1.3). 
 
Graph 1.2: Population between 20 to 24 years Completed Secondary 
Education by Income Decile of Households 
 
Source: CASEN 1990, 2006 and 2009, MIDEPLAN, Chilean Government. 
 
                                                          
8 It is important to note that a school is considered a Catholic school when the church directly 
chooses the head of the school or when the church approves the election of the head of the school. 
Therefore, many schools are related to the Catholic Church but they are not considered officially as 
Catholic schools. 
9 However, 20% of municipalities do not have voucher schools at all (Gallego, 2006). 
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Graph 1.3: % Enrolment by type of school (1990-2008)
 
             Source: Ministry of Education (2008) 
 
1.3 The Current Chilean Educational System  
 
In summary, after the 1980 educational reform, the Chilean educational 
system was characterised by having 3 types of educational institutions at the 
primary and secondary level: public, voucher and private schools. Public schools 
are state-financed and municipality-administrated, receiving a determined 
amount of money per student attending the school, which varies depending on 
the type of education that the school provides. The voucher is paid monthly, 
directly to the school for voucher schools and to the municipalities in the case of 
public schools. 
 
Voucher schools are privately administrated, with or without profit 
purposes and in some cases administrated by religious institutions. In terms of 
finance, the schools are financed by voucher per student attending the school, 
which is provided by the government, and has the same value as the one 
obtained by the public school. However, they could also receive funding from 
charity organisations, as for example Catholic schools receive funding from the 
Catholic Church. In addition, these schools can charge a small tuition fee to each 
student to increase their budget. Voucher schools present larger class sizes 
relative to public schools and normally public schools service the poorest 
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families. On the other hand, private tuition fee schools are those that are fully 
funded by parents’ payments and private resources. The tuition fee schools 
obviously attract the richest students. In Table 1.1 the distribution of students 
among different kinds of schools is presented and Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 show 
the characteristics of schools by type, parents and students. 
 
Table 1.1: Distribution of Primary School Students across School 
Categories, (2008) 
School Type % of Schools % of Enrolment 
Public 54.8 46.0 
Voucher (For-Profit Franchise) 5.7 7.3 
Voucher (For-Profit Independent) 24.6 23.6 
Voucher (Non-Profit Catholic) 6.3 12.3 
Voucher (Non-Profit Protestant) 0.9 1.4 
Voucher (Non-Profit Secular) 1.0 1.6 
Private 6.7 7.4 
Total 100 100 
Number of Schools/Students 10,299 3,420,594 
            Source: Elacqua (2009a) 
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Table 1.2: Primary Schools by Ownership Type: Descriptive Summary (2008) 
School Type N 
% 
Rural 
Avg. School 
Size10 
% Metropolitan 
Region 
% Vulnerable 
Students 
Avg. Mothers' Years of 
Education 
Public 5,129 65 560 13 61 8.6 
Voucher (For-Profit Total) 2,441 29 519 32 37 10.5 
Voucher (For-Profit Franchise) 444 30 651 41 44 10.2 
Voucher (For-Profit Independent) 1,997 29 490 30 45 10.0 
Voucher (Non-Profit Total) 803 21 738 27 31 11.1 
Voucher (Non-Profit Catholic) 575 24 839 26 37 11.3 
Voucher (Non-Profit Protestant) 88 18 563 16 39 10.8 
Voucher (Non-Profit Secular) 80 13 561 44 33 11.1 
Private 442 3 555 37 0 14.8 
Source: Elacqua (2009a) 
 
Table 1.3: Primary Schools by Ownership Type: Descriptive Summary (2008) 
School Type N Class Size11 % Charge Tuition % Full Day Program  Teacher Productivity Award % 
Public 5,129 30.1 0 86 22 
Voucher (For-Profit Total) 2,441 29.2 48 60 19 
Voucher (For-Profit Franchise) 444 31.1 46 62 22 
Voucher (For-Profit Independent) 1,997 28.8 46 59 18 
Voucher (Non-Profit Total) 803 34.9 46 73 42 
Voucher (Non-Profit Catholic) 575 37.1 48 82 46 
Voucher (Non-Profit Protestant) 88 35.1 62 53 30 
Voucher (Non-Profit Secular) 80 27.6 35 61 27 
Private 442 20.7 100  No Information  No Information 
Source: Elacqua (2009a) 
                                                          
10 Only Urban Primary Schools are included as rural schools tend to be very small. 
11 Only Urban Primary Schools are included as classes are, on average, smaller in public schools but that is because they are often located in rural areas where the 
population density is lower and they cannot use economies of scale to increase efficiency (Carnoy and McEwan, 2000). 
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The heads of school of public schools do not have control over 
expenditure decisions; however they can be influenced through lobbies. In the 
case of public schools, the potential earnings are returned to the municipality 
and similarly, any losses incurred are also dealt with by the municipality. Hence, 
teachers do not bear the costs of failure or recoup the benefits of efficiency, 
which could reduce the incentives to provide a better service.  
 
In terms of levels of education, there is pre-school education which is not 
compulsory (up until 5 years old), and is offered by fee-paying private 
institutions, but also by the state; primary education (8 years of schooling); 
secondary education which can be scientific-humanistic or technical (4 years of 
schooling);
12
 and tertiary education (anywhere between 2 and 6 years of 
schooling). Secondary education is available to students who have successfully 
finished primary education and is the vehicle through which people enter tertiary 
education
13
 (if they achieve a determined academic test performance).  
 
Parents have the freedom to choose the school they want without 
restrictions based on their residence. Voucher schools can have a selection 
process based on academic tests, parental interviews, or religion (for example 
some religious voucher schools restrict the entrance, allowing only Catholic 
families) that could produce some sorting problems
14
. Public schools have a first-
come-first-served system to enrol students until they reach their maximum 
school provision, and they cannot use any selection criteria (as for example, 
proximity of residence) with the exception of schools with excess demand which 
                                                          
12 In 2003, secondary level education became compulsory. 
13 This includes private and state universities, professional institutes and technical centres. 
14 In Sweden, where the privately subsidised system also plays an important role, schools cannot 
choose their students (Contreras, et al., 2010). 
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normally select students using parental interviews and academic tests, using 
them as a proxy for students’ quality. So parents can theoretically choose to 
educate their children wherever they want even though they will base their 
decision largely on transportation costs, time etc.  
 
In addition, teachers in public schools are not public employees, but they 
cannot be removed from their positions easily (although since 1995 they can be 
transferred to other schools within the same municipality) and have flat wage 
schedules. After the return to democracy, teachers’ unions gained important 
political influence, obtaining benefits that voucher school teacher do not have 
(for example, voucher schools pay lower teachers’ wages than public schools) 
and also campaigning actively against merging or closing schools and against 
teachers’ movements from one school to another (Gallego, 2006). Perhaps this 
is one importat reason why the number of teachers in public schools is higher 
than in voucher schools.  
 
1.4 Critiques of the Reform 
 
The implications of the 1980 reform are diverse, and it seems that it is 
not evident the idea of competition actually works in reality, especially because 
the implementation of the reform implies so many details that could become 
essential in order to encourage schools to compete and that in case policy 
makers do not take the right decisions, competition could provoke “unexpected 
and maybe perverse responses” (Parry-Rounds, 1997, p.121).  
 
The quality of service could be affected by the fact that public schools 
would have fewer resources (even though if competition is effective and 
increases efficiency, this effect could be cancelled out), in particular because 
voucher schools can select students, leaving the students that have the most 
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difficulties to the public schools (‘sorting’). In addition, voucher schools have 
focused on status elements such as fancy names or luxury uniforms, and 
working conditions for teachers have declined in the wake of the reform 
including low salaries and high overwork. This caused a shortage of teachers and 
a drop in the quality of university students that were accepted into educational 
programmes, often being the students that could not access more demanding 
programmes in terms of academic performance results on the university 
entrance test. Also, after the reform teachers did not have the job quality of 
central government employees and that affected their job security and reduced 
other benefits, producing strikes and limiting the normal functioning of public 
schools. 
 
1.4.1 Sorting and Lack of Real Competition 
 
Students can enrol in any school, not necessarily the ones that are in the 
same area where their families live, therefore public schools in wealthier 
municipalities have expanded and enrolled a larger proportion of students (more 
than 50%) than in poorer municipalities probably because of bad performance or 
lower prestige than public schools have in poorer municipalities. Nevertheless, 
those higher quality schools are becoming income selective (because they are 
over-demanded, they can afford to do so), and are not considering the residence 
of potential students but base selection on entrance examinations and/or using 
parental interviews, where students with higher income parents tend to be 
selected (see Table 1.4). So, public schools that perform better become selective 
and the effect of ‘sorting’ starts to play a role.  
 
In addition, voucher schools have the right to select students with or 
without over-demand, adding an extra sorting effect, that pull better students 
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out from public schools to voucher schools (cream-skimming). This would 
negatively affect the public schools’ performance as the best students from 
public schools are drained to voucher schools (Tokman, 2002). Therefore, this 
situation can create a segmented educational system as similar families tend to 
attend similar educational institutions and they would not mix with students that 
face other kinds of realities, especially because schools can build a reputation 
into communities and attract better teachers. Also, public school incentives could 
be reduced since if the worst students remain in the same schools their chances 
of entering voucher schools are reduced, reducing the competition effect 
between public and voucher schools, so the competition effect can be cancelled 
out. On the other hand, even though the effect of competition is not totally 
cancelled out, it is not clear that schools would compete using the quality of 
education provided as their differential point.  
 
Table 1.4: Parent-reported requirements for school enrolment (%)
15
 
Parent-reported requirements for school 
enrolment Public Voucher Private 
Civil Marriage Certificate 4.8% 8.8% 23.1% 
Church Marriage Certificate or Certificate of Baptism 1.2% 17.4% 34.7% 
Child attended play session 1.8% 5.7% 27.6% 
Child took entrance exam 7.6% 43.4% 62.7% 
Parent interview 12.1% 33.8% 74.7% 
    Source: McEwan, et al. (2008) 
 
In terms of competition for the voucher value, even though some voucher 
schools are non-profit, they are supposed to compete for donations to add to the 
school budget. However, public schools face less competition, because when 
their enrolment fails they receive some transfers from the municipality to pay 
their expenses, so they do not really internalise the consequences of losing 
                                                          
15 4th grade information (2005). 
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students due to bad service provided, as a consequence “if failing schools are to 
be protected from bankruptcy their inefficiency is perpetuated” (West, 1991, pp. 
163). In addition, even though there has been a large private (voucher) school 
expansion and a continuous decline in public school enrolment, the number of 
public schools have not changed significantly. It therefore seems that decision 
makers in municipalities have not been willing to close them, so public schools 
do not actually feel the effects of competition very strongly16. Therefore, public 
schools do not have a direct incentive to provide quality education beyond a 
minimum standard, but voucher schools face explicit competitive incentives 
(Gallego, 2006). 
 
1.4.2 Parents’ Choice and Lack of Information 
 
Economic theory suggests that competition works only under some ideal 
conditions: many buyers and sellers, perfect information, the quality of the 
product is easily identified and easy entry and exit of providers. It seems that for 
the Chilean case, only the first condition is achieved. Voucher schools could 
potentially waste their funds, and parents do not have a direct way to check 
their efficiency. On the other hand, if voucher schools do not perform as 
efficiently as was expected, it does not mean that monopolistic public schools do 
a better job (Neal, 2002). 
 
In terms of parents’ choice, many parents do not take decisions based 
upon the explicit academic performance of schools. Instead, they may consider 
other characteristics of the school as a proxy of the quality provided, for example 
                                                          
16 Actually closing a public school is quite unlikely (around 6% were closed between 2005 and 2009 -
calculus based on the Directory of Schools, Ministry of Education). 
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cleanliness, technological equipment and green spaces17. Overall there is no 
empirical evidence suggesting that the unique and most important thing that 
parents consider in choosing a school is the quality of education. Parents could 
support specific values (religious, for example), or they could care about better 
school facilities, or they could seek to have a higher status or expect to increase 
their social network and avoid immigrants or disadvantaged children, or simply 
because they do not agree with a more open and heterogeneous public school 
environment (Checchi and Jappelli, 2002). Merchandising (fancy uniforms or 
English names, even though they do not even teach in English) is a common 
practice among Chilean voucher (and fee based private) schools to give some 
kind of status to the level of service provided, and this could distract and 
misinform parents on their choice of school. Therefore, it has been claimed that 
parents are not able to make a good choice - the impact of this could be more 
serious among low income families. Lack of information could therefore be an 
issue of concern, because parents would not make the best decision, again this 
issue could be worse for poorer families. In particular, this issue becomes more 
problematic if it is considered that Chilean public schools have historically 
suffered a bad reputation (Arenas, 2004) and that a school’s reputation is built 
depending on the added value that it provides and the composition of students 
that attend. So, instead of preferring the schools with the highest added value, 
parents might choose the school with the best student composition (Mizala and 
Urquiola, 2009). 
 
In addition, stratification could occur as a consequence of the fact that 
high income families would care more for the academic results of the school and 
                                                          
17  It seems that if the general performance of a school is very good and suddenly there is a small 
decline in test scores, the parents may decide to move their children to a different school. On the 
other hand, if in general the schools in the neighbourhood have low scores, parents will tend to put 
more attention on other characteristics of schools (Elacqua, 2009b). 
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the impact of peer effects, especially when richer families try to avoid the 
schools that they perceive as poorer (Elacqua, et al., 2006). Moreover, high 
performance schools have families that are very responsive in terms of the 
quality of the service that students are receiving, in contrast families attending 
lower performance schools are less responsive and the low performance public 
schools become local monopolies that are not very responsive to pressure, or 
that in fact do not face any major threats (Hastings et al., 2005). Finally, 
voucher profit schools will try to retain students that are less cost demanding, on 
the other hand non-profit voucher schools might have the commitment to 
educate the most disadvantaged. However, that does seem to happen in Chile, 
probably because of the decline in religious teachers (priests and nuns), so now 
regular teachers demand more salaries and benefits and religious schools are 
much more budget constrained to achieve their mission (Elacqua, 2009b). 
 
Moreover, using economic theory, it is possible to suppose that 
competition will influence the allocation of resources positively and consumers 
would play an active role in choosing their favourite supplier. However, free 
provision does not seem to be equal to free consumption as families have to 
incur some private costs such as transportation, and it is precisely these 
additional costs which make poorer families use educational services less than 
richer families. In this respect, Gallego and Hernando (2002) explain that the 
ability to move to any school, independent of its location, would be a positive 
aspect for poorer students, at least for those that can move to more desirable 
schools outside their neighbourhood. 
 
On the other hand, segregation would increase if a geographic restriction 
was to be imposed. However, the selection of a school close to their residence 
would realistically be more important for the youngest children as they are more 
dependent on their parents and it would be more costly if they considered that 
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they have to pay the transportation costs every day which would of course affect 
poorer families more (Tokman, 2002). 
 
Despite the costs involved in moving to a school outside the 
neighbourhood, the Chilean reality seems to indicate that there is a certain level 
of mobility between place of residence and the chosen school. According to 
Chumancero, et al. (2009) only 17.6% of students attend their nearest schools 
(24.4% of the students that attend public schools go to their nearest school, 
15.5% of children in voucher schools go to their nearest schools and 8.9% of 
students of private schools go to their nearest)18, using the information from 
about 34 municipalities in the Metropolitan Region19. 
 
Table 1.5 shows the average distance and the average academic 
performance (quality), where the average distance that students travel to their 
school is around 3 kilometres. This information would be particularly relevant for 
Chapter 3 of this research, as it would allow creating a school neighbourhood 
where educational institutions compete for attracting students. 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Using data from CASEN (National Socio-economic Characterisation Survey) it is possible to identify 
the school that children are attending, and the student’s address. Using the name of the school it is 
possible to find the school in the geographic location data set for schools. However, this research 
does not attempt to do that, because each school has many names that are similar, but not exactly 
the same, and matching them correctly would be not easy. The author of the paper mentioned does 
try to do so, but only for the Metropolitan Region. 
19 Considering only schools of their same type: 36.3% of public school students choose the closest 
public school, 24.3% of the voucher school students go to the nearest school. So, choosing the 
closest school might be important, but not essential (Chumancero, et al., 2009).  
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Table 1.5: Distance (Km) and Quality (SIMCE performance) by type of School 
Administration (Average) in the Metropolitan Area. 
Variable Total Public Voucher Private 
Distance of school chosen  2.9 2.57 2.78 4.22 
Quality of school chosen  256 240 257 295 
Distance of nearest school   0.52 0.46 0.55 0.53 
Quality of nearest school  248 240 246 272 
Distance of nearest public school  0.9 0.67 0.93 1.34 
Quality of nearest public school  232 229 231 246 
Distance of nearest voucher school  0.78 0.71 0.73 1.15 
Quality of nearest voucher school  254 250 253 266 
Distance of nearest private school  1.92 2.08 2.07 0.95 
Quality of nearest private school  286 285 287 287 
Number of schools (2 km radius)  20.8 21.1 21.3 18.2 
Quality of schools (2 km radius)  255 252 253 270 
Number of public schools (2 km radius)  4.4 5.2 4.4 2.2 
Quality of public schools (2 km radius)  241 239 240 254 
Number of voucher schools (2 km 
radius)20 13.6 14 15.3 6.3 
Quality of voucher schools (2 km radius)  252 250 252 263 
Number of private schools (2 km radius)  2.8 1.9 1.6 9.8 
Quality of private schools (2 km radius)  286 285 286 287 
Share of students that attend:          
    nearest school  17.6 24.4 15.5 8.9 
    nearest school of the same type  26.9 36.3 24.3 13.8 
Source:Chumancero, et al. (2009) 
 
In terms of segregation related to school choice, Becker (1995) points out 
that poorer families, in particular, need better education to overcome their lack 
of family support and they are normally destined to accept the schools in their 
neighbourhood as they cannot afford to move house or the travelling costs. In 
addition, consumers face the limitation factor of costs associated with changing 
from one supplier to another. Switching costs seem to play a role when parents 
decide whether to change their children from one school to another, so even 
                                                          
20 The proportion of voucher schools in Table 1.2 is lower than in Table 1.5, because the latter only 
includes schools from the Metropolitan region, which has a larger proportion of voucher and private 
schools. 
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though better quality schools might be available, there is some resistance of 
parents for changing children from school to school21 caused, for example by the 
stress that the change implies on the children, and they will have the problem of 
comparing different suppliers of the educational service. However, in the case of 
Chile, the proportion of children that change school is not insignificant (16.73%), 
and around 19% of students attending public schools move to another school 
when they pass from primary to secondary education (considering only schools 
that offer both primary and secondary education). It seems that even though the 
switching cost can be quite high, there is a breaking point which decreases the 
probability of staying at the old school (Chumancero, et al., 2011), see Table 
1.6. 
 
Table 1.6: Number of Students that stay or switch schools (period 2000-
2004) in the Metropolitan Area22 
Stay Total % Public % Voucher % Private % 
No 2,921 16.73 364 19.15 1,841 20.10 716 11.20 
Yes 14,534 83.27 1,537 80.85 7,318 79.90 5,679 88.80 
 Total 17,455 100 1,901 100 9,159 100 6,395 100 
Source: Chumancero, et al. (2011) using SIMCE data set. 
 
Chumancero, et al., (2011), consider this evidence, and point out that on 
average students that move from one school to another obtain around 5.74 
points less in academic test scores, than those that stay, suggesting that those 
that move around are moving to worse schools, and probably the movement was 
                                                          
21 Part of the quality of the educational system is affected by the children’s comfort at the school, if 
parents use their choices correctly in order to move their children, it would imply some sunk costs in 
the process of adaptation implicit when changing schools such as to meet new people, to adapt to 
new rules, changes in the colours of uniform, etc. (Glennerster, 1991). 
22 Considers students in the 4th grade in 2000 who were attending a school that imparts primary and 
secondary level education, so in 2004 (8th grade) they could move or stay. 
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not related to the parents attempting to find a better future, but it was more 
likely related to expulsion from schools in order to try to maintain certain 
standards (however this cannot be considered as certain, because maybe the 
students presented problems before the transfer). Nevertheless, the schools that 
improve their SIMCE (Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación or 
Education Quality Measurement System) results seem to have higher numbers of 
students leaving and those with a worse SIMCE performance attract most of the 
students who are moving. Therefore, school mobility may not be helping social 
cohesion (Zamora, 2011). 
 
1.4.3 Academic Standards and the Teacher’s Role 
 
Concerns may be raised about whether or not voucher school parents 
would get exactly what they want, which for supporters of the voucher system 
could be called an increase of the opportunity of choice. However, the expansion 
of choice could give parents too much control over education, which could create 
repercussions for all society (Neal, 2002). 
 
Competition to attract students should encourage teachers and 
administrators to do anything to make parents and students happy, i.e. reducing 
academic standards and discipline. Teachers are discouraged to give low grades 
that would upset parents and, especially in poorer areas, schools would start 
taking a charitable role rather than focus on consistency between the learning 
level of students and their marks and their level of education. In some schools, 
the decision to offer extracurricular activities rather than adjusting the 
curriculum in order to attract children, could cause teachers to become more 
overloaded and reduce the time that they can dedicate towards preparing their 
classes, which could be even more important in poorer schools where the 
conditions of working might be less than ideal (Carnoy, 1997). 
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Moreover, there is no real communication channels where the parents can 
explicitly point out what they think about the school, and if they are not 
satisfied, the only way to show that is by removing the students from the school. 
In that case, the school would never know the truth and would probably assume 
that they simply moved to another city, for example. 
 
This research was born with the idea that the Chilean educational system 
could be provoking deep changes and damage to the level of opportunities given 
to new generations. The following sections present more clearly the motivation 
and main aims. 
 
1.5 Structure and Contents of Thesis 
 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: Does Education Change People's Economic Destiny? 
Intergenerational Mobility in Chile 
 
There is a general agreement that social mobility in terms of income is 
mostly driven by education, but there is not much empirical evidence on this 
issue. Increasing opportunities in terms of education should be reflected by an 
increase of opportunities in the labour market, followed by an increase of 
mobility in terms of earnings in society, and in particular, a decrease of 
dependence between the parents’ and children’s income. The mechanism of 
transmission of the dependence between children in educational level or 
schooling on the education of their parents is generally given by better educated 
parents. They can help their children in terms of homework or advice for 
important decisions as better educated parents can give more value to investing 
in the education of their offspring. But also, education of parents possibly 
changes the bargaining power in the household, and the mother can be very 
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important in order to invest more in children’s human capital23. Therefore, taking 
into account that education is considered an important transmission mechanism 
of intergenerational income mobility, it should be appropriate to analyse 
intergenerational educational mobility more closely, by itself.  
 
This chapter analyses one of the main concerns and challenges of modern 
society which is the level of equality of opportunity members of populations can 
enjoy. That becomes particularly important in societies where there is high 
income inequality as in Chile because if it experiences a high level of fluidity in 
income distribution, the hope of members of the next generation of families 
becoming better off will encourage people to exert their efforts in terms of 
investment in human capital, making the whole economy more productive. The 
main aim for this chapter is to measure the level of intergenerational earnings 
and educational mobility, trying to establish the level of dependency between 
individuals and their parent’s earnings and years of schooling, using the Cross-
sectional CASEN survey (National Socio-economic Characterisation Survey) of 
1990 and 2009 and the Two-Sample Two-Stages Least Squares technique 
(TS2SLS). 
 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: Does the Increase in Educational Provision and 
Competition between Schools Increase the Quality of the Service? The 
Role of the 1980s Educational Reform in Chile 
 
The question of how the market of education should operate has been 
hotly debated, in many cases with decisions being taken based upon uninformed 
politics and markedly influenced by preconceived ideas based, most of the time 
                                                          
23In this discussion, intra-household allocation theories play an important role, see for example: 
Haddad and Kanbur (1990), Folbre (1984) and Thomas (1999). 
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on ideological foundations. Quality of education, competition between schools, 
integration, subsidies and potential reproduction of inequality at first seems 
complicated to study mainly because it includes many variables, including for 
example local segregation and lack of motivation of families to invest due to fear 
that it will not lead to a return on the investment they would have to make in 
education (Andersen, 2001). If students from poorer backgrounds invest less in 
education, education does not immediately become a good channel to reduce 
inequality and to promote social mobility and educational achievement of 
students and their eventual labour market success will be strongly determined 
by the background of their parents, their social class, ethnicity and residential 
stratification. 
 
The most recent reforms of educational systems have focused on the idea 
that privatisation and decentralisation generate higher competition among 
schools, thereby improving the quality of service that they provide. Schools 
would compete for students to get public funding and that would produce a more 
efficient use of resources and would give them the incentive to improve and to 
innovate. However, it has been claimed that competition can have an effect on 
the level of social segregation as many other concerns may arise, in particular, 
lack of information for poorer families when they choose between schools; thus 
generating a negative effect to the more general idea of giving educational 
opportunities to children. This chapter investigates the effect of the Chilean 
voucher system, implemented during the 1980s educational reform, in terms of 
giving all pupils (independent of their socioeconomic condition) similar 
opportunities to face the future, understanding it as the quality of education that 
they receive. In this respect, Núñez and Gutierrez (2004) conclude that the 
individual’s socioeconomic background, can be an important factor in the 
determination of earnings in the labour market and that this effect on earnings is 
more important than academic performance and that can be a consequence, 
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among other things, of Chile’s school system which is highly segregated (the 
majority of public schools enrol mostly lower-income students while voucher 
schools are attended by mostly well-off students). In addition, high levels of 
segregation can have a negative impact on the cognitive and non-cognitive 
(behavioural) outcome of students, especially the disadvantaged. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the effect of spatial school 
competition on the quality of education that shools provide, trying to discover if 
voucher schools benefit or harm the Chilean educational system, in particular in 
terms of social segregation. The data utilised for this analysis is based on the 
SIMCE of year 2005 and 2009, but other data sets have also been included in 
order to obtain the exact geographic location of schools, characteristics of 
schools and their pupils, and characteristics of municipalities where schools are 
located among others. 
 
1.5.3 Chapter 4: Is Assortative Mating a Limitation for Intergenerational 
Mobility? The Role of the Chilean Privatisation Educational Reform 
 
It has been suggested that the level of economic mobility in a society 
depends, among other things, on the nature of marriages as, when people get 
married to others that are part of their same social class or economic condition, 
the phenomenon of assortative mating arises, limiting the social flux in society. 
This would be particularly important in Latin-American countries where the 
correlation between the education of spouses seems to be higher than in other 
societies (Weil, 2005) and where on top of that, high income inequality 
exacerbates the problem, which could also be the case in Chile. It is believed 
that the level of educational assortative mating among Chilean couples has been 
modified by the 1980’s educational reform, as it encourages that pupils from 
poorer backgrounds attend public schools and richer children attend voucher 
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schools, segregating the future generations according to their social class and 
limiting opportunities for individuals to have a better life when adults. 
 
This chapter analyses the effects of assortative mating on the level of 
intergenerational earnings dependency in the context of the Chilean educational 
reform implemented in the 1980s. Firstly, a simple theoretical model is 
presented where the main aim is to express the intergenerational earnings level 
as a function of educational assortative mating among other things. Secondly, 
the impact of assortative mating in terms of years of schooling on the levels of 
intergenerational earnings dependency is measured. The aim is to try to show 
how important assortative mating can be in order to promote or limit social 
mobility in the country. The data used is the Cross-sectional CASEN survey of 
1990 and 2009. This data set is the same utilised in chapter 2 of this research. 
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2 Does Education Change People's Economic Destiny? Intergenerational 
Mobility in Chile 
 
2.1 Summary 
 
 Education is claimed to be the most influential mechanism involved in the 
process of intergenerational income (but in fact very little evidence has 
been found). 
 Perhaps intergenerational mobility in education is not being reflected in 
the level of intergenerational income mobility in a determined society 
(Fischer, 2009). 
 Most studies on intergenerational mobility in industrialised countries focus 
on income; in developing nations the focus is on education due to lack of 
data availability. 
 Chile has cross-sectional data sets which are widely used to generate and 
to implement social policies in the country (CASEN data set). They 
provide information about individuals and their children, but when the 
latter are too young to be part of the labour market or achieve their 
maximum level of education. Therefore, it is not possible to analyse the 
effect of parents on their children’s earnings or education using the data 
as it is. 
 In 2009, the CASEN data set include questions related to age, education 
and occupation of parents of individuals when individuals were 15 years 
old. This allows for the use of the Two Samples Two Stages Least Squares 
(TS2SLS) econometric technique, which can be used to predict income of 
parents uses a totally independent (but representative) cross-sectional 
data set and using the information given by individuals about their 
parents. 
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 It is found that income intergenerational mobility is higher than 
educational intergenerational mobility. This is the opposite to what was 
expected.  
 The results also show that richer children seem to enjoy a higher 
transmission of income from their fathers than poor children. The 
opposite happens in terms of education. 
 
2.2 Introduction  
 
Inequality is one of the most widely studied social and economic 
concerns. Mostly this has been driven by the idea that a high dispersion of 
income can be a symptom of a society that suffers a lack of opportunities in 
terms of education or employment. For decades, inequality was measured and 
analysed through different lenses, but without considerations related to the flux, 
in terms of socioeconomic position, that individuals or families experience over 
time. This phenomenon was left out because it was thought that the 
transmission between economic conditions was a stochastic process mostly 
explained by luck and individual abilities (Becker and Tomes, 1976). 
 
More recently, it has come to be accepted that social mobility and in 
particular intergenerational social mobility would depend on luck, but also other 
factors such as the level of inheritability of endowment from parents to children, 
the level of altruism of parents (propensity to invest in children’s education), the 
rate of economic growth, taxes and subsidies, discrimination and family’s 
connections or reputation among others. In addition, there is also a common 
agreement that living in a society with better levels of social mobility increases 
individual welfare (Fischer, 2009) and would involve a more efficient allocation of 
talents and skills.  
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In general, two main kinds of social mobility are identified, intra-
generational and inter-generational social mobility. For the former, the main 
interest is about following individuals over time, analysing their movement in 
terms of social or economic status. For this case, in particular when long-run 
panel data are not available, it is common to compare the mobility experienced 
by different cohorts of the population, such as women or people born in the 
same year, and observing their evolution over time. For the latter, the focus is 
on the transmission of social or economic status from one generation to the 
next, mainly focusing on the impact that parents’ background has on their 
children’s outcome.  
 
Earnings, educational and occupation are the most common types of 
parent/child relations analysed, such as father-son (the most common), mother-
daughter or any other combination thereof. In addition, analysis of siblings and 
twins is becoming popular as larger longitudinal data are available to analyse the 
differences between “nature” and “nurture” to determine socio-economical 
outcomes (see for example, Björklund et al., 2007). It is quite obvious that all 
the kinds of analyses mentioned above are probably related, but they do not 
measure the same thing. This research focuses on the analysis of 
intergenerational educational mobility and intergenerational income mobility. The 
former studies the impact of parents’ education and their children’s levels of 
education, the second corresponds to the study of the dependency of a child’s 
income on the parents’ income or earnings. 
 
Becker and Tomes (1976) were the first to formally describe the social 
mobility process in economic terms, which would be mainly driven by social 
organisations rather than by genetic endowment inheritance. Roemer (2004) 
complements this suggestion and points out that there are four transmission 
mechanisms of parents’ background to a child’s income: Social connection; 
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beliefs and skills, or family culture or investment; genetics and giving aspirations 
to children. He suggests that public investment in education should compensate 
the inequalities in terms of culture and investment. However, one of the main 
issues related to educational intergenerational transmission, is that as Behrman 
et al. (2001) state “distributing opportunity is not only to expand schooling, 
because other factors seem to play an important role in the transference of 
intergenerational economic and social status”. For example, better educated 
parents may put more pressure on children studying because they probably 
understand the benefits better, and also they probably provide more information 
to their children when they take their career decisions (Bjorklund and Salvanes, 
2010). Additionally, more educated parents will have better information about 
which schools are best to attend. Parents decide how much to invest in their 
children’s education considering the cost of education and the potential benefits. 
Therefore, the relationship between the schooling of parents and the schooling of 
children may also depend on the family size and the birth order of the children 
because they may not receive an equal proportion of the household income 
which is considered for education. Black et al. (2005) conclude that there is only 
a small causality of parents’ education over children’s education and that it is 
likely that the high correlation that is normally observed corresponds to family 
characteristics or inherited ability. On the other hand, Pronzato (2009) finds that 
the causality of parents’ education on children’s education is strong, independent 
of the countries analysed or the sample selection or the control variables used. 
However, when he includes ability or other unobserved characteristics as control 
variables, the results differed, finding that the fathers’ education has a positive 
influence but not mother’s education and in some cases the opposite results 
have been found. 
 
In general, the intergenerational income mobility cross-country studies 
have been on industrialised countries focusing on the earnings aspect of 
53 
 
mobility. i.e. USA and Germany (Couch and Dunn, 1997), USA and Sweden 
(Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997), Norway, Finland and Sweden (Bjorklund et al., 
2004) and Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA (Jantti et 
al., 2006). Those countries that had parents-children data allowed researchers to 
evaluate the situation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods to measure 
the impact of parents’ background on children’s outcome. However, as will be 
explained in more detail in the following sections, the main problem with 
measures of earnings social mobility at the beginning was caused by the use of 
only 1 year of income as representative of permanent earnings, which would 
cause downward bias in the estimation. 
 
Contrary to that, the majority of developing countries consider only 
information about educational social mobility with the idea that children with less 
educated parents, in general, are also less educated, therefore education of 
parents should be considered one of the most relevant factors that influence the 
level of education achieved by children (Piopiunik, 2011). The focus on education 
in developing countries, instead of on earnings, has been because there is far 
less information regarding earnings social mobility. However, during recent years 
there have been attempts to change this situation especially using new 
econometric techniques and new available data. Some of them have cross-
sectional data sets that include questions about parents, such as age, education 
or occupation, but not earnings. Therefore an innovative approach was 
proposed, the Two Sample 2 Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS) technique. This 
basically allows the use of 2 independent surveys. In the first stage, the parent’s 
earnings are estimated using the older survey, while in the second stage, the 
coefficient from in the first stage are used to predict the earnings of parents 
using the information on their characteristics reported by their children. 
Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) were the first to apply the TS2SLS for the case of 
intergenerational earnings mobility, in their highly cited work; they suggest that 
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the economic background is more important to determine the earnings of people 
in the USA than in Sweden.  
 
For the Chilean case, there have been some attempts to analyse the 
levels of intergenerational earnings and educational mobility. In this context, 
Nuñez and Riesco (2004) conclude that Chile presents less earnings mobility in 
comparison with other countries (finding 0.55 intergenerational earnings 
dependency). This situation has added to the high levels of income inequality in 
the country. Additionally, it is claimed that there has been a decrease in earnings 
dependency over time, which could be explained by the expansion of the 
educational system. The main issue with this research is that it uses only a Great 
Santiago area survey which can produce a homogenous sample, and therefore a 
biased estimation (Solon, 1989). Additionally, the significance of their results is 
not presented and when they use the TS2SLS technique, they only use schooling 
of parents as the instrumental variable. This study is followed by other two 
studies mentioned by Nuñez and Miranda (2011), but which are not found online 
and/or are available for other researches, these studies according to the author 
mentioned above found values of intergenerational earnings dependency of: 
0.58 for the Greater Santiago and 0.67 for the Greater Santiago urban 
population both using schooling to predict father’s earnings and 0.74  and 0.57 
using nationwide data (using schooling and schooling and occupation for 
predicting father’s earnings respectively).  
 
Nuñez and Miranda (2011) also present their own results of 
intergenerational earnings mobility for the Greater Santiago region, considering 
as predictors parents’ schooling and occupation, obtaining a similar elasticity to 
the previous papers (0.52-0.54). They additionally calculate the schooling 
elasticity, getting values around 0.20. In addition, they do not calculate both 
elasticities in a way that they can be compared (by standardising them). Finally, 
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they measure intergenerational mobility using quantile transitions matrices over 
a log-linear regression model. Also, for the Chilean case, Nuñez and Tartakowsky 
(2009) analyse the relationship between inequality of incomes and inequality of 
opportunities concluding that income inequality indicators can be misleading for 
measuring the level of inequality of opportunities in a country. In addition, 
Contreras et al. (2008) researched the determinants of low intergenerational 
income mobility in Chile, concluding that the main ones are the access to quality 
education and access to skill accumulation. 
 
The interest of this research area is driven by the desire to support the 
idea that if the earnings capacity of children is determined to a large extent by 
the background of their parents, then the allocation of resources and talent in a 
society would be inefficient, leading to a less than optimum productivity for the 
entire economy. Hence, the aims are to measure and compare intergenerational 
(mainly Father-Son) earnings and education dependency levels and to 
understand how important education is as a transmission mechanism to 
encourage equality of opportunity in Chile. This choice was made considering 
that, at least in Chile, male individuals are usually the main earners in the 
household. On the other hand, other possible combinations that could be used to 
measure the intergenerational earnings/schooling dependency have been 
considered, for example, Mother and Daughter relationships, which are 
presented in the appendix of this chapter. 
 
This research will contribute to the current literature including nationwide 
data rather than only from the Metropolitan Region of Chile (which has already 
been done in the previous studies mentioned above), it will use occupation, 
schooling and age simultaneously as predictors of father’s earnings and it will 
compare the levels of earnings and schooling mobility, measures that have been 
analysed in isolation by previous studies. In addition, it is of interest to analyse 
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how intergenerational mobility can differ in magnitude with the socioeconomic 
status of families, therefore quantile estimation are included. Section 3 of this 
chapter will present a brief analysis of how intergenerational earnings and 
educational dependency is modelled, following by Section 4 where some issues 
related to the role played by age of individuals, in order to calculate a credible 
measure of intergenerational mobility is presented. Section 5 includes the data 
used description and section 6 the methodology utilised. Finally, in section 7 the 
results are analysed and discusses and in section 8 the conclusion are presented. 
 
2.3 Modelling Intergenerational Income and EducationDependency 
 
The intergenerational income elasticity is considered one of the best ways 
to represent the level of equality in opportunities in a country (Ichino et al., 
2010). In most of the research, the baseline model is the one suggested by 
Becker and Tomes (1976), which has alsobeen modified and reformulated by for 
example, Mulligan (1997), Solon (2004) and Holter (2011) among others. 
 
Basically, all these models involve a very simple linear relationship, 
between children’s earnings and parent’s earnings: 
 
(1)     
              
           
 
Where     
      represents the natural log of the permanent earnings of 
the child i and      
           represents the natural log of parents’ permanent 
earnings of child i. Hence    corresponds to the average earnings elasticity of 
children’s earnings in relation to their parents’ earnings. Finally,    corresponds 
to the error term, therefore to the unobserved factors that affect the child's 
outcomes but which are assumed not directly related with parent’s earnings.  
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The use of earnings rather than total income is considered more 
appropriate in the analysis,as receiving inheritance is not really opposed to 
openness in terms of mobility or meritocracy in society (Vogel, 2006). If other 
types of income, for example physical capital or income from rent, are included, 
for measuring intergenerational income mobility, this would make sense if this 
capital is inherited, but there would be a double counting if it is a consequence of 
the people’s own savings (Bjorklund, 1993). In any case, the proportion of 
income that is represented by earnings is high (95% on average for the Chilean 
case), suggesting that only a small proportion is due to other kinds of incomes 
as rents.  
 
In terms of interpretation,   corresponds to the intergenerational 
elasticity, measuring the % differential in sons’ expected earnings with respect 
to a marginal percentage differential in the earningss of fathers (Bjorklund et al., 
2008). Therefore, if the intergenerational earnings elasticity is equal to 0.30, 
then for an increase of 1% in the father’s earnings, this will indicate that on 
average the child’s earnings will be 0.30% larger when he becomes an adult just 
due to the fact that his father was richer. This intergenerational earnings 
elasticity will increase according to Solon (2004) when genetic transmission of 
ability between parents and children increases, when human capital productivity 
is higher, when earnings returns to human capital are larger and when public 
investment is less progressive. The different levels of intergenerational mobility 
across countries could therefore be given for different values of the parameters 
before mentioned24. 
 
                                                          
24
 Although, Solon (2004) has states himself that these could be only some of the factors that have 
an effect on intergenerational earnings dependency. 
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The case of  =0 corresponds to a society with perfect mobility, as there 
would not be dependency between children’s earnings and their parents’ 
earnings. On the other hand,     corresponds to the case of perfect immobility 
as earnings of children will depend totally upon their parents’ earnings. 
Normally,   takes values between 0 and 1. However, in mathematical terms it is 
also possible to get  >1. As Mulligan (pp. 24-25, 1997) states “  can also be 
larger than one if parental income differences (in % terms) are associated with 
even larger income differences among children. Although   could conceivably be 
any real number, the vast majority of empirical estimates of    are actually 
between 0 and 1. Therefore, it is common to refer to the quantity (1 –  ) as the 
degree of intergenerational mobility.” 
 
The simple model above (in equation (1)) has also been adapted by 
controlling for other variables that could affect the income of children. Gibbons 
(2010) explains that to control for life-cycle effects, the age of parents (and age 
squared) are used, and in some cases when the variation in age of children is 
very large, controlling for the child’s age is also convenient. Normally studies use 
Least Squares estimation of log linear earnings of sons against parents 
controlling for the age of both generations (Solon, 2002). To control for other 
variables, such as children’s education which is also related to parents’ earnings, 
would be useful only if it were a goal to know how much these factors are 
affected by the parents’ earnings (Gibbons, 2010). 
 
The model can then be presented in the following form: 
 
(2)        
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Additionally, the intergenerational comparison between years of schooling 
or levels of education has also been used as an indicator of social mobility in a 
society, and in many developing countries this has been the unique way that it 
has been done, in particular because of the lack of income data availability. 
Years of schooling is generally used to see the relationship between parents and 
children in a similar way that earnings relationships are formulated, but 
replacing earnings by schooling (S) gives: 
 
(3)   
            
                     
 
In terms of control variables, Holmlund et al. (2008) point out that one of 
the reasons to include the age of parents in the intergenerational education 
regression is that the number of people studying higher levels of education has 
been increasing over time. This consideration has been taken into account by the 
majority of research. On the other hand, the age of parents may not be included 
in the intergenerational education regression because more schooled (potential) 
mothers are more likely to postpone motherhood. In addition, there is no 
agreement whether the mother’s level of education should be a control variable 
in the regression of father and child education. If it is not used, the estimation of 
fathers’ schooling effect will contain the direct influence of the father and the 
indirect effect of the mothers’ schooling (Piopiunik, 2011).  
 
2.4 Problems Associated with measuring Intergenerational Mobility 
 
Age of individuals and their parents seems to be crucial in order to 
estimate the “true value” of social openness. The main problem is that it would 
be interesting to measure the level of earnings transmission of permanent 
earnings between individuals and their parents, but to obtain permanent 
earnings figures is not possible, because it would be necessary to know every 
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shock affecting individuals that could increase or decreases their earnings in a 
transitory way. Therefore, if permanent earnings are not identified at the most 
accurate possible level, intergenerational earnings transmission estimation can 
be downward biased (Solon, 1989). For example, Solon (1992) shows that the 
use of only one or a few years of earnings as a proxy for permanent earnings 
can make a big difference in terms of measuring the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity. In particular, for the case of the United States, he shows that when 
more years are averaged to estimate the “permanent” earnings of parents, the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity goes from 0.2 (when a single year is used) 
to around 0.40 when 5 years are used to calculate it using OLS techniques, a 
result that is confirmed by Zimmerman (1992) using another data set.  
 
The solution could then be to use instruments that allow prediction of the 
permanent earnings of parents instead of using limited numbers of years by 
applying OLS. For example, education could be considered as an instrument for 
permanent earnings (Dunn, 2007). In particular, years of schooling could be a 
good candidate (Solon, 1992). Occupation could be another instrument that 
allows researchers to predict permanent future earnings as suggested by Fortin 
and Lefbvre (1998) and Checchi (1997). However, the father’s occupation and 
education (which vary less through the life cycle and will better represent 
permanent earnings) are not only correlated with the father’s earnings, but can 
also be a predictor of children’s earnings. 
 
The education of parents has two effects on a child’s earnings: it 
increases their educational level (they can help them with their school 
homework) which is a direct effect, and it affects the father’s earnings which in 
turn impacts the children’s earnings. Thus, if parents’ education and occupation 
are used only to predict parents’ permanent earnings in the first stage, this will 
cause an upward inconsistency in the instrumental variable (IV) estimator. 
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Therefore, using IV or two stage estimations or considering education, 
occupation or social class to predict fathers’ earnings, generates an upward bias 
because father’s education, occupation and social class are not only correlated 
with the father’s earnings, but also might be positive predictors of the son’s 
earning even after conditioning on father’s long-run earnings. Thus, the solution 
could be to control for these factors as separate explanatory exogenous variables 
(Solon, 1992). However, that would take away the effect of parents’ 
earningsover controlling for the aim ofmeassuring the level of intergenerational 
earningselasticity. On the other hand, it is possible to use the OLS estimation 
based on current earnings as the lower bound of the true intergenerational 
earnings dependency level and the IV estimation as the upper bound (Blanden 
and Machin, 2007) believing that the true value should be among these two 
extremes. When the father’s earning are predicted using information from 
another data set, the estimator will be also have upward bias in the same way as 
a common IV estimator, and the size of the bias will depend on how much the 
earnings of the children are influenced by the factors that were used to predict 
the father’s earnings. Therefore, life cycle earnings are very important in terms 
of arriving at the correct earnings elasticity calculation. In particular, the age of 
son and parents can impact largely on the intergenerational elasticity that is 
calculated. Grawe (2006) explains that the average fathers’ age is negatively 
correlated with the level of earning persistence estimated (then positively 
correlated with the level of intergenerational earning mobility).  
 
Therefore, if the age at which fathers are observed increases (holding the 
age at which sons are observed constant) the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity would decrease due to larger variation in earnings observed for the 
older fathers and the same variation in earnings for the sons who were left 
unchanged would need to be explained. This is supported by Bjorklund (1993) 
who finds that earnings are more correlated with permanent earnings later in life 
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and that earning mobility decreases with the father’s age. The opposite would 
happen if the son’s age increases (leaving fathers’ earnings constant): An 
increase in sons’ age would increase the intergenerational earnings elasticity due 
to the fact that there is more variation in earnings observed across the older 
sons that can be related to the unchanged variation in earnings across fathers. 
Hence, comparing two data sets where both fathers and sons are younger than 
another one, the direction of the bias cannot be determined in a straight forward 
way and there are two opposite effects playing a role. That would potentially 
explain the variation among different researches that use samples with different 
ages.  
 
In addition, Haider and Solon (2006) point out that intergenerational 
earnings mobility literature often pays attention to the right-side measurement 
error. However, it has ignored the problems associated with permanent 
earnings. This has likely been produced by the idea that measurement error in 
the dependent variable does not affect the consistency of the estimator which 
according to Haider and Solon would be the case if sons’ earnings were observed 
when they are between their early thirties and mid-forties, rather than in their 
earlier years as in many studies. This kind of measurement error is commonly 
known as ‘mean reverting’ because even though the earnings could be high in 
the early stages they would converge to their long-run mean.  Solon (2002) 
explains that young sons that have a high socioeconomic level have a more rapid 
growth in earnings than the ones that will be poorer in the future.  
 
So, for those that would have high permanent earnings, when they are 
young the current earnings are lower compared to their permanent earnings. On 
the other hand for those that will have lower permanent earnings; their younger 
earnings will be relatively higher in comparison with their permanent earnings. 
Thus, this kind of error is associated with a bias in the estimation and the 
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direction will be determined by the age at which earnings are observed. A 
tentative solution for this problem would be to use the latest earnings figures 
available or to average earnings over time. However, if the average is done on 
too early years, then the problem mentioned above will become worse.  
 
Therefore, father-age dependency might be very important in explaining 
the differences in results from similar data sets. So the question of who is right 
is impossible to answer as it is impossible to obtain the real permanent earnings 
of an individual. However, it is possible to try to be closer to the best answer, 
which includes the use of the mid-life year (studies considering parents in their 
forties and children in their late twenties and early thirties would be more 
accurate) for parents and children considering similar ages for both of them. 
However, normally surveys contain younger children, so it is likely that there 
would be an underestimation of the intergenerational earning elasticity. The 
decisions in relation to issues mentioned above makes international comparisons 
more difficult. Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) propose that children’s surveys 
should only consider people between 30 to 40 years old and in the case of the 
parents they should be between 25 and 30 years old when their children were 
born. On the other hand, Haider and Solon (2006) explain that to have a sample 
with young children and old parents creates a noticeable downward bias but to 
use a subgroup of the sample, for example, to consider parents and children with 
a range of age between 30 and 40 years old, causes a downward bias due to 
homogeneity in the sample selection. In particular, using a small sample 
increases the error in the bias estimation of variables. Therefore, the best 
solution would be to control by age and age squared of both parents if parent’s 
and child’s earnings are observed at different periods of time (Comi, 2004). 
Finally, Comi (2004) criticises the way that permanent earningsare calculated in 
some research, keeping only fathers and sons who are continuously observed to 
be employed, in this way fathers and sons with zero earnings are removed from 
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the sample. However, excluding these data will increase the average earnings of 
the whole sample. Therefore selection bias will be included, in particular, if 
unemployment is a national phenomenon. 
 
2.5 Data 
 
This research uses two Chilean data sets: the cross-sectional National 
Characterisation Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) of 1990 and 2009. They are 
nationally representative surveys (rural and urban areas in the country’s 15 
regions) collected by the Ministry of Social Development (Chilean government) 
and used as the main data sources to design and evaluate social policies in the 
country. The 2009 survey is particularly interesting because it asked individuals 
information for when they were 15 years old about their parents. This included 
information about education, occupation and age (but not earnings). Therefore, 
the survey in 1990 will be used as the ‘synthetic parents’ sample’ which has 
information about parent’s education, occupation, age and also earnings and 
they will be linked (in a process that will be explained in the methodology 
section) to the information that children in 2009 gave about their own real 
parents. 
 
Only individuals that have information (about education, occupation 
status and age) of their parents have been used to predict their earnings and 
used to evaluate their impact on children’s earnings25. In addition, as will be 
explained later in more detail, parents in the first survey (1990) should be 
representative of the parents that children report in 2009, in terms of age, 
occupation category and educational level. In particular, as mentioned in the 
                                                          
25
 Notice that the concept of earnings used corresponds to the one after tax reductions. 
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previous section, the age of parents and children is very important to avoid bias 
in the estimation of intergenerational mobility.  
 
Therefore, it was considered that individuals in the parents’ survey should 
be between 25 to 65 years old for males and between 25 and 60 years old for 
females, this taking account that university degrees take between 5 to 6 years to 
complete after secondary school which finishes around the age of 18 and that 
the age of retirement is 65 and 60 years old for male and female respectively. In 
Table 2.1 the figures for both samples are presented comparing them in the year 
2009 for the case of fathers-sons relationship (adding 19 years to the figures 
obtained with the 1990 survey). So, the minimum age in 1990 was 25 years old 
as mentioned before, but adding 19 years corresponds to 44 years old, the 
maximum was 65 plus 19 years is 84 years old, giving an average of 59.7 years 
old which is congruent with the age of fathers reported by their sons in 2009 
(average of 60.27). For fathers’ average age, this match was achieved by 
contracting the sample of sons by the age of their fathers, being between 44 and 
68 years old instead of the 44 and 84 years old available in the data set, 
resulting also in a contraction in the age of sons in 2009 to 56 (compared to 65 
that was initially attempted). 
 
Table 2.1: Father’s Age in 2009 (reported) versus 1990 
Age of Father in 2009 
2009 (reported by sons):  t=0 1990 (synthetic fathers):  t1=t+19 
Mean Age 60.27 Mean  Age 59.7 
Min Age 44 Min Age 44 
Max Age 68 Max Age 84 
St Dev.26 5.8 St Dev. 11.45 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
                                                          
26 The smaller standard deviation for the reported information in 2009 will decrease the variance of 
the father’s earnings in the second stage estimation. Therefore, it will increase the standard errors of 
the intergenerational earnings coefficient  which will only reduce the significance of the estimation. It 
therefore cannot cause spurious significant effects. 
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The child’s age is also important, and it should also be congruent with the 
age of their parents. Table 2.2 shows that the average age of sons in the 2009 
sample was 34.97 years old; this figure should be congruent with the expected 
average age of sons if fathers in the 1990 sample are considered. That is, if the 
synthetic fathers in 2009 (the ones obtained using the sample 1990 lagged 19 
years) were on average 59.7 years old, they were born in 2009-59.7=1949 and 
it is supposed that they have a child at the age of 25 years old (which also was 
checked as the most popular age on average to have children in the survey) 
then, the sons were born on average around 1949+25=1974. Therefore, sons in 
the year 2009 would be 2009-1974=35 years old, which is also the average age 
of children in the 2009 data set (34.97). 
 
Table 2.2: Son’s Age 
Son’s Age in 2009 
Mean 34.97 
Min 25 
Max 56 
St Dev. 6.1 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
Graphically, this relationship between the parent’s and child’s age can be 
understood using a time line: 
 
Figure 2.1 Time Line 
Father’s age =0          Father’s age=25    Father’s age=41    Father’s age= 60 
                                 Sons’ Age=0         Sons’ age=16       Son’s age=35 
                    + 25 years 
 
          1949                       1974                   1990                    2009 
 (Fathers are born)    (Sons are born) 
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In terms of levels of education, the figures are similar (except on the 
percentage of people holding primary education and the ones having no degree).  
 
Table 2.3: % Level of Education (Congruency) 
2009 (reported by sons) 1990 (synthetic fathers) 
Education % Education % 
Nursery 0 Nursery 0 
Primary ( < 1965) 22.09 Primary ( <1965) 23.55 
Primary ( > 1965) 31.76 Primary ( > 1965) 14.62 
Secondary ( < 1965) 11.54 Secondary 20.38 
Secondary ( > 1965) 11.35     
Technical Secondary (< 1965) 3.55 Technical Secondary 5.35 
Technical Secondary (> 1965) 2.06     
Professional Technician 
Professional Institute 
0.87 
0.67 
Professional Technician 
& Institute 
1.8 
 
University 4.04 University 6.31 
None 12.06 None 27.97 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
In addition, to compare years of schooling of fathers reported by their 
sons and the synthetic fathers is necessary to convert the maximum level of 
education (reported by sons) into years of schooling using a direct assignation. 
This is necessary as the information about parents’ education in the 2009 survey 
only contain details of levels of education and not years of schooling. The 
assignation procedure is described below: 
 
Maximum level of education (converted to number of years of schooling): 
 
 0 years if father has no education as maximum level of education.27 
 6 years if father has primary education (and finished before the 
reform in 1965 was implemented
28
). 
                                                          
27
 Zero years of schooling helps to represent individuals that do not hold any certificate, in terms of 
education. 
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 8 years if father has primary education (and finished after the reform 
in 1965 was implemented). 
 12 years if father has secondary (or technical secondary) education. 
 16 years if father has professional technical education. 
 18 years if father has university education. 
 
In order to compare both surveys in terms of years of schooling, the 
conversion explained above is imperative, and is presented in Table 2.4 below: 
 
Table 2.4: Years of Education (Congruency): Direct Assignation
29
 
Year 2009 1990 
Schooling (number of years) Assigned Actual 
Mean 8.25 8.56 
Min 0 0 
Max 18 19 
St Dev. 4.24 4.51 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Comparing the results of this direct assignation approach, they are very 
similar to the actual values obtained in the 1990 survey, therefore both surveys 
would be compatible at least in terms of fathers’ years of schooling.  In addition 
and as a check, levels of education for fathers in 2009 were converted to years 
of schooling using a different procedure. An estimation of years of schooling 
using the levels of education as predictors was performed using the 1990 sample 
(where years of schooling are available for the individuals). Therefore, using the 
sample 1990, years of schooling were predicted for each level of education of 
individuals (First Stage), after that, using the regression coefficient obtained, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
28
 The Educational reform of 1965 basically changed the number of years of schooling in primary 
education. Before the reform, primary education included 6 years of study, after that year, there was 
an increase in the number of years to 8 and the number of years of secondary school was reduced 
from 6 to 4, maintaining, if primary and secondary education are considered, the total number of 
years is the same. 
29
 See Appendix 2A1. for Mother-Daughter details (Table 2A1.1 to Table 2A1.6). 
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educational level of fathers in year 2009 (reported by their sons) were predicted 
(Second Stage): 
 
Using the 1990 sample: Years of schooling= Ω0 + Ω1PrimarybeforeReform + 
Ω2PrimaryafterReform + Ω3Secondary (or Technical_Secondary) + 
Ω4Professional_Technical + Ω5University 
 
Considering this second approach the results presented in Table 2.5 are 
less consistent than the results obtained using direct assignation approach. 
 
Table 2.5: Years of Education (Congruency): Predicted Values 
Year 2009 1990 
Schooling(number of years) Estimated Actual 
Mean 10.98 8.56 
Min 4.15 0 
Max 17.22 19 
St Dev. 3.48 4.51 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
In terms of occupation, the main difference is in the percentage of people 
that are not of the working population. However, when they are excluded, the 
occupational categories are very similar in terms of proportion. Notice that 
‘without payment’ represents some workers who even though they work, do not 
receive a formal salary as they work in family businesses (see Table 2.6). 
 
Table 2.6: % Occupation (Congruency) 
2009 (reported by sons) 1990 (potential fathers) 
Education % Education % 
Employer 3.44 Employer 3.33 
Self-Employed 24.79 Self-Employed 25.9 
Employee 69.35 Employee 68.7 
Navy &Military &Police 2.28 Navy & Military& Police 1.26 
Housekeeping 0.13 Housekeeping (inside) 0.04 
    Housekeeping (outside) 0.1 
 
  Without payment 0.65 
Total 100 Total 100 
Not Working 0.65 Not Working 15 
   Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Normally, due to measurement error, particularly for reported earnings, 
self-employment is not considered in other similar research. However due to the 
large proportion of self-employment in Chile (23%), these individuals were 
considered in this research. 
  
Using the samples mentioned above, in total it is possible to find 6,983 
Father-Son pairs and 7,352 Mother-Daughter pairs. Some additional descriptive 
statistics are presented in the following in Table 2.7 and 2.8: 
 
Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics 
Father(1990)_Son(2009) 
1990 2009 
Fathers Sons 
Avg. Number of children in the household (St.Dev.) 2.1(1.5) 1.6 (1.1) 
% Rural 29.8% 33.0% 
Avg. Number years of Schooling 8.6 (4.5) 10.9 (3.4) 
% Married 70.6% 57.9% 
Proportion richest and poorest decile of income30 27.2 15.2 
Avg. Number people in the household (St.Dev.) 4.65(2.05) 4.14 (1.66) 
% Illiteracy 5.87% 1.70% 
    Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 2.8: Sample Sizes with Information on Occupation, Education and Age 
of Fathers (Mothers) 
Sub-Sample size 
Number of Father_Son Pairs 6,983 
Number of Mother_Son Pairs 6,397 
Number of Mother_Daughter Pairs 7,397 
                      Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Average Income 10th income decile /Average Income 1st income decile. 
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2.6 Methodology 
 
2.6.1 Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares 
 
As mentioned before, the 2009 CASEN survey does not provide 
information regarding the income of parents, but it does about their educational 
levels (but not years of schooling), occupation and age. On the other hand, the 
1990 survey which is totally independent to the survey in 2009 contains 
information related to levels of education, occupation, age and income of the 
individuals that were interviewed. Therefore, the main idea is to connect these 
twosurveys using Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS),a 
methodology used by many empirical researchers following the Two Sample 
Instrumental Variable (TSIV) methodology originally proposed by Angrist and 
Krueger (1992) and Arellano and Meghir (1992) which required matrix 
manipulation being not so easily implemented using standard regression 
softwares. The main advantage of this technique is the possibility to use two 
independent surveys. The first one acts as the parents’ survey and the second as 
the children’s survey, children that report information about their parents.  
 
Following Angrist and Krueger (1995), the sample is divided into two half-
samples (S1 and S2) or two totally independent samples are used. Each sample 
consists of data matrices {Yj, Xj, Zj}, j=1,2. Y corresponds to the dependent 
variable, X includes the explanatory variables and Z includes the instrumental 
variables. Assume that the data matrices {Y1, X1, Z1} and matrices {Y2, X2, Z2} 
are jointly independent. 
 
In S2: X2 is the father’s earnings and Z2 corresponds to the vector of 
exogenous variables composed of education, occupation, age and age squared. 
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Hence, S2 is used to estimate the 1
st stage equation to predict father’s earnings, 
obtaining:  
 
  ̂         
    
    
 
The 1st stage parameters obtained (  ̂) are then used together with 
observations on Z1 (‘the instruments’ in S1, also occupation, education, age, and 
age2) to obtain fitted values for X1 (parent’s earnings) in S1. After that, Y1 
(child’s earnings) is regressed on these fitted values (and other exogenous 
regressors if required) using S1. Algebraically, the estimator corresponds to an 
OLS version of a model with predicted exogenous variable, X1: 
 
       ̂  (   ̂    ̂)
  
   ̂
 
   
 
Where    ̂      ̂           
    
   , the regressors obtained in the 1
st 
stage multiplied by the ‘instruments’ in S1. 
 
Therefore: 
 
       ̂                
              
    
    
                
         
 
In this way, the common problem of having information reported by 
children that does not include their parent’s earnings, but does have information 
about educational level or occupational categories, is solved. This is why the 
survey congruency explained in the previous section is important). 
 
It is important to consider that parents’ and children’searnings should be 
permanent, which are difficult to obtain. However, the use of education and 
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occupation as predictors of earnings31 allows us to think that they will give a 
closer estimation of permanent earnings as these factors do not vary so much 
over time. 
 
The father’s occupation is found in 6 occupational categories and 5 
dummy variables: ‘employee’ (the one which was excluded from the 
regressions), ‘employer’, ‘self-employed’, ‘navy’ (police or military), 
‘housekeeping’ and ‘not working’. It may seem strange to include the last 
category since one may suppose that the unemployed have no earnings. 
However, some of them present information for example self-production in small 
farms, which is considered as a kind of labour income by the survey. 
 
The father’s level of education is calculated in three ways. In the first 
alternative (Alt_1) 6 dummy variables are included to represent 7 different 
educational levels (maximum level of education achieved by the individual): 
Primary (before the 1965 educational reform), Primary (after the 1965 reform), 
Secondary, Secondary-Technical, Professional Technician, Without degree and 
University (where University was the variable excluded in the regression).  
 
Also a direct and an indirect conversion of the educational level 
information were made. Namely, the level of education of parents was 
transformed into number of years of schooling considering 8 years for primary 
school, 12 years for secondary, etc. as explained in the previous section which 
was called Alt_2_d, and also, using a schooling regression based on the level of 
education of individuals using the survey in 1990.  So, years of schooling were 
predicted using the different levels of education in the 1990 sample that was 
                                                          
31
 Earnings correspond to income from work in the last month after taxes. 
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called Alt_2_r. The same procedure was used to calculate mother-daughter 
relationships. 
 
To be clearer, the way in which parent’s earnings were calculated in the 
first stage is described below (all using robust standard errors): 
 
i) Parent’s permanent earnings calculated as: Yp=f(occupation, level of 
education, age, age2), (Alt_1). 
ii) Parent’s permanent earnings calculated as: Yp=f(occupation, years of 
schooling (derived directly from correspondent’s level of education32), 
age, age2), (Alt_2_d). 
iii) Parent’s permanent earnings calculated as: Yp= f(occupation, 
schooling (derived from regression of level of education), age, age2), 
(Alt_2_r) 
 
To calculate the levels of intergenerational educational dependency, 
information of schooling of individuals and their parents’ levels of education are 
found in the same survey (2009). Therefore, in a first instance, TS2LS 
estimation is not necessary as an OLS version will be able to give an estimation 
of how parental education influences children’s education. Therefore, the 
calculation follows: 
 
i) Parents’ education calculated as a series of dummy variables that 
correspond to the level of education of parents similar to Alt_1. 
 
                                                          
32
Since the 2009 survey does not contain this information about parents. 
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     ∑                             
 
 
 
The estimation of the son’s schooling is dependent on the level of 
education of his father distributed in six educational dummy variables and on the 
father’s occupational category, also distributed in six dummy variables. The 
difficulty with this idea of measuring education of fathers is the need of obtaining 
only one measurement of educational dependency and not six as would be 
obtained using this alternative. In particular, this is problem when the idea is to 
compare the intergenerational earnings elasticity measurements with the 
respective educational mobility measurements.  
 
Therefore, there are 2 alternative to solve this problem: To convert the 
parents’ educational level into years of schooling (considering for example that if 
an individual finished primary education they must have 8 years of education as 
was done to predict earnings) and then use simple OLS to contrast with 
individual’s schooling (ii). The second alternative is to use the TS2LS 
methodology to predict the years of schooling of parents, considering the 
information given in the 1990 data set (where educational level and years of 
schooling are found for each individual) (iii).  
 
ii) Parent’s education calculated as: Years of schooling derived directly 
from level of educational attainment. (Alt 2_d) 
iii) Parent’s education calculated as: Years of schooling derived from the 
regression of years of schooling in 1990. (Alt 2_r) 
 
To compare both education and earning mobility, the standardised 
coefficient of parent’s earnings (
i
) and parent’sschooling (
e
) and children’s 
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earnings (schooling) is calculated, adjusting the coefficients (β) by earnings 
(schooling) variance of both generations (Blanden, 2009): 
 
 
                                          or 
 
This conversion is useful asit allows comparison of the results obtained 
about education and earnings mobility as predictors and outcomes are 
standardised to have a standar deviation equal to one. Therefore, it is possible to 
interpret the standardised coefficients as the change in the outcome, in standard 
deviation units, due to a change in standard deviation units, in the predictors or 
regressors (full standardisation)
33
. 
 
Bootstrap34 standard errors (300 iterations) were applied in the second 
stage of the estimation for all the regressions utilised as they are more suitable 
when the distribution of one of the variables is not known as in this case, due to 
the prediction of parents’ permanent earnings35. It is important to note that the 
data potentially present heteroskedasticity problems which can be solved using 
robust standard errors (parametrically estimated). However, using bootstrapping 
                                                          
33 Using a standardised coefficient (also called full standardisation), both the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable are standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation of one. 
34 Bootstrapping is a general approach to statistical inference based on building a sampling 
distribution for a statistic by re-sampling the data. It is a non-parametric approach that is based on 
computational iteration rather than on mathematical analysis and the distributional assumptions of 
traditional parametric inference (Mooney, 1996). 
35 Inoue and Solon (2010) pointed out some confusion in the literature in terms of the standard 
errors associated with the TS2SLS and with the Two Sample Instrumental Variable originally 
developed by Angrist and Krueger (1992), the first should be corrected in order to be compared with 
the second, as they are not equivalent. 
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(non-parametrically estimated) also solves the problem and therefore is also 
considered robust. 
 
In addition to the OLS estimation using two independent samples, the 
analysis was extended using Quantile Regression (QR) to analyse the 
situationmore deeply. The details will follow in the next section. 
 
2.6.2 Quantile Regression 
 
It has been argued that the relationship between parents’ and children’s 
earnings is linear in the absence of obstacles to self-financing in investment in 
child human capital, but concave if poor families faces more borrowing 
constraints than richer families (Becker and Tomes, 1976). This fact would 
cause, as Grawe (2004) and Bratsberg (2006) explain, if poorer parents are 
constrained to finance the education of their children (likely due to a lack of 
access to credit markets), their children’s earnings to fall below the earnings of a 
non-constrained child who has the same ability. Therefore, it is expected that 
earnings mobility will be lower among low income families predicting a concave 
relationship (assuming that parental income is a good proxy for access to credit). 
Furthermore, if the functional form of the intergenerational earnings relationship 
varies across countries, then international comparisons can be misleading.  
 
Normally, all the studies that test nonlinearity do it in order to prove the 
concavity conjecture proposed by Becker and Tomes dividing the data set in 
percentiles of the distribution of parental earnings. Hertz (2008), for example, 
using U.S data, finds that β changes depending on which part of the income 
distribution is analysed, being very high for the poorest families and lower for 
the richest, mostly because poor families can be credit constrained to invest in 
their children’s education. On the other hand, some studies have challenged this 
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idea, finding a convex relationship. Bratsberg et al. (2006) show that applying 
log-linear relationships in the Nordic countries involves a serious specification 
error, because their patterns of social mobility (father-son earnings), are convex 
rather than linear. These nonlinear intergenerational earning mobility patterns 
were present in Denmark, Finland and Norway, being more mobile in the lower 
part of the earning distribution, in contrast with the UK and US. However, the 
authors utilise a polynomial approach, in terms of the more traditional quantile 
regression analysis. These approaches differ as the quantile analysis focuses on 
the distribution of the dependent variable (son’s earnings). On the other hand, 
the polynomial analysis faces the non-linearity of intergenerational earnings 
dependency, focusing on the distribution of the independent variable (father’s 
earnings). 
 
Corak and Heisz (1998), using quantile regression, find a S-shaped 
earnings regression considering non-linearity in the parent-child earning 
relationship for the case of Canada. Finding higher beta coefficients among 
middle-income families and explaining this by saying that if low income earning 
parents have low ability children, they would not need much education, therefore 
access to credit to finance would be not a problem.  Hyson (2003) also suggests 
the potential existence of an S-shaped pattern: where β is low for the poorest 
families, highest for middle income and low for the richest. Hence, Han and 
Mulligan (2001) suggest that this may be because high income families probably 
have children with more abilities, and then assuming that returns to human 
capital increase with ability and education is costly, they will also be credit 
constrained (Black and Devereux, 2011). 
 
Therefore, considering potential non-linearity in the earnings and 
schooling intergenerational relationship, quantile regression techniques have also 
been considered.  In simple terms, quantile regression, rather than fitting to a 
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linear model for conditional means as done by OLS, fits to conditional quantiles 
(Angrist et al., 2006). Therefore, quantile regression supplements the estimation 
of the conditional mean function, estimating the entire family of conditional 
quantile functions, providing a deeper understanding of the conditional 
dependent variable distribution including the possibility that the effects of a 
determined variable can change in magnitude and in direction across quantiles 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
 
Quantile regression has the advantage over mean regression of giving the 
possibility of a deeper analysis of the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable as it allows for different direction of causality and magnitude of the 
regressors across the quantiles. However, it is computationally more demanding, 
including a non-analytical solution (which is solved using iteration methods) and 
the fact that it is not available in allsoftware packages (but it is in Stata).  
 
As the OLS estimator, the quantile regression estimator also has some 
large sample properties: 
 
 The estimator of    is consistent and asymptotically normal with a 
known asymptotic distribution. 
 The asymptotic distribution of      depends on the unknown error 
density and for this reason is not easy to estimate. It is therefore 
common to use re-sampling techniques (boostrapping) to estimate 
the distribution. 
 
Also, quantile regression incorporates some interesting properties: QR is 
robust to distributional assumptions (similar to OLS), it is robust with respect to 
outliers (in contrast to OLS) because only the sign of the residuals matters in 
determining the QR estimates but the magnitude does not and it is possible to 
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detect heteroscedasticity with QR if the conditional quantile functions are not 
parallel. 
 
In practical terms, the same methodology used for the linear case is 
applied. However, OLS is applied in the first stage (to predict parents’ earnings), 
but in the second stage, quantile regression is used as was done by Mocetti 
(2007).  
 
Therefore, quantile regression estimation allows differentiation between 
the levels of mobility among different types of children because the quantiles 
point towards the children’s earnings distribution conditional on their father’s 
earnings (Fertig, 2001).   
 
In a formal representation following Cameron and Trivedi (2005): 
 
Suppose Y (or       
     ) is a random variable with distribution function: 
 
                
 
Where    is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Y, and         
is a real number: 
 
Then the    quantile of    is        and therefore:         or       
   
                      
 
The     quantile of    can be obtained by solving: 
 
     ∫ |   |             ∫ |   |      
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      ∫                   ∫            
      
 
 
Applying the first order condition: 
 
  ∫              ∫         
      
 
 
                                  
 
The same reasoning can be extended to the conditional distribution  
 
     ∫ |   |               ∫ |   |        
      
 
 
And if         is a linear function xβ with unknown β, the maximisation 
problem above can be re-written as: 
 
     ∫ |    |               ∫ |    |        
        
 
 
Let the solution be denoted by    (therefore the coefficient of the 
regression can vary with ) and the     conditional quantile is then: 
 
            
 
The     quantile regression estimator of   can be obtained by minimizing 
the sample counterpart: 
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(**)          
 
 
  ∑ |              |       ∑ |              |  
 
This is the average of asymmetrically weighted absolute errors with 
weight   on the positive errors and weight       on the negative errors. 
 
A special case is the median function with        , where the weights are 
symmetric and the objective function reduces to: 
 
            
 
 
∑|     
 
 | 
 
Which is equivalent to minimising the sum of absolute errors and is also 
called the “Least Absolute Deviations” (LAD) estimator. OLS and LAD will differ if 
the error deviation is not symmetric. 
 
For the general case now, let          if     and                  if 
   , this  piecewise function is called the “check function”, then replacing in 
(**) 
         
 
 
∑     
 
   
      
 
         
 
 
∑                       if               ,  and 
 
         
 
 
∑                    if               
 
It is worth noting that this function is not differentiable when       , 
therefore the expression does not have an analytical solution and it has to be 
obtained using linear programming (simplex, interior point methods, etc.). 
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For the purposes of measuring the intergenerational earnings elasticity 
and partial correlation (Std. Coefficient), a child will be in the     quantile ofthe 
income (earnings distribution) if he has earnings larger than the proportion   of 
all the children with earnings and lower earnings than the quantity      
(Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  
 
So basically, applying the quantile regression methods to the estimation 
of intergenerational income mobility36: 
 
          |                         
 
In graphical terms, if the quantile coefficients are plotted in one diagram, 
similarly as the so-called Engel curves, and the quantile lines are all horizontal 
(β=0), there would be perfect mobility because the parent’s income would not 
have any impact on the income of their children. On the other hand, if all the 
lines coincide with the 45 degrees line (slope=1), total immobility is presented 
(β=1). In addition, the non-parallelism among the lines can give signs of 
heteroskedasticity (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  
 
Notice there is no rule for selecting the number of quantiles to analyse 
and that when QR is applied, the same regressions have been used for the first 
stage as when the T2TSLS and OLS techniques were applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 It is possible to find more details in Koenker and Bassett (1978). 
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2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Descriptive Results: Transition Matrices 
 
The data can be seen in terms of transition matrices, describing the 
movements that sons experience relative to their father’s situation, in terms of 
education (number of years of schooling) and earnings. These matrices of 
transition have been widely interpreted as the conditional probability that a son 
has a determined position given that his father was in another position (or the 
same, which would be the diagonal case). Therefore, all the figures on the right 
of the main matrix diagonal represent positive movements and the opposite for 
the figures presented on the left of the diagonal. 
 
Table 2.9: Transition Matrix Earnings Deciles: Father-Sons (%) 
Earnings 
Deciles 
Son 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
  
1 18.5 14.0 13.9 11.3 8.7 9.0 7.8 5.8 6.5 4.6 100 
2 14.0 9.6 8.4 13.0 9.3 13.0 8.5 9.7 8.0 6.5 100 
3 10.0 9.6 12.1 11.3 12.3 9.7 11.1 10.1 8.8 5.0 100 
4 12.2 14.0 10.3 11.4 9.5 9.5 10.2 9.2 7.4 6.2 100 
Father 5 13.9 13.0 9.9 12.0 10.7 10.7 9.0 8.9 7.8 4.1 100 
  
6 11.8 9.0 7.9 9.4 11.0 9.8 10.2 8.8 12.1 10.2 100 
7 11.9 5.0 8.2 10.0 8.2 9.9 10.1 13.1 11.9 11.6 100 
8 8.5 6.3 7.4 8.1 11.3 11.4 10.0 11.8 13.0 12.3 100 
9 7.0 4.6 5.4 7.4 7.5 9.7 10.5 13.0 17.0 17.9 100 
10 5.4 2.6 4.4 6.7 6.9 8.3 10.4 11.5 15.8 27.9 100 
      Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
In terms of mobility between deciles of the earnings distribution, 14% of 
the sons that had a father belonging to the 1st decile moved to the 2nd decile. It 
is possible to see that the highest immobility cases are present at the extremes 
of the diagonal. In particular, it seems that people in the richest decile maintain 
their position in the next generation (27.9%). For levels of education, the 
highest immobility figures are found, again, at the top of the educational 
85 
 
distribution, where 60% of the sons that had a father holding post-secondary 
education also acquired it37. 
 
Table 2.10: Transition Matrix Education Level Deciles: Father-Sons (%) 
Transition Matrix: Level of Education 
Level of Education 
Son 
None Primary SecH SecT T/ University Total 
Father                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
None 29.4 41.1 19.3 7.6 2.6 100 
Primary 6.7 39.4 34.5 12.8 6.6 100 
SecH 3.0 14.9 44.8 14.1       23.2 100 
SecT 1.5 12.4 42.3 15.6 28.2 100 
T/ University 0.0 3.9 30.8 4.4 60.4 100 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
2.7.2 TS2SLS and OLS Results38 
 
Applying TS2SLS and OLS techniques, the results are presented mainly 
using the option when parent’s earnings are predicted using the level of 
education converted directly as years of schooling (Alt 2_d), as this option brings 
more congruency in terms of education between the information provided by 
individuals in 1990 (synthetic parents) and that reported by their children in 
2009 as shown in Table 2.4 in the previous section. The intergenerational 
earnings elasticity takes values of 0.415 when none of the control variables are 
included and 0.467 when age and age squared of fathers and sons are used (see 
                                                          
37 Transition Matrices for the Mother-Daughter pairs can be found in Appendix 2A1. (Table 2A1.7 and 
Table 2A1.8). 
38 Note that 3 normality tests of residuals of the income regression were performed (option 2_d): 
Test for skewness and kurtosis, Shapiro-Francia test and Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. All of them 
give as a result that the normality of residuals can be rejected. For the case of education, the same 
results are obtained. This non-normality does not produce a bias in the estimated coefficients, but it 
causes an efficiency problem, that is the OLS standard errors are no longer the smallest and also a 
bias in the standard errors, therefore the significance test will be wrong. For the last problem, robust 
standar errors will be more appropriate, which has already been considered in the analysis. 
86 
 
column a. and b. in Table 2.11). Both are significant values that could be 
considered low earnings mobility in relative terms (the average of other 
countries corresponds to 0.37). 
 
In term of the intergenerational educational dependency values between 
0.385 (no control variables) and 0.377 (controlled for age and age squared) are 
obtained (see column a. and b. in Table 2.12) which is high intergenerational 
educational mobility compared to other countries (0.62 corresponds to their 
average)39.  
 
In terms of comparing the levels of intergenerational earnings and 
education dependency. It was expected that the standardised beta of education 
would have been lower, therefore leading to a high educational mobility, but a 
higher earnings coefficient, so low earning mobility, suggesting that even though 
children would not depend so much on their parents’ education, in terms of 
earnings, they would because some other factors were also playing a role. 
However, taking into account the standardised version of educational and income 
intergenerational mobility, the values are reduced for the earnings case and 
increased for the educational case (from 0.467 to 0.311 for earnings and from 
0.377 to 0.468 for schooling). In addition, comparing the standardised 
coefficients of earnings and education, the former is lower than the second, 
which is opposite to what was expected. That would mean that intergenerational 
education mobility is lower (in standardised terms) than the earnings mobility 
(               ). So, even though the education achieved by sons depends highly 
on their fathers’ education, when they go to the labour market they are less 
affected by their father’s earnings. 
 
                                                          
39
 See Appendix 2A2. for the situation of other countries. 
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However, this finding could be due to some bias on the calculation of 
father’s earnings in the first stage40. In particular, this could be due to the fact 
that it is assumed that there was no distinction in the data about the category of 
the education establishment where the years of education were acquired. There 
was no difference allowed between studying in a ‘traditional’ university 
(something similar to what could be a member of the UK Russell Group 
Universities) which has more prestige in terms of finding a job, neither was there 
a distinction allowed between private and public schools or/and voucher schools. 
Private schools typically have more prestige and graduate students who obtain 
better results in academic tests which are compulsory to enter to university and 
furthermore, generate wide social connections that could be important in terms 
of finding future jobs. This non-distinction would mean that the estimated 
father’s earnings standard deviation obtained (SD(Y’F)) would be lower than 
what one would expect to find if some of the distinctions mentioned above were 
considered (SD(YF)). Therefore:  (*) SD(Y’F))< (SD(YF). 
 
Taking account of this assumption and considering the standardised 
version of the intergenerational earnings coefficient, it is possible to calculate 
both of the potential values of standardised β (or ρ). The first is the one that was 
calculated with the information that the sample provided and the second is the 
one that should be calculated if the information is available41. Therefore: 
 
      
       
      
       or            
  (  )
  (  )
 
 
Looking at the size of the difference among them:     
                                                          
40
 See first stage regressions in Appendix 2A3., Table 2A3.1 and Table 2A3.2. 
41
 The standard deviation of son’s earnings is not affected as the earnings were not calculated using 
other variables. 
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  (  )    
      
      or        
  
  
     
 
 
 
      
 
 Using the assumption in (*):   
     
 
 
      
  . Therefore:    
   
  
    
 
So        . Hence, the earnings standardised coefficient obtained is 
lower than the one expected to be obtained. On the other hand, for the 
standardised coefficient of intergenerational education dependency, this problem 
is not present as fathers’ years of education are not predicted using another data 
set. 
 
In addition, it is important to mention that the R2 in the first stage is not 
very high (around 0.35). This could indicate that the explanatory variables are 
not highly correlated with the variable to be instrumented (father’s earnings), 
creating inconsistency in the TS2SLS (Ermisch and Nicoletti, 2006). However, it 
is not possible to use other “instruments” for father’s earnings in the first stage 
using 1990 data, only the ones given by the sons in 2009, which allows the 
connection of both data sets. 
 
The case becomes interesting when mother’s earnings and the mother’s 
schooling are entered as control variables in the earnings and education 
regressions respectively. In this case, the standardised version intergenerational 
earnings dependency coefficient becomes larger than (but similar to) the 
standardised educational mobility coefficient (0.286 in column d. in Table 2.11 
versus 0.229 in column e. in Table 2.12). This would imply a lower educational 
dependency (son’s education would not depend mostly on father’s education) but 
son’s earnings depends a bit more on his father’s earnings (as was expected). In 
addition, it would give an indication that there could be another mechanism that 
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interferes in the process of mobility through education. For example, it could be 
some kind of labour market discrimination or issues related to the educational 
system are existent in Chile. It could also be that an elite social class is being 
formed, composed of people from private, prestigious and expensive schools 
who also develop networks in order to establish connections that allow them to 
obtain better jobs and better salaries than people holding relatively similar 
qualifications in terms of years of schooling but not the social connections42. This 
issue would be analysed in more details in future chapters of this research. 
 
It is also important to mention that the mother’s education seems to have 
a greater effect on the education of her son than the mother’s earnings seems to 
have on the son’s earnings (see column d. in Table 2.11 and column e. in Table 
2.12 respectively). In terms of education and considering the standardised 
version, the mother’s education has even more impact than the father’s 
education on the son’s education, which would support the idea that mother’s 
education is a crucial factor. 
 
Including years of schooling in the intergenerational earnings mobility 
regression (see column e. in Table 2.11), it is possible to measure how much of 
the intergenerational earnings coefficient/std. coefficient is reduced due to 
education of the child and also, it is possible to see how big the schooling effect 
is in order to promote the equalisation of opportunities. It was found that son’s 
education takes away a large part of the father’s earnings effect (it reduces it by 
half).  
 
                                                          
42
 Mothers’ earnings would have a moderate correlation with Father’s earnings (0.4) but the 
correlation is higher among them when years of schooling are considered (0.65). 
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Considering other options for estimating fathers’ earnings43, for the first 
option (when the parents’ earnings are calculated using occupation and level of 
education instead of asignating a determined number of years of schooling to the 
different levels of education) the effect of father’s earnings on the son’s earnings 
is significant, obtaining values of between 0.254 (no control variables) and 0.340 
(when controlling for age and age squared of son and father). That could be 
considered high intergenerational earnings mobility. It is not possible to compare 
the results with the education intergenerational dependency when using this 
alternative, as it implies obtaining more than one coefficient that contains 
information about the level of dependency between parents and children in 
terms of education. In the case of the alternative 2.r (when the parents’ 
earnings are predicted using the years of schooling calculated through a 
regression), lower values than in the alternative 2.d were obtained. 
 
In addition, when the regressions consider mother-daughter pairs the 
results for the standardised earnings elasticity is half of that obtained in the 
father-son relationship. However, in terms of the education coefficient, they are 
similar, which implies that the mother’s education has a greater impact on her 
daughter’s education compared to the impact of mother’s earnings on her 
daughter’s earnings44. 
 
                                                          
43
 Details can be found in the Appendix 2A3. (Table 2A3.3 and Table 2A3.4). 
44
 More details of Mother-Daughter regressions can be found in the Appendix 2A3. (Table 2A3.5). 
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Table 2.11: TS2SLS Results (Father-Son Earnings45) 
Variable a:B a: Bst. b: B b: Bst. c: B c: Bst. d: B d: Bst. e: B e: Bst. f: B f: Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)Father 0.415*** 0.277*** 0.467*** 0.311*** 0.003 0.002 0.411*** 0.286*** 0.216*** 0.144*** 0.205*** 0.142*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.182) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) 
age     0.068*** 0.568*** 0.067*** 0.562*** 0.042** 0.333** 0.064*** 0.531*** 0.034** 0.269** 
      (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
age_Sq   
  
-0.001*** 
-0.487*** 
-0.001*** -0.475*** -0.001** 
-0.322** 
-0.001*** -0.399*** -0.000 
-0.19 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ageFather     -0.003 -0.021 0.022 0.174 0.013 0.147 -0.020 -0.161 0.006 0.066 
      (0.030) (0.033) (0.012) (0.027) (0.011) 
age_SqFather     0.000 0.089 -0.000 -0.135 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.017 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
employerFather         0.270 0.067             
          (0.249)             
selfemployedFather         0.070 0.0409             
          (0.060)             
navyFather         0.197*** 0.0400**              
          (0.065)             
HousekeeperFather         0.259 0.0129             
          (0.199)             
WithoutPayt.Father         (dropped) (dropped)             
          .             
SchoolingFather         0.054*** 0.314***             
          (0.017)             
Ln(Earnings)_Mother             0.140*** 0.110***     0.067*** 0.0526*** 
            (0.017)     (0.015) 
Schooling                 0.089*** 0.414*** 0.099*** 0.432*** 
                (0.002) (0.003) 
_cons 8.117*** 0.035** 5.979*** 0.038*** 10.040*** 0.034*** 4.817*** 0.051*** 8.398*** 0.018*** 7.062*** 0.004*** 
  (0.206) (0.817) (1.697) (0.547) (0.768) (0.499) 
N. of observations 6,983 6,983 6,983 6,397 6,983 6,397 
R2 0.074 0.094 0.110 0.092 0.235 0.231 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 Standard Errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2.12: OLS Results (Father-Son’s Education)
46
 
Variable a: B a: Bst. b: B b: Bst. c: B c: Bst. d: B d: Bst. e: B e: Bst. 
Schooling_Father 0.385*** 0.479*** 0.377*** 0.468*** 0.373*** 0.463*** 0.327*** 0.406*** 0.186*** 0.229*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.040) (0.011) 
age     0.052 0.0937 0.069 0.124 0.069 0.124 0.040 0.072 
      (0.080) (0.070) (0.070) (0.053) 
age_Sq     -0.002 -0.207 -0.002* -0.236* -0.002* -0.236* -0.001** -0.196** 
      (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age_Father     0.336*** 0.573*** 0.302*** 0.515*** 0.263** 0.448** 0.236*** 0.636*** 
      (0.110) (0.108) (0.112) (0.032) 
age_Sq_Father     -0.003*** -0.526*** -0.002** -0.466** -0.002** -0.390** -0.002*** -0.607*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
employer_Father         0.707*** 0.0376*** 0.018 0.00094     
      
 
 
(0.213) (0.617)     
selfemployed_Father        -0.209** -0.0263** -0.356** -0.0449**     
      
 
 
(0.091) (0.164)     
navy_Father        1.000*** 0.0436*** 0.898*** 0.0391***     
      
 
 
(0.189) (0.219)     
HouseKeeper_Father        0.075 0.00080 0.196 0.00209     
      
 
 
(0.770) (0.770)     
WithoutPayt.Father        -0.448 -0.0109 (dropped) (dropped)     
          (0.381) .     
Schooling_Mother                 0.246*** 0.282*** 
      
 
 
  
 
    (0.011) 
Ln(Earnings)_Father           0.511 0.0731     
  
    
 
  
 
(0.434)     
_cons 7.847*** 0.0436*** -2.532 -0.04 -1.845 -0.0366 -6.096 -0.0372 0.208 0.0658 
  (0.093) (2.951) (3.132) (4.794) (1.390) 
N.of observations 7,323 7,323 7,124 7,124 7,181 
R2 0.223 0.232 0.238 0.238 0.246 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009
                                                          
46
 Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Additionally, results were analysed considering different sons’ cohorts (5 
years each) separetely. The results are presented in Table 2.13 and Graph 2.1 
where controls for father’s age and age squared are included47. The results 
suggest that, excluding the oldest cohort (50-55 years old) because of the large 
standard errors (probably associated with having only a few observations) the 
situation has been maintained over time quite similarly, except for the youngest 
cohorts (25-30 years old) where the intergenerational coefficient and its 
standardised version seem to decline for both earnings and education. Therefore, 
the situation is slowly improving and the level of dependency among fathers and 
sons is being reduced over time48. However, the possibility that this result is 
produced by an age effect should be considered, that is, younger people always 
present lower intergenerational earnings and schooling dependency than older 
people, and when the individuals in the youngest cohort become part of the 
older cohorts they will exhibit higher values on earnings and schooling 
intergenerational dependency. 
 
Graph 2.1: Cohort (Son’s age) Results 
 
       Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
                                                          
47
 See details in Appendix 2A3., Table 2A3.6 and Table 2A3.7. 
48
 The results, controlling additionally for son’s age and age squared and the ones not controlling for 
any variables, are included in the Appendix 2A3. (Graph 2A3.1 and Graph 2A3.2). 
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Table 2.13: Age Cohort Results49 
Earnings Coefficients by Children's age Cohorts: Alt_2_d (only father's age and age squared) 
Variable C1 (25-30) C2 (30-35) C3 (35-40) C4 (40-45) C5 (45-50) C6 (50-55) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Ln.EarningsFather 0.399*** 0.266*** 0.500*** 0.333*** 0.497*** 0.332*** 0.491*** 0.328*** 0.484*** 0.323*** 0.71 0.474 
  (0.0438) (0.0414) (0.0432) (0.0526) (0.1) (0.52) 
Age_Father 0.0582 0.462 0.00686 0.0545 0.0774 0.615 0.348 2.763 -0.235 -1.864 -10.07 -80 
  (0.0545) (0.0698) (0.123) (0.319) (0.994) (10.74) 
Age_Sq_Father -0.00046 -0.43 -9.38E-06 -0.00873 -0.0005 -0.465 -0.00256 -2.383 0.0019 1.768 0.0777 72.41 
  (0.000482) (0.000592) (0.00101) (0.00253) (0.00766) (0.0811) 
_cons 6.369*** -0.108*** 6.809*** 0.0515*** 4.402 0.0738 -4.39 -0.0729 14.65 0.198 330.7 5.323 
  (1.518) (2.058) (3.719) (10.02) (32.36) (357.4) 
N 1735 1891 1780 969 271 30 
R-sq 0.065 0.099 0.109 0.089 0.119 0.255 
Education Coefficients by Children's age Cohorts: Alt_2_d (only father's age and age squared) 
Variable C1 (25-30) C2 (30-35) C3 (35-40) C4 (40-45) C5 (45-50) C6 (50-55) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Y.SchoolingFather 0.344*** 0.427*** 0.408*** 0.506*** 0.385*** 0.478*** 0.359*** 0.446*** 0.409*** 0.508*** 0.465* 0.577* 
  (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0176) (0.0256) (0.0414) (0.188) 
age_Father 0.318 0.541 0.702* 1.196* 0.653 1.112 2.225 3.792 0.177 0.302 -20.95 -35.7 
  (0.215) (0.303) (0.47) (1.17) (4.852) (54.9) 
Age_Sq_Father -0.00256 -0.511 -0.00585* -1.170* -0.00502 -1.003 -0.0174 -3.469 -0.00153 -0.306 0.162 32.4 
  (0.0019) (0.00257) (0.00384) (0.00919) (0.0375) (0.414) 
_cons -1.157 0.168 -13.09 0.0664 -13.32 -0.0235 -63.54 -0.295 1.678 -0.22 682.5 2.172 
  (6.055) (8.863) (14.33) (37.26) (157.1) (1818.7) 
N 1817 1973 1863 1033 290 30 
R-sq 0.204 0.244 0.221 0.185 0.221 0.271 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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2.7.3 Quantile Regression Results 
 
The quantile regression (QR) results are significant, with increasingly 
larger earnings standardised betas obtained over the quantiles (lower quantiles 
present lower standardised betas and so higher mobility, and higher quantiles 
present higher standardised betas or lower earnings mobility). This can be 
appreciated also in the respective graph representation (Graph 2.2). On the 
other hand, for the education quantile regression, the lower quantiles present a 
higher standardised beta which means lower educational mobility and higher 
quantiles present a lower standardised beta which means higher mobility 
(opposite to the earnings case) which is also presented in graphical terms 
(Graph 2.3). The results for the median are also very similar to the ones 
obtained by applying OLS (mean).  
 
Therefore the overall situation is that the intergenerational earnings 
standardised coefficients are higher for higher quantiles and lower for the lower 
quantiles. That corresponds to higher intergenerational earnings mobility at the 
bottom of the children’s earnings distribution and lower intergenerational 
earnings mobility at the top of the children’s distribution. This is probably 
consistent with the idea that at the bottom of the earnings distribution, social 
policies that aim to raise opportunities for people have been working in the 
country, but that social background continues to be very imortant in obtaining a 
highly paid job. The opposite occurs for the case of the intergenerational 
transmission of schooling, which could be happening because less educated 
people do not value schooling as much. Therefore, if individuals achieve lower 
levels of education, it may be due to their parents not having forced or 
supported them sufficiently in order to continue studying, likely because these 
parents did not study themselves. On the other hand, highly educated 
individuals probably achieve high educational levels due to the larger number of 
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opportunities given to them compared to their parents when they themselves 
were younger. 
 
Comparing the betas (standardised) only at the 90th percentile, the 
earnings beta is larger than the educational one (0.451 versus 0.414). The 
details can be found in Table 2.14 and in Graph 2.2 and 2.3, where the 
intergenerational earnings/education standardised coefficient is plotted over 
quantiles and contrasted to the OLS estimation (dashed line).  
 
In the QR, when the mother’s earnings/education are included in the 
earnings/education regression as control variables50, the 2nd highest earnings 
quantiles are higher than the 2nd highest education quantiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 QR controlling for mother’s earnings and son’s schooling can be found in the Appendix 2A3. (Table 
2A3.8 and Table 2A3.9). 
97 
 
Table 2.14: QR Results (Father-Son Earnings & Education)51 
Earnings: Father-Son 
Variable q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)_Father 0.227*** 0.152*** 0.286*** 0.191*** 0.476*** 0.317*** 0.585*** 0.391*** 0.675*** 0.451*** 
  (0.035) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033) (0.040) 
age 0.042* 0.348* 0.032*** 0.267*** 0.078*** 0.649*** 0.081*** 0.674*** 0.105*** 0.874*** 
  (0.022) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) 
age_Sq -0.001* -0.314* -0.000*** -0.222*** -0.001*** -0.591*** -0.001*** -0.557*** -0.001*** -0.743*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age_Father 0.045 0.354 0.045** 0.360** 0.008 0.060 -0.038 -0.298 -0.046 -0.364 
  (0.039) (0.020) (0.033) (0.047) (0.067) 
age_Sq_Father -0.000 -0.324 -0.000** -0.326** 0.000 0.0179 0.000 0.373 0.001 0.468 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
_cons 7.277*** -0.925*** 6.965*** -0.605*** 5.359*** -0.0568*** 5.783*** 0.619*** 4.915** 1.236** 
  (1.172) (0.585) (0.895) (1.213) (1.993) 
N. of observations 6,983  
R2  0.094 
Education: Father-Son 
Variable q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Y. Schooling_Father 0.426*** 0.530*** 0.479*** 0.595*** 0.335*** 0.416*** 0.373*** 0.464*** 0.333*** 0.414*** 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.006) (0.026) (0.004) 
age 0.203 0.362 -0.093 -0.167 -0.300*** -0.536*** 0.051 0.090 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.148) (0.107) (0.074) (0.067) (0.068) 
age_Sq -0.004** -0.558** 0.000 0.014 0.003*** 0.414*** -0.001 -0.099 0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age_Father 0.058 0.099 0.143 0.243 0.375*** 0.640*** 0.321*** 0.547*** -0.000 0.000 
  (0.152) (0.195) (0.099) (0.055) (0.241) 
age_Sq_Father -0.001 -0.106 -0.001 -0.243 -0.003*** -0.577*** -0.003*** -0.502*** 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
_cons 0.674 -1.021 4.399 -0.448 2.783 0.0722 -1.273 0.5486 12.000 1.134 
  (4.231) (5.878) (3.208) (1.943) (7.903) 
N. of observations 7,323  
R2  0.232 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
                                                          
51Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Graphs 2.2: Intergenerational Earnings Standarised Coefficient by Quantile52 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2.3: Intergenerational Education Standarised Coefficient Mobility by 
Quantile 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
In addition, the representation of a kind of Engel curve shows that some 
kind of heteroskedasticity could be present, as they are not parallel, justifying 
the application of QR. Heteroskedasticity test (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg) 
was also performed, obtaining as results the rejection of the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity (constant variance of standard errors) for the income equation. 
The same conclusion is obtained for education regression. Details can be found 
                                                          
52 To see more detail, see Appendix 2A3(Graph 2A3.3 to Graph 2A3.15). 
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in Appendix 2A4. (Graph 2A4.1, Graph 2A4.2, Table 2A4.1, Table 2A4.2 and 
Table 2A4.3). Furthermore, it is worth noting that tests of equality of the 
regression coefficients at different conditional quantiles (F-Test) were rejected. 
 
2.7.4 Robustness Results 
 
The results were also tested for robustness. In order to do this the 2009 
sample was split in two. Male individuals that are aged between 25 and 35 years 
old were considered as the sons and the male individuals in the sample who 
were between 50-60 years old were considered as the respective fathers. The 
TS2SLS was repeated but instead of considering 2 independent samples, only 1 
sample was used and divided into 2 sub-samples acting independent of one of 
another. The sample of fathers was used to predict their earnings using the 
same variables as when the 1990 sample was used and then the estimators 
were used in the second stage to calculate the predicted fathers’ earnings and to 
estimate then the intergenerational earnings elasticity and intergenerational 
educational coefficient. The results are quite similar to those obtained in the 
original procedure, but slightly bigger for the earnings case. The same was 
obtained for the educational mobility, the intergenerational educational 
coefficient (in the standardised version and in the non-standardised one) are 
very similar but slightly bigger than when 2 totally independent samples were 
used. 
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Table 2.15: Robust Results: Splitting the 2009 Sample into Two53 
Father-Son: Earnings   Alt_2_d Father-Son: Schooling   Alt_2_d 
Variable 
2_earnings 
Variable 
2_education 
B (Coef.) Bst. B (Coef.) Bst 
Ln(Earnings)_F 0.394*** 0.260*** Sch_Father_d 0.361*** 0.459*** 
  (0.036)   (0.016) 
Age 0.048 0.207 age 0.020 0.019 
  (0.095)   (0.372) 
age_Sq -0.000 -0.0911 age_Sq -0.000 -0.026 
  (0.002)   (0.006) 
age_F 0.160 0.754 age_Father -0.225 -0.237 
  (0.154)   (0.688) 
age_Sq_F -0.001 -0.753 age_Sq_Father 0.003 0.298 
  (0.001)   (0.006) 
_cons 2.192 0.0486 _cons 12.681 0.0574 
  (4.323)   (20.463) 
N. of obs. 2,349 N. of obs. 2,455 
R2 0.075 R2 0.208 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
2.8 How Inequalities are Transmitted 
 
Mobility and inequality are different dimensions of the social distribution 
of advantages in a society; therefore a society with a certain level of inequality 
but with a high level of mobility would create less concern than a society with 
the same level of inequality but with lower mobility (Torche, 2005). 
 
Hence, it is important to analyse the relationship between inequality and 
social mobility because it gives us an idea of the hope that people might 
experience in society in terms of improving their socioeconomic condition. 
However, the inequality and social mobility literatures have in general been 
advancing in isolation (Andrews and Leigh, 2009).   
 
Corak (2006) suggests that the intergenerational earnings elasticity (β) 
can also be translated to calculate the economic advantage that a high earnings 
family can expect to have over a low earnings family in the next generation. 
 
                                                          
53
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Considering the basic equation of parent-children income transmission: 
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The ratio of incomes for children for high income families (H) and Low 
income families (L) are expressed by Corak (2006) as: 
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Therefore, if Chile has a β of 0.467 and the proportion between the 
poorest decile to the richest decile is 6.17 times (using predicted parent’s 
earnings in the second stage, 2009) it is possible to replace the equation above 
and to obtain: 
 
    
    
=  
         
         
      =            =2.34 
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Therefore, sons born in families in the 10th decile of earnings distribution 
can expect to have 2.34 times more economic advantage (more earnings) than 
children born in families in the 1st decile of the earning distribution due only to 
their fathers’ economic position, which eventually will increase the level of 
inequality of the country. These figures are even more extreme when the ratio 
between the richest and the poorest total income (but excluding subsidies and 
transfers) deciles was found to be 46 times in 2009 (Ministerio de Planificacion, 
2010). Hence, the reproduction of inequality would be six times in the next 
generation. That would be one of the reasons as to why income inequality has 
not reduced over time. 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
  
This chapter started with the objective of clarifying the Chilean situation 
in terms of intergenerational mobility, and with the idea that education plays an 
important role in the process of giving to future generations the opportunities to 
achieve success independent of their social background. More social mobility 
implies living in a society where the level of dependency of children’s earnings 
(education) on their parents’ earnings’ (education) is lower, which means that 
the level of equality of opportunity is better, which would lead to a society where 
the resource allocation is more efficient, where skills and abilities are preferred 
determinants over social connections, or gender or any other kind of social 
discrimination. Unfortunately, the literature related to the Chilean case and to 
the developing world in general is scarce.  
 
Many difficulties are associated with the lack of data availability, but this 
could be due to a kind of dissuading of reality by those that are already better 
educated, probably at the top of the earnings distribution and in the offices 
where social policies are proposed. Furthermore, it seems that formal research in 
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Chile is far from considering the design, analysis and implementation of new 
strategies in order to increase the level of opportunities of a country that may 
seem rich and prosperous in the eyes of its neighbours, but that in reality 
presents high levels of social segregation. 
 
Measures of intergenerational mobility were used to understand the 
Chilean case and to analyse the level of failure or success that society has 
bringing new hope to the entire population. It seems that Chile is a country that 
has low intergenerational earnings elasticity compared to other countries and 
high intergenerational education mobility (both conclusions consider the non-
standarised version of the coefficients), which could be a sign that public policies 
which increase the level of educational opportunities in the countries have been 
successful, at least in comparison with other countries. Nevertheless, 
intergenerational earnings dependency results are relative to developed 
countries (as they have data to obtain this measure) and intergenerational 
schooling dependency results are relative to developing countries (which have 
focused on education, due to earnings lack of data). In addition, when 
standardised versions are utilised to compare the level of earnings and 
educational mobility, the former is higher than the latter, which is opposite to 
what was expected. The use of standardised coefficient was needed to compare 
earnings and schooling coefficient. On the other hand, children’s schooling seems 
to be very important in terms of reducing the father’s earnings effect on their 
own earnings. However, children’s schooling would also depend strongly on their 
parents’ schooling.  
 
The results suggest that, considering sons’ age-cohorts, the levels of 
intergenerational mobility have been maintained over time quite constantly, 
except for the youngest cohorts. In addition, as mentioned by Torche (2010) it 
seems that in the context of high inequality, as in the Chilean one, the levels of 
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positive assortative mating could be quite high in terms of education, because 
economic inequality makes the gap between social classes larger, limiting the 
interaction among individuals with different educational levels. This topic is 
analysed in more details in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
 
Quantile regression estimations seem to suggest that earnings and 
educational intergenerational mobility behave differently depending on the sons’ 
earnings distribution and the sons’ years of schooling distribution respectively. 
The results found that the first is higher in the lowest quantiles and lower in the 
highest quantiles. The opposite is found when considering educational mobility. 
This could imply that social policies that focus on supporting the poorest of 
society have been working (for example, creating employment for the unskilled), 
thereby reducing the father-son dependency in terms of income. On the other 
hand, the educational results could suggest that poorer parents cannot support 
their children in terms of education and that the social policies in this respect 
have failed to equilibrate the situation, and they could also suggest that poorer 
parents do not value education as much, therefore they would not encourage 
their children to acquire better educational levels than them.  
 
Finally, there is almost a common agreement that the focus of the last 
governments has been put on increasing the access to levels of schooling in 
order to promote equality of opportunities among the population, giving children 
better options for their future. However, the expansion of the Chilean 
educational system has not been without controversy. Maybe the marginal 
impact of this policy is reaching a maximum and the focus should change to the 
family and public provision of social services as proposed by Corak (2006) or 
improvements to the way in which (or where) education is imparted (which 
segregates the population) should be made. Therefore in that case, the first step 
would be to formally prove that the educational system in Chile limits social 
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mobility, which will be analysed in the next chapter. This limitation could be 
caused by a lack of resources for education, by abundant tight social connections 
created in primary schools or maybe by a lack of competition among schools that 
create a poor service provision, in particular in terms of quality. 
 
This chapter has attempted to increase the literature related to the 
Chilean case intergenerational mobility, opening new challenges for the future, 
with the aim of promoting social and economic equality of opportunities. 
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Appendix Intergenerational Mobility 
2A1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2A1.1: Age Mothers 2009 (reported) versus 1990 
Age in 2009 
2009 (reported by Daughters) :t 1990 (potential Mothers) : t+19 
Avg. Age 58.51 Avg. Age 58.25 
Min Age 44 Min Age 44 
Max Age 67 Max Age 79 
St. Dev. 6.02 St. Dev. 10.25 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
Table 2A1.2: Daughters’ Age 
Daughters' age in 2009 
Avg. 34.97 
Min 25 
Max 56 
St.Dev 6.1 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
Table 2A1.3: % Level of Education (Congruency), Mother-Daughter. 
% Level Education 
2009 (reported by Daughters) 1990 (potential Mothers) 
Education % Education % 
Nursery 0 Nursery 0 
Primary (before 1965) 23.14 Primary (before 1965) 22.55 
Primary (after 1965) 33.5 Primary (after 1965) 14.76 
Secondary (before 1965) 11.17 Secondary 22.1 
Secondary (after 1965) 12.61     
Technical Secondary (after 1965) 3.1 Technical Secondary 4.61 
Technical Secondary (before 1965) 1.79     
Professional Technician 0.79 Professional Technician&Institute 1.7 
Professional Institute 0.51     
University 3.37 University 5.4 
None 9.9 None 28.88 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Table 2A1.4: Years of Education (Congruency),Mother-Daughter. 
Number of years of 
Schooling Direct Regression Estimated Real  
Mean 8.33 10.96 6.8 8.48 
Min 0 4.23 0 0 
Max  18 16.55 18 19 
St. Dev. 3.98 3.19 5.80 4.39 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 2A1.5: % Occupation (Congruency), Mother-Daughter. 
% Occupation 
2009 (reported by Daughters) 1990 (potential Mothers) 
Education % Education % 
Employer 2.4 Employer 1.68 
Self-Employed 23.52 Self-Employed 20.9 
Employee 51.95 Employee 57.8 
Navy& Military &Police 0.2 Navy &Military &Police 0.15 
HouseKeeping 21.93 HouseKeeping (inside) 3.39 
    HouseKeeping (outside) 13.1 
 
  Without payment 0.95 
Not Working 58.58 Not Working 65.7 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 2A1.6 Descriptive Statistics (Mother-Daughters) 
Mother_Daughter 
1990 2009 
Mother Daughter 
Avg. Number of children in the 
household (St.Dev.) 
2.14 
(1.44) 
1.75 
(1.08) 
% Rural 24.94% 28.15% 
Avg. Number years of Schooling 
8.48    
(4.4) 
11.33 
(4.4) 
% Married 65.62% 41.39% 
Proportion richest and poorest decile 
of earnings 0.3315 0.1722 
Avg. Number people in the household 
(St.Dev.) 
4.72 
(1.99) 
4.29 
(1.72) 
% Illiteracy 5.72% 0.98% 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
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Table 2A1.7: Transition Matrix Earnings Mother-Daughter (%) 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
Table 2A1.8: Transition Matrix Education Mother-Daughter (%) 
Transition Matrix: Level of Education 
Level of Education 
Daughter 
None Primary SecHum SecTec T/University Total 
Mother 
None 32 37 22 5.8 4 100 
Primary 14 28 33 13 13 100 
SecHum 2.5 12 42 14 29 100 
SecTec 1.5 8.2 39 14 38 100 
T/University 1.3 2.4 22 5.7 68 100 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transition Matrix: Earnings Deciles (%) 
Earnings 
Deciles 
Daughter 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
  
1 18 12 13 11 9 8 9 8 7 5 100 
2 10 10 11 11 11 12 9 11 8 7 100 
3 13 9 13 15 11 11 10 8 8 3 100 
4 13 9 12 12 9 11 10 9 8 8 100 
Mother 5 9 11 7 11 11 11 10 10 11 11 100 
  
6 7 6 6 8 7 9 10 14 16 17 100 
7 14 11 10 10 8 8 11 8 9 10 100 
8 14 10 11 15 9 9 9 9 9 7 100 
9 9 8 9 8 10 9 12 13 11 13 100 
10 6 6 5 5 6 6 10 13 18 26 100 
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2A.2 Cross-Country Comparisons 
 
Table 2A2.1: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity and Standardised Coefficients 
Country Coeff_Inc. Std.Coeff_Inc. 
Australia 0.33 0.22 
Brazil 0.82   
Canada 0.23 0.14 
Chile 0.47 0.31 
China (urban) 0.32   
Colombia 0.70   
Cyprus 0.09 0.05 
Czech Republic 0.20 0.13 
Denmark 0.14 0.14 
Ecuador 1.13   
Finland 0.18 0.15 
France 0.46   
Germany 0.23 0.17 
Hungary 0.22 0.16 
Italy 0.44   
Japan 0.25   
Kyrgyzstan 0.20 0.28 
Latvia 0.28 0.22 
Malaysia 0.54   
Mexico 0.50   
Nepal 0.32   
New Zealand 0.25 0.19 
Norway 0.24 0.14 
Pakistan 0.24   
Peru 0.67   
Poland 0.40   
Russia 0.06 0.05 
Slovakia 0.25 0.16 
South Africa 0.61   
Spain 0.40 0.34 
Sweden 0.28 0.14 
Taiwan 0.23   
UK 0.50 0.27 
USA 0.47 0.29 
Average 0.37 0.19 
Source: Solon, (2002), Blanden, et al. (2005), Andrews and Leigh (2008), Gong, 
Leigh and Meng (2010), Li (2011), Azevedo and Bouillon (2009), OECD (2012) 
and World Bank (2012)  
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Table 2A2.2: Intergenerational Education Coefficients and Standardised 
Coefficients. 
Country Coeff_Educ. Std.Coeff_Educ. 
Bangladesh   0.38 
Belgium 0.41 0.40 
Brazil 0.95 0.59 
Chile 0.38 0.47 
China (rural) 0.34 0.20 
Colombia 0.80 0.59 
Czech Republic 0.44 0.37 
Denmark 0.49 0.30 
East Timor 1.27 0.39 
Ecuador 0.72 0.61 
Egypt 1.03 0.50 
Estonia 0.54 0.40 
Ethiopia (rural) 0.75 0.10 
Finland 0.48 0.33 
Ghana 0.71 0.39 
Hungary 0.61 0.48 
Italy 0.67 0.54 
Indonesia 0.78 0.55 
Ireland 0.70 0.46 
Kyrgyzstan 0.20 0.28 
Malaysia 0.38 0.31 
Nepal 0.94 0.35 
Netherlands 0.58 0.36 
New Zealand 0.40 0.33 
Nicaragua 0.82 0.55 
N.Ireland 0.59 0.32 
Norway 0.40 0.35 
Pakistan 1.00 0.46 
Panama  0.73 0.61 
Peru 0.88 0.66 
Philippines 0.41 0.40 
Poland 0.48 0.43 
Slovakia 0.61 0.37 
Slovenia 0.54 0.52 
South Africa 0.69 0.44 
Sri Lanka 0.61 0.49 
Sweden 0.58 0.40 
Switzerland 0.49 0.46 
UK 0.71 0.31 
Ukraine 0.37 0.39 
USA 0.46 0.46 
Vietnam 0.58 0.40 
Average 0.62 0.42 
Source: Solon, (2002), Blanden, et. al (2005), Andrews and Leigh (2008), Gong 
et al. (2010), Li (2011), Azevedo and Bouillon (2009), OECD (2012) and World 
Bank (2012)  
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Graph 2A2.1: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity versus Spending on 
Education 
 
Source: Solon (2002), Blanden, et. al (2005), Andrews and Leigh (2008), Gong 
et al. (2010), Li (2011), Azevedo and Bouillon (2009), OECD (2012) and World 
Bank (2012)  
 
Graph 2A2.2: Intergenerational Earnings Correlation versus Spending on 
Education 
 
Source: Solon, (2002), Blanden et. al (2005), Andrews and Leigh (2008), Gong 
et al. (2010), Li (2011), Azevedo and Bouillon (2009), OECD (2012) and World 
Bank (2012)  
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Graph 2A2.3: Intergenerational Education Coefficient versus Spending on 
Education 
 
Source: Solon (2002), Blanden, et al. (2005), Andrews and Leigh (2008), Gong 
et al. (2010), Li (2011), Azevedo and Bouillon (2009), OECD (2012) and World 
Bank (2012)  
 
Graph 2A2.4: Intergenerational Education Correlations versus Spending on 
Education 
 
Source: Solon (2002), Blandenet. al (2005), Andrews and Leigh (2008), Gong et 
al. (2010), Li (2011), Azevedo and Bouillon (2009), OECD (2012) and World 
Bank (2012)  
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2A.3 First Stage Regressions and Alternative Results 
 
Table 2A3.1: First Stage Earnings Regressions using Levels of 
Education54 
1st Stage Earnings Regression: Level of 
Education (1990) 
Variables 
Fathers Mothers 
Earnings_LevelEducation 
Coef. (Robust S.Errors) 
primary -0.590*** -0.460*** 
  (0.014) (0.011) 
primary_65 -1.199*** -0.977*** 
  (0.028) (0.022) 
secondary_hum -0.742*** -0.587*** 
  (0.028) (0.021) 
secondary_tec -0.751*** -0.622*** 
  (0.033) (0.024) 
institute -0.465*** -0.353*** 
  (0.048) (0.032) 
none_educ -1.421*** -1.157*** 
  (0.027) (0.021) 
employer 1.357*** 1.439*** 
  (0.040) (0.034) 
self-employed 0.294*** 0.225*** 
  (0.014) (0.012) 
navy_police 0.202*** 0.286*** 
  (0.032) (0.030) 
HouseKeeping -0.273** -0.468*** 
  (0.122) (0.017) 
withoutpayment -0.891*** -0.985*** 
  (0.051) (0.031) 
age 0.074*** 0.056*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) 
age_sq -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 10.331*** 10.387*** 
  (0.095) (0.043) 
N. of obs. 19,013 34,671 
R2 0.354 0.344 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
                                                          
54
Standard errors are in brackets. 
114 
 
Table 2A3.2: First Stage Earnings Regressions using Levels of 
Schooling55 
1st Stage Earnings Regression: Levels of 
Schooling (1990) 
Variables 
Fathers Mothers 
Earnings_Schooling 
Coef. (Robust S.Errors) 
employer 1.350*** 1.414*** 
  (0.039) (0.034) 
self-employed 0.289*** 0.223*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) 
navy_police 0.199*** 0.285*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
housekeeping -0.236* -0.454*** 
  (0.142) (0.017) 
withoutPayment -0.877*** -0.970*** 
  (0.048) (0.029) 
age 0.077*** 0.057*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) 
age_sq -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Schooling 0.090*** 0.078*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
_cons 8.324*** 8.767*** 
  (0.081) (0.034) 
R2 0.355 0.356 
N. of obs. 19,840 36,120 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2A3.3: Second Stage Results Alternative 1 (Education as Level of 
Education)56 
Father-Son: Earnings   Alt_1 
Variable B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)_F 0.254*** 0.160*** 0.340*** 0.214*** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.183) 
age     0.072*** 0.597*** 0.066*** 0.546*** 
    
 
(0.016) (0.015) 
age_Sq     -0.001*** -0.517*** -0.001*** -0.463*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
age_F     0.024 0.194 0.014 0.114 
    
 
(0.032) (0.032) 
age_Sq_F     -0.000 -0.121 -0.000 -0.093 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
primary _F         -0.913*** -0.581*** 
    
 
    (0.056) 
primary _65_F         -0.898*** -0.508*** 
    
 
    (0.153) 
secondary_hum _F         -0.591*** -0.339*** 
    
 
    (0.081) 
secondary_tec _F         -0.500*** -0.157*** 
    
 
    (0.084) 
institute_F         -0.135 -0.023 
    
 
    (0.117) 
withoutdegree_F         -1.080*** -0.480*** 
    
 
    (0.198) 
employer_F         0.249 0.062 
    
 
    (0.251) 
selfemployed_F         0.074 0.043 
    
 
    (0.060) 
navy _F         0.163** 0.033** 
    
 
    (0.068) 
HKeeping _F         0.269 0.013 
    
 
    (0.218) 
WithoutPayment_F         (dropped) (dropped) 
    
 
    . 
_cons 9.854*** 0.035*** 6.476*** 0.038*** 11.660*** 0.036*** 
  (0.211) (0.861) (1.965) 
R2 0.025 0.045 0.130 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
                                                          
56
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2A3.4: Second Stage Results Alternative 2_r (Education as 
Estimated Years of Schooling)57 
Father-Son: Earnings   Alt_2_r 
Variable B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)_F 0.327*** 0.195*** 0.398*** 0.237*** 0.021 0.0123 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.186) 
age     0.071*** 0.594*** 0.071*** 0.595*** 
      (0.016) (0.016) 
age_Sq     -0.001*** -0.513*** -0.001*** -0.507*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
age_F     0.014 0.113 0.035 0.279 
      (0.030) (0.033) 
age_Sq_F     -0.000 -0.049 -0.000 -0.234 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Employer_F         0.280 0.221 
      
 
 
(0.252) 
Selfemployed_F        0.055 0.0695 
      
 
 
(0.061) 
Navy_F        0.301*** 0.0325 
      
 
 
(0.064) 
HKeeping_F        0.299 0.0611 
      
 
 
(0.211) 
WithoutPayment_F        (dropped) (dropped) 
      
 
 
. 
Y.Schooling_F        0.047*** 0*** 
      
 
 
(0.018) 
_cons 9.013*** 0.0351*** 6.123*** 0.0383*** 9.306*** 0.0353*** 
  (0.227) (0.843) (1.705) 
N. of observations 6,983 6,983 6,983 
R2 0.037 0.056 0.067 
Father-Son: Earnings   Alt_2_r 
Variable B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Y.Schooling_F 0.360*** 0.368*** 0.349*** 0.357*** 0.286*** 0.292*** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.041) 
age     0.083 0.148 0.096 0.171 
 
    (0.086) (0.075) 
age_Sq     -0.002* -0.259* -0.002** -0.281** 
 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
age_F     0.449*** 0.765*** 0.356*** 0.606*** 
 
    (0.113) (0.121) 
age_Sq_F     -0.004*** -0.712*** -0.003*** -0.538*** 
 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Employer_F         0.080 0.004 
 
    
  
(0.608) 
Selfemployed_F         -0.456*** -0.0576*** 
 
    
  
(0.164) 
Navy_F         1.587*** 0.0692*** 
 
    
  
(0.220) 
HKeeping_F         0.445 0.005 
 
     
 
(0.749) 
WithoutPayment_F        (dropped) (dropped) 
 
    
 
 
. 
Ln(Earnings)_F        0.628 0.0802 
 
    
 
 
(0.431) 
_cons 7.073*** 0.0436*** -7.168** 0.0401** -11.339** 0.0376**  
  (0.145) (2.939) (5.083) 
N. of observations 7,323 7,323 7,124 
R2 0.131 0.142 0.152 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2A3.5: Second Stage Results Alternative 2_d (Education as Years 
of Schooling): Mother-Daughter58 
Mother-Daugther: Earnings   Alt_2_d Mother-Daugther : Education   Alt_2_d 
Variable B Bst. Variable B Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)_M 0.249*** 0.197*** Sch_mother_d 0.367*** 0.420*** 
  (0.016) 
 
(0.009) 
age 0.022 0.1740 age 0.047 0.086 
  (0.017) 
 
(0.065) 
age_Sq -0.000 -0.201 age_Sq -0.002** -0.250** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
age_M 0.107*** 0.807*** age_mother 0.128 0.223 
  (0.032) 
 
(0.120) 
age_Sq_M -0.001*** -0.734*** age_Sq_mother -0.001 -0.120 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
_cons 6.122*** 0.0153*** _cons 3.750 0.0401 
  (0.900) 
 
(3.196) 
N.of obs. 7,397 N.of obs. 8,193 
R2 0.043 R2 0.211 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2A3.6: Age Cohort Results (Controlling for Father and Son’s Age)59 
Earnings Coefficients by Children's age Cohorts: Alt_2_d (son and father age and age2) 
Variable C1 (25-30) C2 (30-35) C3 (35-40) C4 (40-45) C5 (45-50) C6 (50-55) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)_F 0.400*** 0.267*** 0.502*** 0.335*** 0.498*** 0.332*** 0.490*** 0.327*** 0.473*** 0.316*** 0.277 0.185 
  (0.0481) (0.0392) (0.0417) (0.0556) (0.119) (0.442) 
age -0.303 -2.521 0.548 4.568 -0.795 -6.629 0.845 7.038 -2.231 -18.59 25.32* 211.0* 
  (0.563) (0.669) (0.77) (1.339) (2.671) (11.46) 
age_Sq 0.00596 3.595 -0.00806 -4.864 0.0105 6.359 -0.00974 -5.873 0.0231 13.94 -0.241* -145.5* 
  (0.01) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0155) (0.028) (0.109) 
age_F 0.0451 0.358 -0.00206 -0.0164 0.0811 0.644 0.342 2.717 -0.196 -1.557 -21.23* -168.7* 
  (0.0525) (0.0733) (0.113) (0.305) (0.904) (8.618) 
age_Sq_F -0.00036 -0.333 5.96E-05 0.0555 -0.00053 -0.496 -0.00252 -2.348 0.00162 1.508 0.163* 151.8* 
  (0.000462) (0.000618) (0.000917) (0.00243) (0.00698) (0.0652) 
_cons 10.54 0.855 -2.229 -0.338 19.27 0.69 -22.47 -1.471 67.21 6.824 36.62 -100.8 
  (7.968) (11.29) (14.05) (30.16) (75.19) (377.6) 
N 1735 1891 1780 969 271 30 
R-sq 0.069 0.1 0.11 0.09 0.123 0.441 
Education Coefficients by Children's age Cohorts: Alt_2_d (son and father age and age2) 
Variable C1 (25-30) C2 (30-35) C3 (35-40) C4 (40-45) C5 (45-50) C6 (50-55) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Y.Schooling_F 0.343*** 0.427*** 0.408*** 0.507*** 0.384*** 0.477*** 0.358*** 0.445*** 0.388*** 0.482*** 0.49 0.609 
  (0.0175) (0.0203) (0.0158) (0.024) (0.0472) (0.251) 
age -0.627 -1.122 -0.733 -1.311 0.123 0.22 2.778 4.967 -10.31 -18.43 13.64 24.38 
  (2.069) (2.411) (3.723) (5.836) (11.52) (70.84) 
age_Sq 0.0105 1.364 0.0118 1.527 -0.00295 -0.382 -0.034 -4.396 0.103 13.3 -0.126 -16.29 
  (0.0369) (0.0365) (0.0491) (0.0678) (0.121) (0.674) 
age_F 0.332 0.566 0.682* 1.163* 0.678 1.156 2.229 3.799 1.099 1.874 -26.76 -45.59 
  (0.229) (0.295) (0.514) (1.175) (4.522) (51.37) 
age_Sq_F -0.00267 -0.534 -0.00571* -1.141* -0.00517 -1.033 -0.0173 -3.458 -0.00836 -1.671 0.206 41.09 
  (0.00204) (0.00249) (0.0042) (0.0092) (0.0348) (0.39) 
_cons 7.69 0.355 -1.131 0.227 -14.74 0.0177 -120.7 -0.976 228.4 7.402 507.5 -11.65 
  (29.68) (40.66) (69.65) (130.9) (318.9) (1751.8) 
N 1817 1973 1863 1033 290 30 
R-sq 0.205 0.244 0.222 0.188 0.249 0.284 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
                                                          
59
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2A3.7: Age Cohort Results (None Control Variables)60 
Earnings Coefficients by Children's age Cohorts: Alt_2_d (none control variables) 
Variable C1 (25-30) C2 (30-35) C3 (35-40) C4 (40-45) C5 (45-50) C6 (50-55) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
lnY_Father 0.387*** 0.258*** 0.487*** 0.325*** 0.475*** 0.317*** 0.480*** 0.320*** 0.481*** 0.321*** 0.78 0.521 
  (0.0457) (0.0352) (0.035) (0.0513) (0.102) (0.415) 
_cons 8.300*** -0.132*** 7.325*** 0.0480*** 7.521*** 0.134*** 7.514*** 0.194*** 7.469*** 0.156*** 4.222 0.249 
  (0.508) (0.391) (0.382) (0.562) (1.095) (4.4) 
N 1735 1891 1780 969 271 30 
R-sq 0.062 0.098 0.102 0.083 0.118 0.123 
Education Coefficients by Children's age Cohorts: Alt_2_d (only father age and age2) 
Variable C1 (25-30) C2 (30-35) C3 (35-40) C4 (40-45) C5 (45-50) C6 (50-55) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Y.Schooling_F 0.339*** 0.421*** 0.410*** 0.509*** 0.384*** 0.477*** 0.359*** 0.446*** 0.409*** 0.508*** 0.485**  0.602**  
  (0.0174) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0272) (0.0514) (0.164) 
_cons 8.571*** 0.144*** 7.782*** 0.0836*** 7.801*** 0.026*** 7.606*** -0.091*** 6.710*** -0.232*** 6.919*** 0.0121*** 
  (0.183) (0.145) (0.143) (0.225) (0.415) (1.209) 
N 1817 1973 1863 1033 290 30 
R-sq 0.201 0.242 0.218 0.182 0.221 0.24 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Graphs 2A3.1: Age Cohort Results (Controlling for Father and Son’s Age) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
Graphs 2A3.2: Age Cohort Results (None Control Variables) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990
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Table 2A3.8: QR Results (Father-Son Earnings & Education): Controlling by Age and Mothers’ Earnings (Education)61 
Earnings: Father-Son 
Variable q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Ln(Earnings)_F 0.189*** 0.126*** 0.223*** 0.149*** 0.375*** 0.250*** 0.486*** 0.324*** 0.576*** 0.385*** 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.039) (0.043) 
Ln(Earnings)_M 0.040* 0.0546* 0.035*** 0.0478*** 0.063*** 0.0854*** 0.085*** 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.163*** 
  (0.023) (0.013) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) 
age -0.000 -0.000665 -0.000** -0.000551** -0.001** -0.00103** -0.001*** -0.00131*** -0.001*** -0.00200*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age_Sq 0.024 0.0322 0.042* 0.0574* 0.023 0.0307 -0.014 -0.019 -0.048 -0.065 
  (0.034) (0.023) (0.036) (0.044) (0.056) 
age_F -0.000 -0.000228 -0.000 -0.000438 -0.000 -0.000155 0.000 0.000247 0.001 0.000728 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age_Sq_F 0.092*** 0.0782*** 0.121*** 0.104*** 0.184*** 0.157*** 0.179*** 0.153*** 0.210*** 0.179*** 
  (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) 
_cons 7.401*** -3.098*** 6.487*** -3.419*** 4.476*** -3.009*** 4.355*** -1.559*** 3.672** -0.695*** 
  (0.914) (0.680) (1.001) (1.216) (1.598) 
N. of obs. 6,591 
R2 0.114 
Education: Father-Son 
Variable q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
  B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. B Bst. 
Y.Schooling_F 0.293*** 0.364*** 0.320*** 0.398*** 0.228*** 0.283*** 0.259*** 0.322*** 0.242*** 0.301*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.022) (0.023) 
Y.Schooling_M 0.207 0.369 0.034 0.062 0.071 0.128 0.082 0.147 0.242** 0.432** 
  (0.145) (0.110) (0.063) (0.073) (0.109) 
age -0.004* -0.530* -0.001 -0.172 -0.002** -0.255** -0.001 -0.160 -0.004** -0.464** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
age_Sq 0.113 0.193 -0.057 -0.097 0.118 0.202 0.352*** 0.600*** 0.574** 0.978** 
  (0.171) (0.117) (0.148) (0.062) (0.251) 
age_F -0.001 -0.192 0.001 0.115 -0.001 -0.122 -0.003*** -0.542*** -0.005** -0.925** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
age_Sq_F 0.280*** 0.334*** 0.253*** 0.302*** 0.178*** 0.212*** 0.164*** 0.195*** 0.133*** 0.159*** 
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) 
_cons -2.505 -0.971 6.477* 0.433* 3.013 0.108 -3.251** -0.562*** -9.800 -1.158 
  (5.282) (3.638) (3.901) (1.537) (7.310) 
N. of obs. 7,035 
R2 0.264 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
                                                          
61
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2A3.9: QR Results (Father-Son Earnings): Controlling by Age and Son’ Schooling62 
Earnings: Father-Son 
Variable q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Ln(Earnings)_F 0.082*** 0.0549*** 0.152*** 0.101*** 0.212*** 0.141*** 0.291*** 0.194*** 0.363*** 0.242*** 
  (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.040) 
age 0.036** 0.303** 0.043*** 0.357*** 0.061*** 0.510*** 0.070*** 0.583*** 0.102*** 0.854***  
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.032) 
age_Sq -0.000* -0.242 -0.000** -0.262* -0.001*** -0.392** -0.001*** -0.429*** -0.001** -0.685*   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age_F 0.019 0.147 0.042 0.335 -0.003 -0.0229 -0.049 -0.388 -0.061 -0.483 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.035) (0.063) 
age_Sq_F -0.000 -0.138 -0.000 -0.305 0.000 0.0596 0.000 0.431 0.001 0.531 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Schooling 0.079*** 0.370*** 0.074*** 0.343*** 0.087*** 0.404*** 0.091*** 0.425*** 0.088*** 0.411*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
_cons 8.901*** -0.917*** 7.513*** -0.544*** 7.980*** -0.0491*** 8.546*** 0.516*** 7.937*** 1.099*** 
  (0.772) (0.900) (0.884) (1.009) (1.960) 
N. of 
observations 
6,983 
R2 0.235 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
 
 
                                                          
62
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Graphs 2A3.3: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity and control variables by 
Quantile   
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.4: Intergenerational Education Coefficient and control variables by 
Quantile  
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Graphs 2A3.5: Intergenerational Earnings Std. Coefficient and control variables 
by Quantiles 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.6: Intergenerational Education Std. Coefficient and control 
variables by Quantile  
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Graphs 2A3.7: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity and control variables by 
Quantile (Controlling by Mothers’ Earnings) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.8: Intergenerational Education Coefficient and all other variables 
by Quantile (Controlling by Mothers’ Education) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Graphs 2A3.9: Intergenerational Earnings Std. Coefficient and control variables 
by Quantile (Controlling by Mothers’ Earnings) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.10: Intergenerational Education Std. Coefficient and all other 
variables by Quantile (Controlling by Mothers’ Education)  
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Graphs 2A3.11: Intergenerational Earnings Coefficient and all other variables 
by Quantiles (controlling by son’ schooling)
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.12: Intergenerational Earnings Std. Coefficient and control 
variables by Quantiles (controlling by son’ schooling)
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Graphs 2A3.13: Intergenerational Earnings Std. Coefficient by Quantile 
(controlling by Mothers’ Earnings) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.14: Intergenerational Education Mobility Std. Coefficient by 
Quantile (Controlling by Mothers’ Education) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Graphs 2A3.15: Intergenerational Earnings Coefficient by Quantile (controlling 
by son’ schooling) 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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2A4 Tests 
 
Graph 2A4.1 Earnings Residuals Distribution 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 2A4.1: Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality (Earnings) 
Earnings: Test for Normality (Residuals) 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
    
 
  ------- joint ------ 
Variable Obs    Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adjchi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Ln(Earnings)_ resid  7.00E+03 0.1523 0 . 0 
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data 
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z 
Ln(Earnings)_ resid  6983 0.96691 35.877 2.476 0.00664 
 Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Ln(Earnings)_resid  6983 0.9674 118.726 12.66 0 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Graph 2A4.2 Earnings Residuals Distribution 
 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 2A4.2: Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality (Education) 
Education: Test for Normality (Residuals) 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
    
 
  ------- joint ------ 
Variable Obs    Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adjchi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Schooling_F_resid 7.30E+03 0 0 . 0 
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data 
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z 
Schooling_F_resid 7323 0.98083 20.543 2.206 0.01368 
 Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Schooling_F_resid 7323 0.98085 72.713 11.376 0 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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Table 2A4.3: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity: Earnings 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: Ln(Earnings)_F age age_Sq age_F age_Sq_F 
chi2(5)      =   204.80 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity: Education 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: Schooling_F age age_Sq age_F age_Sq_F 
chi2(5)      =   131.50 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
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3 Does the Increase in Educational Provision and Competition between 
Schools Increase the Quality of the Service? The Role of the 1980s 
Educational Reform in Chile 
 
3.1 Summary  
 
 Recent reforms of educational systems have focused on privatisation 
(increasing school choice) and decentralisation. The idea is that higher 
competition among schools would improve the quality of service 
(Friedman, 1962) and that local authorities have better information 
related to the needs of families in their areas. 
 However, competition could be associated with social segregation as it 
could cause sorting among students, concentrating the poorest pupils in 
to public schools which could also be a concern in terms of negative peer 
effects. 
 Chile has implemented a voucher and privatisation system nationwide for 
more than 30 years which seems to be in crisis considering that it has 
been continuously underperforming in international educational tests. It is 
also considered very socially segregated. The arguments against voucher 
systems have always been more ideological than supported by empirical 
evidence. 
 Therefore, the analysis of whether or not competition among schools has 
increased the quality of schools and if it could be having an effect on the 
levels of social segregation experienced in the country seems to be 
relevant. 
 The data utilisedis the SIMCE (System of Measurement of Quality of 
Education) for the year 2005 and 2009. It corresponds to academic tests 
taken every year in every urban school of the country including 
information related to school location and characteristics. 
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 The results suggest that increasing competition from public schools  
increases the student academic performance of schools located in the 
area and that the performance decreases when the number of voucher 
schools increases. Therefore, voucher schools have not positively 
contributed to educational quality of public schools in Chile, raising doubts 
as to whether or not a privatised market of education really achieves its 
objectives. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
A major goal of social policy in many countries is to design and 
implement an educational system that promotes opportunities for all students, 
with the presumption that education will provide them with the necessary tools 
to have a good future in terms of earnings and quality of life. In this way, 
inequality should be reduced and a healthy flux in society should provide hope 
and incentives for new generations. In this respect, some educational policies 
have focused on increasing public spending on education or increasing teacher 
quality, among other things, but the effectiveness of these policies has not been 
agreed. Zanzig (1997) shows that Scholastic Aptitude Test scores (SAT) from 
1967 to 1992 have declined by more than 50 points in the USA even though the 
spending on education has almost doubled; therefore teachers’ quality, class size 
and other factors financed with that funding could be irrelevant with respect to 
improving students’ performance. Nonetheless, the performance of students 
seems to improve when teachers’ salaries are better and when the time students 
stay in class increases. 
 
Actually, if education is an important determinant in the future earnings 
of people and it is accepted that the quality of education is important, it would 
be beneficial not only to the individual, but also to the whole economy of a 
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country. There are many channels through which education can influence 
earnings, but there is no conclusive evidence that school quality affects them 
(Heckman et al. 1995). In particular, there is no evidence about the relationship 
between test scores, understood as a measure of education quality, and labour 
achievement (Hanushek, 1986). However, it has been traditional in the literature 
to use academic tests to measure quality provided by schools and it is 
considered that good quality education in primary and secondary education are 
important in order to access further levels of education which would determine 
future earnings. 
 
If education is accepted as the main player in terms of explaining the 
levels of social mobility, the quality of education has become the main concern. 
In particular, understanding that if poorer children receive education of high 
standards they will be able to compete better with richer children in the labour 
market. In this context, Restuccia and Urrutia (2002) suggest that differences in 
the quality of early education are considered amongst the most important 
components of earnings persistence across generations. The traditional approach 
for increasing quality of education was increasing resources available to schools. 
However, this seems to be disappointing in terms of increasing incentives of 
students and schools to improve, even though schools are able to provide higher 
added value (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, others, beginning with Friedman (1962), have 
promoted a new approach for making educational systems more efficient, 
namely by increasing the quality of the service provided through decentralisation 
and privatisation of the educational market. With this approach in mind, the 
most recent educational reforms in many countries have been more market-
oriented than previous ones, promoting competition between schools and being 
more reactive in terms of covering the needs and preferences of parents (public 
135 
 
schools offer a standardised and homogeneous service for everyone without 
distinction). Mostly, these reforms have been focused on facilitating the opening 
of private institutions that would be able to provide education. However, in 
practice, the idea of increasing the quality of the service provision through 
increasing competition does not seem to be working as intended. In particular, 
the Chilean experience has always been controversial, considering for example, 
the bad results in international academic tests such as PISA, where Chile has 
been scoring well below average compared to other OECD countries63 (McEwan 
et al., 2008). Similarly, the New Zealand experience seems to indicate that 
competition through privatisation (as in Chile) has failed in terms of increasing 
achievement and therefore opportunities for low income children (Fiske and 
Ladd, 2001). Often, schools compete using marketing techniques or other ways 
to influence the consumer choices, but without a real change in the service 
provided. Clever marketing might attract families with more talented children 
and that in turn would increase the school’s achievement, but it would not do so 
by investing more resources in education itself but by taking resources away to 
spend them on advertising their schools (Lubiensk, 2005). In addition, a lack of 
information available to parents can weaken the competition between schools, 
which can be even worse when the parents are poor or less educated. The 
potential competition could also create more inequality among schools and 
children instead of increasing the standard of education, concentrating poorer or 
less supported children into fewer schools, reducing the overall quality of the 
service. It has been therefore claimed that the educational system is one of the 
main institutions of social reproduction (Breen, 2001). 
 
                                                          
63
 Results of international tests such us PISA and TIMMS can be found in Appendix 3A1, in Table 
3A1.1 and 3A1.2 respectively. 
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In general, the empirical evidence comes from studies that have looked 
at competition effects but only measure the differences in outcomes between 
voucher and public schools, assuming that they compete for students (for 
example, McConnell, et al. (2004), Mizala and Romaguera (1998)). Other studies 
have focused on explaining the levels of socioeconomic segregation in society 
that market-oriented and competitive systems achieve (Nores and Narodowski, 
2002). Few researchers consider the concept of competition as the percentage of 
students enrolled in public versus voucher schools and even fewer consider 
geospatial competition between schools
64
 i.e. to measure the role of location in 
the quality of education provided.  
 
The main concern of research related to competition effects on student 
performance, considering a privatised market of education (which should 
encourage an increase in the service provision) is the lack of data, especially 
because voucher programmes have been, in most cases, implemented on a 
small scale or were too recent to be evaluated. Therefore, most of the research 
has been done in places where the magnitude of the competition effect is very 
small relative to the general impact on the whole educational system of a 
country (McEwan and Carnoy, 2000). For example, there were several voucher 
schools operating in the US where there were privately funded schemes in 
Cleveland (Scholarship and tutoring program), Indianapolis (Educational choice 
charitable trust program) and San Antonio (Children’s educational opportunity 
foundation scholarship program). These programmes were small and are not 
expected to grow much more. There were also two public schooling voucher 
schemes, in Florida and Milwaukee (Wisconsin, USA) where the results were 
mixed, but had high parental satisfaction (Belfield, 2001). 
 
                                                          
64 This could be due to a lack of geo-referential data for the schools’ locations. 
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Chile is a good source of empirical evidence, as a simultaneous voucher 
and privatisation system has been implemented nationwide for more than 30 
years in the country. The country decentralised education in 1980 under a non-
democratic government, initiating a voucher system of provision of education 
which includes religious and non-religious organisations. This was supposed to 
produce an increase in competition and therefore, an increase in educational 
quality in the municipalities that had a larger proportion of private institutions 
(Ladd and Fiske, 2003).  Therefore, it is of interest to analyse how expanding the 
educational market through voucher schools will increase the quality of the 
whole educational system, the quality of public schools or only the quality of 
voucher schools. The possibility of sorting in the educational system has also 
been considered, since children may not be selected by their abilities but more 
worryingly, will be selected solely based upon their parents’ background and 
education. This could be very harmful to the opportunities for new generations, 
concentrating “richer” children in voucher schools and leaving more vulnerable 
children in public schools. The network created in isolation from other 
socioeconomic groups could reproduce social segregation in societies even more, 
and education or, more strictly speaking, the educational system could limit 
social interaction and set aside any hope for less fortunate children. For Chile, in 
terms of the effects of privatisation on an increase in competition and an 
increase in the quality of the service, most of the studies have been focused on 
describing the effect on children’s academic performance due to their attendance 
at public or voucher schools. 
 
This research is motivated by the desire to contribute with evidence to 
the study of the effect of competition and market-oriented educational provisions 
on the level of social segregation and the low levels of social mobility in Chile. It 
is important to keep in mind that the Chilean educational system seems to be in 
crisis, which is reflected by a permanent underperforming in international 
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educational tests (Medrano and Contreras, 2009) and to consider that the 
arguments against voucher systems have always been more ideological than 
actually supported by empirical evidence (Arenas, 2004). Therefore, the aim of 
this research is to measure the impact of the geospatial level of competition 
between Chilean schools on the level of academic performance that they 
achieve. That is, to analyse if a higher number of schools decrease or increase 
academic performance of schools in the area. It will be assumed that 
performance can be a sign of the quality of education that schools provide65 and 
that the skills that children enrolled in that school develop will be a determinant 
in accessing higher levels of education and probably accessing better jobs and 
better salaries in the future. The effect of sorting is also analysed, considering 
that voucher schools could be attracting the best students in the area leaving 
public schools with those that suffer from poverty or who have less educated 
parents. In addition, non-linearities in the effect of competition are considered, 
as maybe competition could reverse its effect when it reaches a certain level. 
 
3.3 School Competition Effects around the World and in Chile 
 
Previous results regarding the effect on school performance due to 
competition seem to be diverse, but it is quite clear that there are differences 
between different studies, which could be related to the fact that the effect of 
competition was analysed in different contexts, but also because some of them 
were aimed at analysing the effect of voucher schools on public school 
performance and others, to the effect of a general competition in the educational 
market in terms of student’s performance. Hoxby (1994) uses data from 
American school choice programmes and finds that student achievement 
improves when they attend voucher schools and that public schools respond 
                                                          
65Controlling for prior school performance. 
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positively to competition. This is confirmed by Arum (1996), pointing out that in 
the US the proportion of private subsidised schools has an important positive 
influence on the performance of public schools, as theory predicts. However, the 
improvement does not seem to be related to an increase of efficiency through 
competition, but because of an increase in the resources provided to public 
schools. 
 
In terms of the decision-making process between voucher and public 
schools, Contreras and Macias (2002) point out that most of the research in the 
USA has been focused on explaining competition based on the Tiebut 
mechanism. This is not relevant for the Chilean case, as in the US, families 
choose the education district based upon the place they choose to live
66
, 
concluding that for Chile the implementation of a voucher system has been 
positive in terms of education quality (considering the Herfindalh Index as a 
measure for school competition)67. On the other hand, Hsieh and Urquiola 
(2003) find that in Chile, school choice does not seem to improve student 
performance and point out the importance of separating between the effects of 
school productivity (increasing the productivity in public schools, as private 
schools are more efficient) and school sorting. They also suggest that if school 
choice induces greater segregation, it is not possible to measure to what extent 
public schools have improved due to greater competition. It is suggested then, 
that the voucher system in Chile produces cream-skimming and that the average 
                                                          
66 In Chile, housing mobility is not very high, 8% in contrast to the USA which has 14%, and in Chile 
most of those families are high income families (Elacqua, 2009c). 
67 Herfindalh Index corresponds to a measure of a firms’s market concentration (for this case, 
school’s market concetration) in relation to other firms (other schools) within the same industry (in 
the same municipality). The index is calculated as the sum of the squared values of all firms' shares 
of a given market (all schools share per municipality). Therefore, an increases in this index indicates 
a decrease in competition within a municipality. 
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performance of public schools probably decreases even though it is possible that 
there has been a slight increase in efficiency, as this kind of school loses their 
best students. This does not mean that voucher systems do not produce any 
benefits, but maybe schools are spending the money on things that some 
parents value more (such as the aesthetic appearance) but not on what actually 
affects productivity which overall could cause the improved efficiency from 
privatisation reforms of the Chilean education system, but that those benefits 
are cancelled out with the increase of inequality (Patrinos and Sakellariou, 
2008). 
 
In addition, it seems that the results for the Chilean case are also varied 
(competition would have positive and negative effects on academic performance) 
depending on the academic test used, the year of the test considered and the 
control variables included. Furthermore, some of the reasons for these 
inconclusive results are that the voucher system which was initially implemented 
in the early 1980s was not a proper voucher system, as initially the budgets of 
public schools were not immediately affected by the reform and the 
decentralisation of public schools was completed in the late 1980s. On top of 
that, test scores were not public until the mid-90s as a democratic government 
was not elected until 1999 and the value of the voucher consistently declined 
during the 1980s and only started increasing in the early 1990s. That could be a 
reason why the results that considered the latest years find a positive effect of 
competition. 
 
Additionally, if other countries are considered, the results are also not 
conclusive. In the British context (where competition is promoted by publishing 
school rankings, but not through a big scale privatisation), Gibbons, et al. (2006) 
analysed the effect of increasing school choice and increasing school competition 
separately for the case of London’s primary schools. The former is related to 
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residential location and depends on the number of schools available to a family; 
the latter is related to school location and depends on the number of schools 
available to students attending a certain school because at the family level, 
these effects are different, finding evidence to suggest that geospatial 
competition affects performance positively but only for faith schools. Slightly 
different results are found by Bradley and Taylor (2002) who analyse the effect 
of the quantity and the quality of schools per area in England, finding that an 
increase in competition actually increases performance of schools in the area. 
This is also found by Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008), for the case of Sweden, 
where the effect of voucher school reform in 1992 is considered, concluding that 
the effect of a bigger share of voucher schools per municipality on student 
performance is positive, but small and only found in the short run (for an 
increase in student performance in a determined year in primary school, but not 
to increase performance of students in secondary school or university tests 
entrance). A summary of these previous results are presented in Table 3.1 
below: 
 
Table 3.1: Summary School Competition Effect on Performance 
Authors Country Measure of Competition Effect of Competition 
on School Quality 
Böhlmark and 
Lindahl (2008) 
Sweden Share of Voucher Schools + , but small and only in 
the short term 
Ladd and Fiske 
(2003) 
New 
Zealand 
Perception of Competition by Head 
Teacher & Increase of Enrolment in 
Voucher Schools per Municipality 
-  
Gibbons, et al. 
(2008) 
London, UK Average Number of Schools 
Accessible to Pupils in each School 
+, but Very Limited 
Bradley and Taylor 
(2002) 
England, 
UK 
Quantity and Quality of  Schools by 
Area 
+ 
Hoxby (1994) US Enrolment of Voucher Schools by 
Area 
+ for Public Schools 
Hsieh and Urquiola 
(2003) 
Chile Enrolment of Voucher Schools by 
Area 
Non Effect for Public 
Schools 
Contreras and 
Macias (2002) 
Chile Herfindalh Index + 
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3.4 Does the Right to Choose Correspond to the Individual’s Ability to 
Choose? 
 
From the theoretical point of view, the increase in welfare implementing a 
voucher system, will be given by an apparent satisfaction of parents that decide 
to move their children from a public to a voucher school. However, the increase 
in welfare for those that can move can be cancelled out by the decrease in 
welfare for those that cannot but who want to (Carnoy, 1998), especially when 
many families move from one area or city to another whilst trying to find jobs 
and cheaper places to live, and educational choice would not be an important 
priority. In addition, using economic theory it is possible to suppose that 
competition will influence the allocation of resources positively and consumers 
would play an active role in choosing their favourite supplier. Therefore, free 
provision does not seem to be equal to free consumption as families have to 
incur some private costs such as transportation, and it is precisely these 
additional costs which make poorer families use education services less than 
richer families. In this context, transportation costs play an important role in the 
impact of a voucher system, as when they are very high, the poorest will be 
limited to attend only the schools in their neighbourhood. Hence, the ability of 
parents to transport their children to the school of their choice cannot be taken 
as certain (Levin, 1991). 
 
In terms of segregation related to school choice, Becker (1995) points out 
that poorer families, in particular, need better education to overcome their lack 
of family support and they are normally destined to accept the schools in their 
neighbourhood as they cannot afford to move house or the travelling costs. In 
addition, consumers face the limitation factor of costs associated with changing 
from one supplier to another. Switching costs seem to play a role when parents 
decide to change or not to change their children from one school to another, so 
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even though better quality schools might be available, families would not change 
their children from their current schools as there is some resistance of parents 
for changing children from school to school68 caused, for example by the stress 
that the change implies by itself, and they will have the problem of comparing 
different suppliers of the educational service. However, for the case of Chile, the 
proportion of children that change school is not insignificant (16.73%), and 
around 19% of students attending public schools move to another school when 
they pass from primary to secondary education (considering only schools that 
offer both primary and secondary education). It seems that even though the 
switching cost can be quite high, there is a breaking point which decreases the 
probability of staying at the old school (Chumancero, et al., 2011), see Table 
3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Number of Students that stay or switch schools (period 2000-2004) 
in the Metropolitan Area69 
Stay Total % Public % Voucher % Private % 
No 2,921 16.73 364 19.15 1,841 20.10 716 11.20 
Yes 14,534 83.27 1,537 80.85 7,318 79.90 5,679 88.80 
 Total 17,455 100 1,901 100 9,159 100 6,395 100 
Source: Chumancero et al. (2011) using SIMCE data set. 
 
Chumancero, et al., (2011) consider this evidence, and point out that 
students that move from one school to another obtain around 5.74 points less in 
academic test scores, than the ones that stay, suggesting that those that move 
                                                          
68 Part of the quality of the educational system is affected by the children’s comfort at the school, if 
parents use their choices correctly in order to move their children, it would imply some sunk costs in 
the process of adaptation implicit when changing schools such as to meet new people, to adapt to 
new rules, changes in the colours of uniform, etc. (Glennerster, 1991). 
69 Table 3.2, only considers students in the 4th grade in 2000 who were attending a school that 
imparts primary and secondary level education, so in 2004 (8th grade, the last one in terms of 
primary education) they could move to another school or stay in the same school. 
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around are moving to worse schools, and probably the movement was not 
related to the parents attempting to find a better future, but it was more likely 
related to expulsion from schools in order to try to maintain certain standards 
(however this cannot be considered as certain, because maybe the students 
presented problems before the transfer). Nevertheless, the schools that improve 
their SIMCE results seem to have higher numbers of students leaving and those 
with a worse SIMCE performance attract most of the students that are moving. 
Therefore, school mobility may not be helping social cohesion (Zamora, 2011). 
 
Despite the costs involved in moving to a school outside the 
neighbourhood, in order to move from one school to another, the Chilean reality 
seems to indicate that there is a certain level of mobility between place of 
residence and the chosen school. According to Chumancero et al. (2009) only 
17.6% of the students attend their nearest schools (24.4% of the students that 
attend public schools go to their nearest school, 15.5% of the children in the 
voucher schools go to their nearest school and 8.9% of the students of private 
chools go to their nearest)70, using the information from about 34 municipalities 
in the Metropolitan Region71. 
 
                                                          
70
 Using data from CASEN it is possible to identify the school that children are attending, and the 
student’s address. Using the name of the school it is possible to find the school in the geographic 
location data set for schools. However, this research does not attempt to do that, because there are 
many names for each school which are similar, but not exactly the same and matching them 
correctly would not be easy. The author of the paper mentioned does try to do so, but only for the 
Metropolitan Region. 
71
 Considering only schools of the same type: 36.3% of public school students choose the closest 
public school, 24.3% of the voucher school students go to the nearest school. So, choosing the 
closest school could be important, but not essential (Chumancero, et al., 2009).  
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In addition, Table 3.3 shows the average distance and the average 
academic performance (quality), where the average distance that students travel 
to their school is around 3 kilometres. Even though this information corresponds 
to students in the Metropolitan area (Greater Santiago), it will be relevant in 
future sections to establish an arbitrary geographical area to measure 
competition. 
 
Table 3.3: Distance (Km) and Quality (SIMCE performance) by type of School 
Administration (Average) in the Metropolitan Area. 
Variable Total Public Voucher Private 
Distance of school chosen  2.9 2.57 2.78 4.22 
Quality of school chosen  256 240 257 295 
Distance of nearest school   0.52 0.46 0.55 0.53 
Quality of nearest school  248 240 246 272 
Distance of nearest public school  0.9 0.67 0.93 1.34 
Quality of nearest public school  232 229 231 246 
Distance of nearest voucher school  0.78 0.71 0.73 1.15 
Quality of nearest voucher school  254 250 253 266 
Distance of nearest private school  1.92 2.08 2.07 0.95 
Quality of nearest private school  286 285 287 287 
Number of schools (2 Km radius)  20.8 21.1 21.3 18.2 
Quality of schools (2 Km radius)  255 252 253 270 
Number of public schools (2 Km radius)  4.4 5.2 4.4 2.2 
Quality of public schools (2 Km radius)  241 239 240 254 
Number of voucher schools (2 Km radius)  13.6 14 15.3 6.3 
Quality of voucher schools (2 Km radius)  252 250 252 263 
Number of private schools (2 Km radius)  2.8 1.9 1.6 9.8 
Quality of private schools (2 Km radius)  286 285 286 287 
Share of students that attend their:          
    nearest school  17.6 24.4 15.5 8.9 
    nearest school of the same type  26.9 36.3 24.3 13.8 
Source:Chumancero, et al. (2009) 
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3.5 Data 
 
The data sets to be used in this chapter are part of the SIMCE (System of 
Measurement of Quality of Education) – an academic test that exists from the 
year 1990 until now. These data sets correspond to academic tests in 
mathematics, reading/writing (in Spanish), natural sciences and history (in 
recent years, English and physical education have also been included), which are 
taken every year in every urban school of the country independent of the 
school’s type of funding (alternating fourth grade and eighth grade in primary 
schools and second grade for secondary schools) by the Ministry of Education 
(Chilean government). For this research, private schools are not taken into 
account, as they were never part of the voucher reform and tuition is fully paid 
by families, with almost no control from the government. 
 
The purpose of these tests is to act as a tool for increasing the quality 
and equity of education in Chile, collecting information about the academic 
performance of students and the quality of the service provided by schools, 
including information about the school’s location and parents’ and teachers’ 
information. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the levels of education that were evaluated each year 
using the SIMCE academic performance test (“x”). So, for example, in the year 
1998 only 4th year primary education students took the test, in 2003 only 
students in their second year of secondary education were evaluated, in 2007 4th 
and 8th years of primary school took the test, etc. The colour of the cells 
corresponds to the chronological compatibility of the test for the same pupils. 
That is, 2 cells will have the same colour if the same students are found in 
another school grade in the following years. For example, students in 4th grade 
in primary school in 1999 were in their 8th grade of primary school in 2003 and 
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in their second grade of secondary school in 2005, that is why the cell is red for 
these cases. Therefore, two pairs of years would be potentially suitable to be 
considered if two cells have the same colour and they are signed with an X: 4th 
Primary 2005 and 8th Primary 2009, 8th Primary 2004 and 2nd Secondary 2006, 
4th Primary 2007 and 8th Primary 2011 or 4th Primary 2006 and 2nd Secondary 
2012. Each year, the sample corresponds to approximately 4,450 schools and 
350,000 students distributed in to 15 regions and 330 municipalities (this is in 
fact, a population sample as all urban schools have been considered). 
 
Table 3.4: Level of Schooling Evaluated Using the SIMCE Test by Year 
Year Level of Education 
  4th Primary 8th Primary 2nd Secondary 
1998     x 
1999 x     
2000   x   
2001     x 
2002 x     
2003     x 
2004   x   
2005 x     
2006 x   x 
2007 x x   
2008 x   x 
2009 x x   
2010 x   x 
2011 x x   
2012 x   x 
 
The information is collected for the school but also for the students. 
However, there is no personal identification code that allows the students to be 
followed over time, only the schools can be followed. In order to select the years 
to be used for this research, the aim was to choose 2 years where the same 
children were evaluated, allowing to control for previous attainment of students. 
The year 2002, for example, is not suitable, as if 4th year primary school 
students in 2002 were evaluated in primary school and four years later, when 
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they are in their 8th of primary school, the test was taken in the 2nd year of 
secondary education in that year. However, the year 2005 and the year 2009 are 
compatible as in 2005 the test was taken in the 4th  year of primary school and 
four years later the test was taken in the 8th year of primary school. The years 
2004 and 2006 would also be suitable, as in the year 2004 students were 
evaluated in their 8th year of primary education, and two years later, in 2006, 
the students would be in their 2nd year of secondary education. Nevertheless, 
this combination will be avoided as there is a lot of mobility between students to 
different schools when they finish primary education, so it is unlikely that the 
students in 2004 that were in their 8th year of primary school will remain at the 
same school to receive secondary education. Another suitable combination would 
be the years 2006 and 2011 or the years 2007 and 2012, but the information 
was not available when this research commenced and they are both 5 years 
apart which could not be appropriated in terms of controlling for previous 
educational attainment. Therefore, the years to be used are 2005 and 2009, 
because in this way the students evaluated in a specific year attending a specific 
grade are also evaluated in a further grade in the future. 
 
In practical terms, the performance of schools is calculated as the 
school’s average score in mathematics and Spanish for each year. Additional 
information about schools, which is not found in the SIMCE data set, has been 
added using the schools’ identification number. In addition, in order to include 
characteristics of the municipalities and schools involved, other data sets have 
been included. The connection between the school’s information data set and 
municipalities’ information has been done using the location of each school 
(name of the municipality in which they are located) and the respective 
municipalities’ name in the local governments data set. In terms of the 
geographic coordinates data (schools’ address), the information is found in 
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metres by UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator), which is a projection that uses 
2-dimensional Cartesian coordinates to represent the surface of the Earth.  
 
Table 3.5 below shows the variables that have been taken from the main 
data set to be used (SIMCE) and from the other data sets. The information 
related to municipalities corresponds to illiteracy and poverty levels, assuming 
that they would affect the performance of students in an area (even though 
students do not necessarily live in the same municipality as where schools are 
located). In addition, the spending by municipalities on public education is 
expected to control for different levels of resources available to schools. Other 
municipality information is also used, for example, the average schooling of the 
population or the human development index, which includes information about 
education, health and income of every area. 
 
There is one particular piece of information that has not been presented 
in Table 3.5, the number of Catholic churches and chapels by municipality. This 
information will help to solve some endogeneity problems in the estimation that 
will be explained in subsequent sections. The reason for not presenting the 
information as an additional data set utilised is that it was manually created - it 
does not exist by itself. It was created using information disclosed on-line by 
Catholic archbishops on their respective web sites. The majority of the 
information was found as: Name of the parish (or main church, which is serviced 
by at least one priest), the number of chapels (secondary churches depending on 
the parish) and their addresses. The number of churches (and chapels) was 
counted manually and connected to a municipality’s name (using the address 
information). Hence, it is possible to link this to the previous data sets. However, 
it was not possible to acquire information for all the municipalities involved, 
mostly because there was no information related to church location or the 
records were not available to the general public or researchers. Therefore, there 
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are only 212 out of 345 municipalities that have information regarding the 
number of Catholic churches. 
 
Table 3.5: Data Sets, Variables and Years Included 
Data Sets Variables, Year 
SIMCE 2009, 
Ministry of Education 
Average Academic Test Performance (SIMCE) by 
School, 2009 
  Average Income of Parents by School, 2009 
  Educational Level of Father by School, 2009 
http://www.simce.cl/  Educational Level of Mother by School, 2009 
  Average Income of Households by School, 2009 
  Type of School (Voucher or Public), 2009 
    
Schools Directory, Ministry of Education Number of Students by School, 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/    
Enrolment, Ministry of Education Number of Teachers by School, 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/  Number of Teachers’ Working Hours by School 
  Gender of Students by School, 2009 
    
Vulnerability Index, Ministry of Education Vulnerability Index of Schools, 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/  Students Socioeconomic Groups, 2009 
    
Voucher Registration, Ministry of Education Type of  Voucher School (Fee or Free), 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/  Fee, 2009 
  
Vulnerable Children, Ministry of Education  Number of Vulnerable Children by School, 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/    
SIMCE 2005, Ministry of Education 
Average Academic Test Performance (SIMCE) by 
School, 2005 
http://www.mineduc.cl/    
School Geographic Location, Ministry of Education, 
Chilean Government (X,Y) Coordinates by School, 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/    
CASEN 2006, Ministry of Development and Planning Poverty Level  by Municipality, 2006 
http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl    
Municipality Indicators, Ministry of Housing and 
Urbanism 
Perception Close to Public Transportation by 
Municipality, 2010 
http://www.observatoriourbano.cl/indurb/seleccion.asp  Perception of Traffic Jam Level by Municipality, 2010 
  Books per capita by Municipality, 2001 
  Illiteracy Level by Municipality, 2006 
  Water Coverage by Municipality, 2006 
  Electricity Coverage by Municipality, 2006 
  Average Schooling Population by Municipality, 2006 
  Municipality Information, SINIM: Municipality 
Information National System Education Spending Per Capita  by Municipality, 2006 
http://www.sinim.gov.cl/    
Human Development Index by Municipality, UNDP & 
Ministry of Development  Human Development Index by Municipality, 2003 
http://www.desarrollohumano.cl/    
Census 2002, National Estadistics Institute Number of Indigenous People by Municipality, 2002 
http://www.ine.cl/  Number of Catholic People by Municipality, 2002 
  Population Density by Municipality, 2002 
  
Population Total and 5 to 14 years old by Municipality, 
2002 
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In terms of the sample characteristics, the sample used is characterised 
by having a similar proportion of public relative to voucher schools performing 
the test in 2009, where 32.7% are totally free voucher schools and 67.4% are 
voucher schools charging tuition fees (see Table 3.6). In addition, 238 
municipalities of the sample have at least 1 voucher school. The municipalities 
included in the analysis are 330 (as mentioned before) out of 346 with a total of 
4,457 schools. 
 
Table 3.6: % of Each School Type (2009) 
School Type Number % 
Public 2,450 54.97% 
Voucher 2,007 45.03% 
Voucher_Free 655 32.64% 
Voucher_Fees 1,352 67.36% 
Total Schools 4,45772 100% 
 
In addition, Table 3.7 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample 
used, considering school characteristics, students’ performance and municipality 
features73. For example, in some schools less than 15% of pupils are vulnerable, 
but in other schools 100% of their students are considered vulnerable. There is a 
large difference between levels of their HDI (human development index) 
between municipalities; this index combines the estimation of life expectancy at 
birth of individuals, their health and income. Moreover, there is also a large 
difference in the level of poverty found in each municipality, showing potential 
residential segregation among Chilean households. Differences are also found 
related to the education of parents in every school, some schools probably 
receive the benefits of receiving children where all the parents have finished 
                                                          
72
 The number of schools is later reduced to around 3,000 when considering the control variables 
included. 
73
 More information (classified by voucher or public schools) is found in Appendix 3A2. (Table 3A2.1 
and Table 3A2.2). 
152 
 
tertiary education and others are probably affected by the disadvantage of 
parents with very low levels of education. In addition, there is a large difference 
in terms of the percentage of Catholic individuals living in each municipality, 
from between 23% to 96% professing faith. 
 
Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics74 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number Churches by Municipality 3,529 7.08 6.06 1.00 28.00 
Spending Education per capita (Thousands of Chilean 
Pesos) by School 4,415 74.21 37.93 9.39 297.84 
Density (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality Population by 
Km2 4,457 3,340 6,075 0 29,654 
Fee by School (Chilean pesos) 4,457 5,178 11,742 0 76,402 
average Income Parents by School (Chilean Pesos) 4,355 283,954 189,536 50,000 1,631,429 
% Mother Tertiary Education by School 4,355 4.04 7.69 0 100 
% Father Tertiary Education by School 4,355 4.95 9.17 0 100 
Total Population  by Municipality 4,457 121,110 115,789 507 492,915 
Population (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality 4,473 21,749 21,777 8 102,760 
% Indigenous by Municipality 4,457 5.49 9.43 0.18 78 
% Vulnerable Students by School 4,415 75.69 15.28 14.57 100 
% Catholics by Municipality 4,457 70.71 9.53 23.04 96 
Average Schooling Population by Municipality (years) 4,016 8.34 1.46 5.57 14 
% Infant Mortality by Municipality 4,058 9.06 9.03 0.00 77 
HDI 2003 by Municipality 4,400 0.71 0.05 0.51 1 
% Poverty by Municipality 4,455 14.79 6.69 0.60 51 
Weekly Working Hours Teachers per Students 4,457 1.73 0.70 0.31 7 
Score_Language8_2009 by School 4,457 243.80 23.71 154 329 
Score_Math8_2009 by School 4,457 248.95 25.64 180 340 
Score_Language8_2005 by School 4,386 249.59 25.28 150 329 
Score_Math8_2005 by School 4,382 240.84 27.01 150 326 
avgSIMCE_2009 by School 4,457 246.37 23.82 175 334 
avgSIMCE_2005 by School 4,380 245.23 25.64 150 325 
Total Teachers per 20 Student by School 2009 4,457 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.09 
Size School 2009 (number of Students) by School 4,457 491.75 426.78 20 5,107 
% Illiteracy by Municipality 4,058 4.19 2.92 0.30 14.09 
% Positive Perception Public Transportation by Municipality 3125 85.10 7.54 43.20 99.00 
 
                                                          
74
 Descriptive statistics for the restricted sample size used under the Instrumental Variable 
methodology can be found in Appendix 3A2. (Table 3A2.3). The sample is reduced because 
information about the number of churches is available for only 212 municipalities. 
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3.6 Methodology 
 
3.6.1 The Model 
 
 The impact of competition between schools on school quality will be 
analysed considering the approach followed by Gibbons et al. (2008) which is 
based on the following model: 
 
                           
 
Where     corresponds to the average academic performance (understood 
as the quality of education, even though it is certain that other issues can be 
considered75) of children in school s at year t (2009).         is theaverage 
performance of the same children in an earlier year (2005) in the school sto 
controlfor a school’s previous performance, in a way that allows the estimation of 
the change in school performance, instead of focusing on current performance by 
itself. This is of particular importance because it will allow the measurement of 
the added value effect of competition.          corresponds to the competition index 
of the school s at year t, that is, the number of schools that are in a straight line 
distance of less than 3 km76 from the school analysed77.      is the vector of 
student, school and neighbourhood characteristics and     is the error term. 
                                                          
75
 Quality consist of much more than just a standardised academic test, it could also be measured by 
class size, expenditures, student performance, by measures of teachers’ skills (Hanushek, 1986) or 
by the success of children in their future labour market, even though academic tests are found to 
have a weak correlation with labour market outcomes (Card and Krueger, 1996). 
76
 The distance was selected using the average distance that students travel from their residence to 
their school presented by Chumancero, et al. (2009). 
77
 The schools that are used are the voucher and public ones around a determined school, using as 
location two dimensional Cartesian coordinates. 
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For example, Graph 3.1 shows two schools (S1 and S2) and a number of 
public and voucher schools around them, within a radius of 3 km. In the case of 
S1, there are 5 public schools and 4 voucher schools around it. On the other 
hand, S2 has 6 public schools and 5 voucher schools around it. Therefore, the 
competition index from public schools having an effect on the performance of 
school S1 is equal to 5 and the competition index from public schools on the 
performance of S2 is equal to 6 (the same procedure is used for calculating 
competition indexes from voucher schools on school S1 and S2). This approach 
of fixing the radius of 3 km differs from Gibbons et al. (2008) as they define 
travel zones that encompass all the postcodes in the same Local Education 
Authority as the school s and that are inside the circle drawn around the school s 
at the median of the distribution of the distance between school and houses for 
that school’s students. This is not possible for this research as the data do not 
include students’ house location, and travel zones are not possible to define. This 
creates the limitation of not incorporating either the geography or the density of 
every municipality into the competition measure. Although the density issue has 
been solved by controlling for this variable), some cities have a concentration of 
schools in their city centre, leaving their hills for residential location. Therefore, it 
may look as though such cities have a high competition index, when in reality 
this is due to the particular geographic characteristics of each area. 
 
Graph 3.1: Competition Index Calculation 
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In the case of competition indices, they were calculated using the location 
coordinates by school mentioned before. In order to measure the distance 
between school locations three additional programmes were used: ArcGis 10 (in 
particular, the ArcMap application), Geospatial Modelling Environment (GME) and 
R+ which allows calculation of the distance between geographic points. 
 
ArcGis allows one to use Excel data (the data given by the Chilean 
government are in an Excel format) and export it as a shapefile (or shp). This 
transformation is necessary as the ArcGis version utilised does not allow the 
calculation of distance between points by itself (in previous versions that was 
possible using some ArcGis extensions). However, GME is able to read ArcGis 
files (shp) and to calculate the distance between points using as an extension of 
the statistics programme R+. The calculation of distances are again exported to 
csv (Comma Separated Value) format which is easily imported to Stata, allowing 
the connection of the geographic coordinates information with the other data 
sets via the unique identification number for schools. 
 
In practical terms, the competition index is applied only to primary 
schools in urban areas and it is separated initially in to two competition indexes: 
A public competition index (which represents the number of public schools 
around school s) and a voucher competition index (which represents the number 
of voucher schools around school s). Using only primary education would help 
because children often move between schools when they progress to secondary 
education (many primary schools do not allow for the possibility of continuing 
onto the secondary level at the same institution).  
 
Considering also the fact that voucher schools impose a tuition fee, the 
competition index for voucher schools is also divided into two, a voucher 
competition index that represents the number of voucher schools around school 
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s that charge some tuition fee and a voucher competition index that represents 
the number of voucher schools around school s that are totally free. 
 
The modifications above are to be incorporated into the model as follows: 
 
a) Separating between public and voucher schools: 
 
                                                   
 
b) Separating between public, voucher schools with tuition fee and free 
voucher schools: 
 
                                                                              
          
 
In addition, the competition index is re-calculated considering the quality 
(average test performance) of public schools that are located at less than 3 km 
from school s and the quality of education of voucher schools that are located at 
less than 3 km from school s, as suggested by Bradley, et al. (1999).  
 
On the other hand, competition indices could undesirably capture the 
effect of urban density and school size effects (Gibbons, et al., 2008), therefore, 
the competition indices described above have also been calculated, dividing them 
by the number of people living in the municipality where the school s is located. 
Also, the theoretical idea of increasing public school performance due to an 
increase in competition from the private sector (increase in the number of 
voucher schools around public schools) has been considered, but also the 
possibility of important levels of sorting (better students going to voucher 
schools and worse students staying in public schools) which would influence a 
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decline in quality levels of public schools when they face voucher school 
competition78.  
 
Moreover, considering that Chile is a country that spans a vast longitude 
where people face different realities and there are large regional differences in 
terms of inequality of opportunities of access to education and health (Contreras, 
et al., 2009) the results are estimated using 4 out of the 15 different regions, 
the Metropolitan Region (the most highly populated region located in the centre 
of the country), the Atacama Region (located in the north of Chile, covered 
mostly by the driest desert in the world, The Atacama’s Desert (Wierzchos, et 
al., 2006), Valparaiso Region (the third most populous region, located in the 
centre of the country and where the one of the busiest ports resides) and the 
Bio-Bio Region (the second most populated, located in the south of Chile). 
 
The effect on a public school’s academic performance due to the number 
of public schools around it and the same for voucher schools will be evaluated, to 
try to analyse if competition from voucher schools affects the performance of 
public schools. In particular, the equations include interaction variables including 
competition indices and a dummy variable that indicates the type of schools 
analysed. This allows the analysis of the effect from public schools on voucher 
school performance or the effect from voucher schools on public schools, for 
example: 
 
 
                                                          
78 Spillover effects have also been considered using the spatial econometric matrix available in Stata. 
However, due to a lack of memory, it was impossible to perform. Note, however, that  municipality 
characteristics were not particularly significant, therefore neighbouring municipalities are unlikely to 
have more effect, except perhaps for schools located on the borders. 
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i) CIndexPublic_VoucherDummy= CIndexPublic*VoucherDummy, therefore if the 
VoucherDummy is equal to 1 (the school analysed is a voucher school), the 
interaction term will capture the difference between the effect of public schools 
on voucher schools compared to the effect of public schools on other public 
schools. On the other hand, if the VoucherDummy is equal to 0 (the school 
analysed is public), the coefficient on the CompetitionIndex_Public by itself will 
capture the effect of public schools in the area on public school performance in 
the area. 
 
ii) CIndexVoucher_VoucherDummy=CIndexVoucher*VoucherDummy, therefore 
if VoucherDummy is equal to 1 (the school analysed is a voucher school), the 
interaction term will capture the difference between the effect of voucher schools 
on public schools compared to the effect of voucher schools on other voucher 
schools. On the other hand, if the VoucherDummy is equal to 0 (the school 
analysed is public), then the coefficient on the CompetitionIndex_Voucher by 
itself will capture the effect of voucher schools in the area on public school 
performance in the area. 
 
 Finally, the robustness of the results will be tested, using different 
distances to calculate the competitive index, i.e. 2 kilometres and 4 kilometres 
as a lower and higher band of the original 3 kilometres. 
 
3.6.2 Estimation Bias and Instrumental Variables 
 
To compare schools it is necessary to control for children’s characteristics, 
school characteristics and their background, in order to be able to compare them 
at the same condition and effectively analyse if the quality of education is really 
affected by the competition that schools face and not because the students and 
schools face different environments. Nevertheless, competition could be an 
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endogenous variable, as more schools could be established in a particular area 
because, for example, better performing students could be located there 
(reverse causality), so the competition index would be correlated with the error 
term and OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimation will be biased and 
inconsistent, as there will be a violation of one of the assumptions which are 
relevant for this methodology. In addition, due to the fact that voucher schools 
will be more likely built in areas where low quality public schools are located 
(acting as a substitute for the latter), the comparison of the academic 
performance of students attending public schools with the performance of 
students attending voucher schools is not easy when areas differ in the 
proportion of voucher schools found. A simple comparison will confuse the effect 
of an increasing demand for voucher schools due to their potential higher 
efficiency with the possibility that voucher schools are going to be in higher 
demand when public schools are of low quality. In other words, the number of 
voucher schools could be endogenous to the quality of public schools and that 
would create a downward biased OLS estimation of the effect on school 
performance in academic tests (Hoxby, 1994). The solution is to use the 
instrumental variable approach described below: 
 
Considering the linear model:                                 , where 
   is endogenous if       (    )   . 
 
 For the Chilean case, the endogenous variable is the voucher school 
competition index. The public school competition index is considered as 
exogenous because the local government does not have a clear policy that 
makes them decide to build new schools, and also the possibility of closing public 
schools seems to be very unlikely. 
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If one assumes that there is an additional variable,    (the instrument) 
which satisfies two assumptions:  
 
a)   is uncorrelated with   :            
b)   is correlated with    :    (    )    
 
Then,    should simply have no effect on   after controlling for all      - in 
other words,   should not be correlated with an unobserved factor that 
affects      - and,   must be related (positively or negatively) to the endogenous 
variable     . 
 
It is important to keep in mind that condition a) cannot be tested and it is 
only possible to appeal to economic theory. On the other hand, condition b) can 
be tested by regressing      on   , if the coefficient on   is significantly different 
from zero, then the assumption holds. 
 
In addition, IV estimation is always considered as being biased in small 
samples. However, using a large enough sample considerably reduces their bias, 
so that IV estimation is consistent, even though in large samples, IV methods 
can still have problems if the instruments are weak  (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Finding good instruments is not easy, they should be correlated with the 
number of voucher schools found in a determined area, but they should not have 
an impact on the performance of students. One of the variables that achieves 
these requirements is the percentage of Catholics in each municipality, 
considering that an important percentage of voucher schools are officially 
Catholic and many others are at least nemed according to Catholic saints or 
otherwise that could potentially attract Catholic families. Catholic voucher 
schools would be favoured by sharing buildings and having more available 
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teachers (nuns and priests79). However, the proportion of Catholics could be 
misleading in the sense that many people claim to be Catholic (according to the 
2002 census, more than 70% of the Chilean population purport to be Catholic), 
but they are not fully practicing their faith, and in many cases they do not pay 
too much attention to the religion of the school as Chilean society is quite 
homogenous in this respect, so this would not make too much of a difference in 
terms of values or ethical preferences. 
 
Therefore, a second option was to select as an instrument the number of 
Catholic churches by municipality, where a larger number of them implies a 
larger number of Catholic households that are more likely to care strictly for 
Catholic education and would like to attend a school with such a system. 
Therefore, a high number of Catholic churches likely indicates that the area 
would be populated by families that are more concerned about practicing 
Catholic values and traditions and also with families that might care more about 
religious education, than areas with a lower number of Catholic people that are 
not very interested in practicing their faith (areas with less Catholic churches 
around), and about sending their children to Catholic schools. Some voucher 
schools are officially Catholic (registered with the Catholic Church), but others 
may choose a name of a Catholic saint as the name of their school (even though 
the school is not registered as officially Catholic), and in this way they attract 
students with parents that primarily are concerned about Catholic education.  
 
                                                          
79The fact that churches will create more space of study for children in the area, potentially 
increasing their academic performance, does not really impact the instrument used, as the number of 
churches by municipality is considered rather than by a neighbourhood area where schools are 
located. So, all the schools in the same municipality will have the same number of churches as an 
instrument. 
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Therefore, it is expected that a higher number of Catholic churches by 
municipality will increase the number of voucher schools in that particular area. 
In addition, Catholic schools are believed to be exogenous, that is, no churches 
are built or closed over time, therefore they do not follow a tendency associated 
with a higher development or a larger amount of amenities in a particular area. 
 
3.6.3 Quantile Regression, Split Sample and the Impact of 
Socioeconomic Background 
 
Quantile Regression techniques are also used to analyse the results. In 
particular, different competition effects are expected to be found depending of 
the levels of performance that schools achieve, so for example, a higher effect 
on competition on higher performance schools is expected to be found, 
asparents in this kind of school would care more about the school’s academic 
achievements and would also have more information about it. On the other 
hand, performance in academically lower-achieving schools should not be as 
affected by competition from other schools. The details of quantile regression 
estimation have already been presented in the previous chapter, but 
implementing it in terms of the impact of school competition on school 
performance the school s will be in the     quantile of academic performance if 
school s has an academic performance larger than the proportion   of all the 
schools and lower performance than the quantity     (Koenker and Hallock, 
2001). So basically, applying the quantile regression methods to the estimation 
of competition effects on school performance: 
 
            ( |                       )                                  
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Additionally, the sample is split according to the socioeconomic condition 
of schools. For this, the original sample is divided into five, corresponding to the 
five categories (A, B, C, D and E) of the average socioeconomic status of families 
that attend each school given by the Ministry of Education and using the 
conglomerate technique80. They are classified in this way considering the 
average education and monthly income of each household which has children 
attending each school, and the average vulnerability index of their students (this 
is given by the Ministery of Education and considers the probability that pupils 
drop school considering chracteristics related to education and income of their 
parents, socio-cultural background, and neighbourhood where they live, among 
others). 
 
In order to consider the socioeconomic level of the school (A, B, C, D and 
E), the creation of five new samples would be required. Each sample could have 
a different impact of competition on the level of performance, so the coefficient 
that represents the index of competition can take different values depending on 
the socioeconomic level of the school (although the competition could come from 
any socioeconomic group of schools). 
 
3.7 Results 
 
3.7.1 Descriptive Results 
 
Competition between schools, understood as the number of schools 
(public or voucher) in a particular area, seems to vary depending on the type of 
school analysed.  Schools face an average of 2.7 public schools in a 3 km 
                                                          
80
 In this way, a school’s characteristics within the same group are similar and different to schools’ 
characteristics of other groups. 
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radius81. On the other hand, schools face, on average, a larger number of 
voucher schools around them (9.1 schools). However, as presented in Table 3.8, 
schools face more competition from voucher schools that charge tuition fees 
(7.3), which follows the logic that totally free voucher schools are normally run 
by Catholic or charitable institutions, therefore it is unlikely for them to decide to 
build too many schools in the same area. 
 
 
Table 3.8: Competition Index by School Type (3 km) 
 
 
The Chilean educational system seems to be suffering an evident 
segregation of students by social class: the poorest children attend public 
schools, generating segregation in the educational system, and likely negative 
peer effects. Table 3.9 shows the distribution of socio-economic groups of 
schools. These socioeconomic groups are given by the Ministry of Education, 
considering information related to the average parents’ income and schooling 
and the level of vulnerability82 of children by school. Group A includes the 
poorest and the most vulnerable schools, followed by group B which also 
includes schools that have been classified as being attended (on average) by 
children from poorer backgrounds but a bit better-off than the first group. 
Groups C and D include what could represent the schools that attend the middle 
class.  
                                                          
81
 This figure differs from Table 4.2 as there, only schools in the capital of Chile have been 
considered. 
82
 Corresponding to an index that involves the probability of leaving the school, students’ and 
parents’ health characteristics, cultural environment, socioeconomics and psychosocial 
characteristics, etc. (JUNAEB, 2005). 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CompIndex_Public by School 4,457 2.70 5.02 0 41 
CompIndex_Voucher by School 4,457 9.09 12.00 0 66 
CompIndexVoucher_free by School 4,457 1.75 2.96 0 25 
CompIndexVoucher_fees by School 4,457 7.33 10.36 0 63 
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It is possible to see that public school students are part of the poorest 
group, having a student composition higher in group A (33.7% of public schools 
arefrom group A). That is, pupils from the poorest backgrounds are over-
represented in public schools. However, free voucher schools also service very 
poor students (33.9% of this type of schools are from group A). On the other 
hand, voucher schools that charge a fee to parents seem to attract middle class 
students (group C and D are the most popular among these schools).  
 
Group E is actually very small because the amount of schools classified as 
being attended by average “richer” families are very few, as richer students 
normally go to fully privatised schools. This analysis could be revealing some 
hints of sorting in the Chilean educational system, where students are clustered 
in their schools considering their social background. The sorting effect in other 
educational systems seems to arise due to parental decisions of where to live, or 
due to the selection process about who will benefit from school vouchers (for 
example, poorer female students) as mentioned by Burgess et al. (2005), but in 
the Chilean case seems to be related to the selection process that voucher 
schools implement. 
 
Table 3.9: Distribution of Schools According to Socioeconomic Group 
Type of 
School 
Socio-Economic Group 
A B C D E Total 
Public 820 33.7% 1,258 51.7% 331 13.6% 24 1.0% 0 0.0% 2,433 100% 
Voucher_Fee 4 0.3% 144 10.5% 627 45.8% 565 41.3% 29 2.1% 1,369 100% 
Voucher_Free 222 33.9% 246 37.6% 167 25.5% 19 2.9% 1 0.2% 655 100% 
Total 1,046 23.5% 1,648 37.0% 1,125 25.2% 608 13.6% 30 0.7% 4,457 100% 
 
 The concentration of poorer children in public schools seems to affect 
their performance, Table 3.10 shows the average student performance by school 
in the SIMCE academic test, where it is shown that public schools have a lower 
academic performance than voucher schools and privileged children (the ones 
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that normally attend voucher schools that charge tuition fees) have better 
results. This could effectively be because voucher schools are more efficient at 
producing better results than public schools, or because children that attend 
voucher schools have better abilities, or because their parents can help them 
and support them in their studies, not allowing for an equalising effect of the 
educational process.  
 
Table 3.10: Average Student Performance by School in SIMCE (2009) 
Type of School  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public 238.10 18.45 175 329 
Free Voucher 241.18 22.86 184 322 
Fee Voucher 263.89 23.59 183 334 
 
 Nevertheless, looking at the changes in performance (value-added), the 
percentage of schools that improved their academic performance from the year 
2005 to the year 2009 (that is when the performance of a school in 2005 is 
compared to the performance of the same school in the year 2009) is higher 
among free voucher schools (64.0%) and very similar between public schools 
and fee-based voucher schools (49.2% and 50.4% respectively)83. See Table 
3.11. 
 
Table 3.11: % Schools Improving their Academic Performance 
Variable N % 
Public 1,187 49.23 
Free Voucher 405 63.98 
Fee Voucher 673 50.37 
Total84 2,265 
   
The following section presents the results obtained using competition indices and 
their effect on performance. 
 
                                                          
83 Any level of improvement has been considered. 
84 The sample is reduced because it corresponds only to the schools that have improved. 
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3.7.2 Estimation Results 
 
The main interest of this research is to analyse the effect of school 
competition on the level of performance of schools. Considering the OLS 
estimation, the results are found in Table 3.13 column a. Results indicate that a 
higher number of public schools has a positive effect on the academic 
performance of schools in an area of 3 km radius and that a higher number of 
voucher schools in the area has a negative effect on the academic performance 
of surrounding schools: one additional public school in the area improves the 
neighbour school’s academic performance by 1.598 points and the effect of 
voucher schools in the area decreases the performance of neighbouring schools 
by 0.763 points. Both effects are small if it is considered that the possible 
average academic performance varies from 175 to 334 points, but relevant if it 
is considered that the results control for the previous academic performance 
results (year 2005) to appreciate the improvement from one period of time to 
another which on average is equal to 1.27, instead of just measuring the 
absolute effect on academic performance. Therefore, the effect of competition 
mentioned above corresponds to an increase/decrease in academic performance, 
relative to previous performance. These results may be contrary to what was 
originally expected, but it could be representative of the idea that voucher 
schools take the best students and in a particular area there could be one or two 
good schools that are attracting the best students, deteriorating the performance 
of all the other schools in the area (the prestigious school would improve its 
performance, but on average the performance across all schools could 
decrease). Otherwise this result could be produced by a tendency to locate 
voucher schools where public schools have bad results and a bad reputation85.  
 
                                                          
85
 The endegoneity of voucher school location will be tackled in the following sections. 
168 
 
Voucher schools effectively seem to be more efficient, obtaining better 
results than public ones as presented in column a. of Table 3.13. In particular, 
voucher school pupils achieve around 13 points higher on average than public 
school pupils, which could be a reason for why their coverage has increased over 
time and a consequence of the way that voucher schools allocate their 
resources, or because, as was mentioned above, the bad quality of public 
schools which leads families to send their children to voucher schools, leaving 
the best students in these kinds of institutions, or because, in fact, voucher 
schools enrol students with different characteristics (for example, more able 
pupils), therefore voucher students would also benefit from better peers 
(McEwan, 2004). The idea that more able children attend the same schools will 
be of particular concern; because more able students are those that likely 
receive greater support from their parents, because their parents are probably 
also more able and better educated (see Topor et al. 2010). This would increase 
the inequality of educational opportunities of children and it could increase the 
effect of parental background on a child’s educational attainment, which could 
play a very important role in the intergenerational reproduction of inequality. In 
the case of Chile, even though there has been a large educational expansion and 
social policies have focused on decreasing inequality, the effect of parental 
background on the educational attainment of children has been constant over 
time (Torche, 2005), therefore pupils with similar background and ability in the 
same classroom, sharing a large proportion of their life, could create friendship 
and social connections that could reinforce previous inequalities in society.  
 
To facilitate the understanding of the results, Table 3.12 tabulates a 
dictionary of the variables utilised in future tables: 
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Table 3.12: Dictionary of Variables 
Variable Definition Level 
CompIndex_Public  Competition Index from Public Schools School  
CompIndex_Voucher  Competition Index from Voucher Schools School  
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexVoucher 
(interaction).  
Perception of  Transportation system 
asks  individuals how they perceive the 
public transport (with higher values 
indicating a more positive perception) 
Interaction Variable between people’s 
perception of transportation system coverage 
in the municipality they live and the 
competition Index from voucher schools Municipality  
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexPublic 
(interaction) 
Perception of  Transportation system 
asks  individuals how they perceive the 
public transport (with higher values 
indicating a more positive perception) 
Interaction Variable between people’s 
perception of transportation system coverage 
in the municipality they live and the 
competition Index from public schools Municipality  
avgTest_2005 Average Performance (Mathematics and 
Spanish) in the academic test SIMCE in 2005 School 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent Number of Weekly Working Hours per 
Student School  
voucher_School Dummy Variable: 1 if Voucher School and 0 if 
Public School School  
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) 
Interaction variable between the dummy 
variable of voucher school and the number of 
weekly hours per student School 
ComIndexPublic_VoucherSchool 
(interaction) 
Interaction variable between the competition 
index from public schools and the dummy 
variable of voucher school School  
ComIndexVoucher_VoucherSchool 
(interaction) 
Interaction variable between the competition 
index from voucher schools and the dummy 
variable of voucher school School  
%_Father_UniversityDegree Percentage of Fathers that have completed a 
university degree School  
%_Mother_UniversityDegree Percentage of Mothers that have completed a 
university degree School  
avgIncome_Parents Average Income of Parents School  
girls Dummy Variable: 1 if Schools is only for girls 
and 0 otherwise School  
boys Dummy Variable: 1 if Schools is only for boys 
and 0 otherwise School 
fee Fee charged by the school to parents School 
Density_5_14 Population density of individuals between 5 
and 14 years old Municipality  
% Poverty (defining 'poor' as a 
household’s monthly income per capita 
below the poverty line; established by 
the Chilean government, which is 
around £70) Percentage of poor individuals Municipality 
%_Indigenous Percentage of indigonous individuals Municipality  
BooksperCapita_2001 Number of books per capita 2001 Municipality  
%_Illiteracy_2006 Percentage of illiterate individuals in 2006 Municipality 
AvgSchoolingPop Average Schooling of Population Municipality 
Munispe_EducPC Municipality spending on Education per capita Municipality  
170 
 
Table 3.13: Effect of Competition on Performance, OLS and IV Results 
School Performance 
a: OLS 
(Quantity) b: OLS 
Interaction 
c: IV d: IV 
Interaction 
e: OLS 
(Restricted 
Sample) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public  1.598** 1.450** 3.092** 3.024* 1.684*** 
School Level (0.625) (0.610) (1.449) (1.556) (0.627) 
CompIndex_Voucher  -0.763** -0.761** -1.646* -1.649* -0.804** 
School Level (0.377) (0.376) (0.916) (0.951) (0.378) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexVoucher (interaction) 0.008* 0.008* -0.032* -0.033* 0.008* 
School Level (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018) (0.004) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexPublic (interaction) -0.018** -0.018** 0.014 0.015 -0.019*** 
School Level (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
SchoolPerformance_2005 0.559*** 0.559*** 0.574*** 0.574*** 0.564*** 
School Level (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent 0.460 0.309 -0.089 -0.158 0.108 
School Level (0.712) (0.731) (0.811) (0.756) (0.744) 
voucher_School 13.903*** 13.077*** 13.578*** 13.298*** 13.354*** 
School Level (2.014) (2.269) (2.329) (2.713) (2.174) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) -5.455*** -5.236*** -5.284*** -5.167*** -5.095*** 
School Level (1.119) (1.141) (1.308) (1.199) (1.209) 
ComIndexPublic_VoucherSchool (interaction)   0.284*   0.328   
School Level   (0.149)   (0.260)   
ComIndexVoucher_VoucherSchool (interaction)   -0.039   -0.086   
School Level   (0.045)   (0.171)   
%_Father_UniversityDegree 0.228** 0.227** 0.198** 0.197** 0.220** 
School Level (0.089) (0.089) (0.095) (0.099) (0.096) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.240** 0.244** 0.251** 0.251** 0.238** 
School Level (0.100) (0.100) (0.103) (0.105) (0.111) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.451 0.481 0.460 0.506 0.601 
School Level (0.517) (0.515) (0.602) (0.604) (0.587) 
boys 9.320*** 9.452*** 9.340*** 9.428*** 9.129*** 
School Level (2.328) (2.306) (2.431) (2.459) (2.373) 
girls 9.604*** 9.829*** 9.685*** 9.844*** 9.294*** 
School Level (1.287) (1.289) (1.621) (1.609) (1.424) 
fee 0.043 0.040 0.016 0.015 0.016 
School Level (0.068) (0.068) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) 
Density_5_14  years old -1.158 -1.687 15.484 14.339 0.453 
Municipality Level (6.071) (5.944) (17.269) (17.447) (6.839) 
% Poverty -0.013 -0.004 -0.043 -0.032 -0.007 
Municipality Level (0.072) (0.073) (0.091) (0.096) (0.072) 
%_Indigenous -0.040 -0.039 -0.128 -0.129 -0.152 
Municipality Level (0.060) (0.060) (0.257) (0.269) (0.158) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.222** 0.223** 0.326 0.319 0.203* 
Municipality Level (0.096) (0.094) (0.532) (0.509) (0.109) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.869*** 0.860*** 0.780 0.787* 0.982*** 
Municipality Level (0.253) (0.251) (0.505) (0.454) (0.339) 
AvgSchoolingPopopulation -0.022 -0.017 0.057 0.063 0.038 
Municipality Level (0.243) (0.242) (0.352) (0.347) (0.288) 
MunicipalitySpending_EducPCapita -6.894 -8.382 -24.531 -23.784 -0.347 
Municipality Level (19.103) (18.841) (34.915) (35.838) (23.729) 
_cons 99.609*** 100.120*** 100.478*** 100.422*** 97.584*** 
  (4.532) (4.573) (6.250) (6.405) (4.645) 
Number of observations 2,909 2,909 2,578 2,578 2,578 
R2 0.659 0.659 0.651 0.651 0.651 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Transportation costs could also play an important role in the impact of a 
voucher system, as when they are very high, the poorest will be limited into 
attending only the schools in their neighbourhood. Hence, the ability of parents 
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to transport their children to the school of their choice cannot be taken as certain 
(Levin, 1991). In this respect, it is possible to analyse the effect of the coverage 
of the transportation system (since a competing school is only a realistic 
competitor if it is accessible), the expectation is that a wider coverage of a 
transportation system will increase the entitlement of choosing between one 
school or another (because it will make the movement from the area of 
residence to school easier86). However, contrary to what might be expected, a 
higher perception by individuals of how close they are to public transport from 
their house decreases the positive effect of the competition from public schools 
(by -0.018 points)87 and reduces the negative effect of the competition from 
voucher schools (by 0.008 points), thus, when the transportation system is 
wider in terms of coverage, the competition effects of public schools and voucher 
schools tend to zero (see column a. in Table 3.13 for more details). One of the 
reasons could be a decrease in the quality of the service due to the expansion of 
public services (for example, the Metropolitan Region public transportation 
service has experienced a massive modernisation and expansion in their 
coverage, since the ‘TranSantiago’ plan started being implemented in 2005, 
when massive chaos was faced by commuters and the new system was largely 
rejected by popular opinion)88. Unfortunately, information related to the quality 
of transportation system per municipality is not currently available. 
 
 
                                                          
86 Better public transportation will increase the ability of people to choose schools because of better 
mobility, but it would not impact the number of schools in a determined area. 
87Calculating the respective partial derivatives. 
88 The effect of perception of being close to public transportation has not been included in the 
specification in column a. in Table 3.13, because it is assumed that by itself it does not affect schools’ 
academic performance, but it affects as an interaction with the number of schools located in the 
area. 
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Briefly considering the coefficients on the other explanatory variables in 
the estimated equation in column a. in Table 3.13, parents’ education (especially 
mother’s education) plays an important role in the performance of children that 
is,schools that perform better also have “higher quality” parents. Nevertheless, 
parents’ income surprisingly seems to have no significant effect. Moreover, the 
results also suggest that, as in many other countries, single sex schools perform 
better relative to mixed gender schools (around 9 points increase in 
performance). Most of the municipality level variables (population density, 
poverty level, proportion of indigenous population, spending on education, etc.) 
reveal statistically insignificant effects; however the number of books per capita 
in each municipality and the percentage of illiterate individuals in each 
municipality are exceptions, which are probably affected by neighbourhood 
socioeconomic status. In this sense, areas of better socio-economic standing are 
likely to have more informed parents, who are also parents that are likely to 
know that if a school does not satisfy their expectations, they can take their 
children out and move them to a better one. Therefore, schools in areas where 
parents are more informed will feel the parental pressure to compete for 
students, increasing the quality of education they provide accordingly. Different 
specifications to the preferred ones presented on column a. in Table 3.13 are 
found in Appendix 3A3. (Table 3A3.1), obtaining very similar results (the 
preferred specifications were chosen considering that they include the larger 
number of control variables associated with schools and municipalities’ 
characteristics). 
 
Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity89 (that is errors do not have 
constant variance, meaning that the t-values for the estimated coefficients 
                                                          
89
 Using Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test (Ho: Constant variance), heteroscedasticity was 
detected. 
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cannot be trusted because the estimates of the standard errors are biased), all 
the results were calculated using robust standard errors which do not assume 
homoscedasticity. Additionally, the standard errors have been clustered by 
municipality in the estimation in order to control for the possibility that individual 
errors are correlated at municipality level90. The usual assumption is that the 
error terms are iid. (independently and identically distributed), but this is 
violated in many cases, as observations within group i could be correlated, which 
make the standard errors wrong in the OLS estimation, but will not invoke a bias 
in the estimation. Therefore, clustered errors are assumed, which assumes zero 
correlation across groups, but allows for within-group correlation of the error 
terms. 
 
 The separate effects that the number of public and voucher schools have 
on the academic performance of public and voucher schools has also been 
considered by including interaction terms between the competition index and the 
type of school being considered (see column b. in Table 3.13). The results found 
that a higher number of public schools increases the performance of voucher 
schools (1.450 + 0.284=1.734 added value) in the area more than it increases 
the public school performance in the area (1.450 added value); but this, as 
mentioned before, could be due to the allocation of voucher schools in areas with 
a large number of bad quality public schools. On the other hand, the effect of a 
higher number of voucher schools on public schools is indistinguishable from the 
effect of voucher schools on other voucher schools. Therefore, voucher schools 
would be damaging to surrounding schools independent of their type. 
 
                                                          
90
 Fixed effects by municipality (holding constant the average effects of each city) were also tested, 
but no significant effect was found.By including fixed effects (group dummies), the intention was to 
control for the average differences across cities in any observable or unobservable predictors. 
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The negative effect of competition from voucher schools could be 
produced by i) the location of voucher schools in areas where public schools are 
of a very poor quality (omitted variables problem), ii) a higher number of 
voucher schools located in areas that for some reason perform better (reverse 
causality problems) or iii) sorting (i.e. voucher school taking the ‘best’ students 
from public schools provoking this negative effect). Effects i) and ii) would create 
a potential endogeneity concern. Therefore, in order to potentially distinguish the 
effects above from the real effect of sorting, an IV estimation is necessary. If 
this estimation still shows a negative effect, it would mean that even though i) 
and ii) have been ruled out, an increase in the number of voucher schools is 
detrimental for the surrounding schools due to sorting. This is apparently 
happening as IV results show a negative and significant effect of the number of 
voucher schools on public school performance91, suggesting that the results 
obtained could be due to sorting, as voucher school location will be exogenous, 
depending only on the number of Catholic churches in the area (a variable which 
has been stated as affecting the number of voucher schools in the area 
positively, but not having an effect on the performance of schools in academic 
tests). In this respect, for the IV estimation, the first stage of the estimation 
(Appendix 3A3., Table 3A3.2) shows that the number of Catholic churches is a 
good instrument for the number of voucher schools, showing a positive and 
significant relationship between both variables and using the rule of thumb of 
having a joint significance (F-test) in the first stage above 10, it is possible to 
suggest that it would be a good instrument92. The instrumental variable 
estimation includes bootstrap standard errors. Because of the use of interaction 
variables that includes the endogenous variable (voucher competition index), the 
                                                          
91
 Although, it is likely that the effect of sorting is better reflected by the Quality Competition Index, 
than the number of schools competition index, as the quality of neighbourhood schools will be mostly 
affected. 
92
 F(19,148)=36.21, Prob>F=0.000 
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first stage regression was estimated manually which without using bootstrapping 
in the second stage (300 iterations) would not consider that the voucher 
competition index is actually a predicted value and the standard errors would be 
wrong (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
 Using IV estimation(see column c. in Table 3.13, for the same 
specification of column a., but using IV estimation), the results show a higher 
positive impact on academic performance from public school competition than 
when using the OLS estimation (the effect size is also doubled). Furthermore, a 
bigger decrease on academic performance when the voucher competition index 
increases is observed in comparison to the OLS results. This support the idea 
that the negative effect from an increase in the number of voucher schools in a 
particular area is due to sorting as opposed to endogenous voucher school 
location explaining the negative OLS effect, that is,they are attracting the most 
able students, which is worrying in terms of reproducing educational 
opportunities for future generations, as explained previously. 
 
In addition, in column d. in Table 3.13, using IV estimation, the 
differential effect of the number of public and voucher schools on the 
performance of voucher and public schools is considered, finding that even 
though the effect from public schools is still positive and from voucher schools is 
still negative, the effect of either on public schools does not seem to differ from 
the effect on voucher schools. Therefore, the IV results in this respect are similar 
in size to the OLS results, but the difference in the impact between school type 
(interaction variable for public/voucher school effect on public/voucher school 
performance) is no longer statistically significant due to the higher standard 
error in this specification. 
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This is consistent with the idea of sorting in the Chilean educational 
system, because voucher schools would damage the academic performance of 
the surrounding areas. This could be particularly worrying, if equity issues are 
considered, as more disadvantaged students will be sorted into public schools, 
and their performance in schoolis probably related, at least at early stages, with 
parental socioeconomic background. Student’s ability could play an important 
role in terms of their academic performance, in this sense, integrating more able 
with less able students does not seem to harm the former students as showen 
by Guyon, et al. (2012) for the case of Northern Ireland, therefore an 
educational system that promotes integration rather than segregation by ability 
would be able to increase equity without reducing efficiency (or vice versa, 
increasing efficiency without decreasing equity), which is in general the most 
common concern in terms of social policy. On the other hand, pupils with a low 
ability could receive benefits from being in a more homogenous environment, 
because teachers can be obliged to teach them at the speed that suits them 
(Figlio and Page, 2000). Nevertheless, Gallindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) find 
that more able pupils would benefit from a more homogenous school 
environment, but low ability pupils would not actually be affected by being with 
better or similar peers. 
 
 The idea that homogeneity could bring benefits to pupils with different 
levels of ability could be cancelled out by the fact that parents claim that they 
choose schools by considering academic performance, but in practice they 
consider other factors. In England, for example, more educated and richer 
parents tend to claim that they prioritise the academic characteristics of schools 
and less educated and poorer parents tend to claim that they prioritise school 
proximity. Nevertheless, “better” parents in practice choose schools with a lower 
proportion of free school meal students. Therefore, even though parents do not 
explicitly say they choose schools related to the socioeconomic background of 
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pupils, in reality they do (Burgess et al., 2009). This is what could also be 
happening in Chile, where a comparison (using the Santiago data set) between 
claimed and revealed preferences is analysed by Elacqua et al. (2006) finding 
that parents state that they choose schools based on their academic 
performance among their school possibility set, but in practice they choose 
schools that are very similar in terms of their socio economic characteristics 
even though these schools can be very varied in terms of academic quality. 
Therefore ability sorting would not be the only concern, but the idea of sorting 
by social class would also become very relevant. In fact, this is in line with the 
findings of Nunez and Guttierrez (2004), who indicate that social class would be 
more important than academic performance at university in terms of explaining 
earnings of individuals. 
 
It is important to mention that the IV estimation results related to the 
coverage of the transportation system differ in sign from the OLS results (see 
column c. and d. in Table 3.13). Therefore the results are conclusive as IV 
estimation will indicate that a higher coverage of transportation system 
increasesthe positive effect of a higher number of public schools and also 
increases the negative effect of a higher number of voucher schools in an area.  
 
Finally, the OLS results based on exactly the same sample used for the IV 
estimation has been considered. For this case, there has been a contraction in 
the sample size (not all the municipalities have information about the number of 
Catholic churches located in their area). The results are presented in column e. 
in Table 3.13 obtaining a higher positive effect from public schools and more of a 
negative effect from voucher schools than using the original sample and the OLS 
technique in column a.  
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3.7.3 Robustness Checks 
 
The results were tested for robustness, considering the level of 
competition involved in a 2 km and 4 km radius, obtaining positive effects of 
competition at 2 km from public schools that were even higher than when a 3 
km radius was considered. On the other hand, a higher negative impact, on 
performance, is observed from voucher school competition when a 2 km radius 
was considered rather than a 3 km one. Using 4 km, the results are similar, but 
the effect of competition from public schools is lower than when using 2 km and 
3 km, and the effect of competition from voucher schools is less negative than 
when considering other values to calculate the distance between schools (more 
details can be found in Appendix 3A3., Table 3A3.3 for 2 km and Table 3A3.4 for 
4 km). 
 
Additionally, when the voucher competition index is separated into two, 
considering voucher schools that charge tuition fees and the ones that are totally 
free, the results are significant only for the positive effect on performance from 
public schools  and negative for the effect of competition from fee-based voucher 
schools (more details can be found in Appendix 3A3., Table 3A3.5)93. 
 
Moreover, the possibility that schools react to the average quality of other 
schools in the area instead of to the number of schools in the area, has also 
been considered. In particular, the competition index of public schools is 
calculated as the average performance of public schools in an area of 3 km 
radius and the competition index of voucher schools is calculated as the average 
                                                          
93
 The difference in results from when the separation between the voucher fee and free schools is 
considered and when they are not separated is likely because the number of voucher schools (with 
fee or without) could be correlated to the number of public schools in an area. 
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performance of voucher schools in an area of 3 km radius. In column a. of Table 
3.14 the results are presented, finding that a higher quality of public schools 
increases the performance of other schools, while the opposite effect is produced 
by voucher schools with a higher average performance. However, these results 
are not statically significant94. 
 
In column b. of Table 3.14 the competition indexes for voucher and public 
schools were also modified with the idea that the number of schools established 
in a particular area can be affected by the number of individuals at the right age 
to attend school living there. Therefore, the competition index from public 
schools is re-understood as the number of public schools in a 3 km radius 
divided by the size of the population between 5 to 14 years old in the 
municipality (i.e. children at the right age toattend primary school) where 
schools are located (the same for the competition index from voucher schools)95. 
In previous regressions, this issue was considered by controlling for population 
density of individuals between 5 to 14 years old, not finding statistically 
significant results in this respect. 
 
                                                          
94
 A wider range of specifications, but considering the competition indexes calculated as the average 
quality of schools in the neighbourhood (instead of the quantity) is found in Appendix 3A3., Table 
3A3.6. 
95
 Different specifications for this estimation have also been considered (see details in Appendix 3A3, 
Table 3A3.7). In addition, regional samples are considered (Region of Antofagasta or Region II, 
Metropolitan Region or Region XIII, Region of Valparaiso or Region V and Region of Bio-Bio or Region 
VIII) to try to analyse if competition is playing a different role when considering the difference 
between geographic areas in the country. The competition results are not statistically significant for 
this case. Nevertheless, the regional results indicate that voucher schools are significantly better 
than public schools only in two of the four regions analysed, i.e. Region VIII and the Metropolitan 
Region which are the largest in the country in terms of population (see column a., b., c. and d. in 
Appendix 3A3, Table 3A3.8). 
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Moreover, the sample has been split into four different samples using 
different socio-economic groups. It is found that middle-class schools’ (those to 
which children from socio-economics groups B and C attend) performance would 
be positively affected by competition from public schools. On the other hand, the 
effect of voucher schools is significantly negative only for the performance of 
surrounding schools where children from socio-economic group C attend. But 
even more importantly, amongst the poorest students, competition from public 
schools has a negative and statistically insignificant effect as presumably, the 
threat of pupils changing schools when offered alternatives is less credible. The 
results per socio-economic group are presented in Table 3.15. These results can 
be interpreted as middle-class parents taking part and more advantage of the 
educational market. It is likely that if parents are more educated and/or richer, 
they would be more interested in having information about school ranking based 
on academic test results, and furthemore they are usually able to buy the 
newspaper and to have access to this information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
 
Table 3.14:Average Quality and Population Based Competition Indexes96 
School Performance  
a: OLS 
(Quality) 
b: OLS 
(Population) 
  coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public  0.203 0.291** 
School Level (0.387) (0.141) 
CompIndex_Voucher -0.063 -0.136 
School Level (0.334) (0.088) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexVoucher (interaction) 0.000 -0.003** 
School Level (0.004) (0.002) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexPublic (interaction) -0.001 0.002 
School Level (0.004) (0.001) 
avgTest_2005 0.565*** 0.558*** 
School Level (0.024) (0.017) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent -0.368 0.630 
School Level (0.976) (0.708) 
voucher_School 13.988*** 14.165*** 
School Level (2.499) (1.986) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) -3.796** -5.491*** 
School Level (1.552) (1.118) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree 0.220 0.238*** 
School Level (0.140) (0.089) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.343* 0.240** 
School Level (0.178) (0.100) 
avgIncome_Parents 1.054 0.428 
School Level (0.740) (0.516) 
boys 9.109*** 9.410*** 
School Level (2.458) (2.311) 
girls 8.379*** 9.610*** 
School Level (1.665) (1.295) 
fee -0.146 0.043 
School Level (0.094) (0.069) 
Density_5_14 years old -4.995   
Municipality Level (5.173)   
% Poverty 0.044 -0.008 
Municipality Level (0.095) (0.072) 
%_Indigenous -0.055 -0.035 
Municipality Level (0.089) (0.064) 
MunicipalitySpending_EducPCapita -25.408 6.530 
Municipality Level (18.490) (16.758) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.172** 0.179** 
Municipality Level (0.077) (0.088) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.895*** 0.907*** 
Municipality Level (0.271) (0.250) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.404 -0.037 
Municipality Level (0.265) (0.252) 
_cons 67.776*** 97.976*** 
  (13.442) (4.554) 
Number of observations 1,755 2,909 
R2 0.659 0.657 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 3.15: Socio-Economics Groups Estimation97 
 School Performance A B C D 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public -1.420 1.341* 2.261* 4.326 
School Level (3.591) (0.780) (1.272) (3.268) 
CompIndex_Voucher 0.004 -0.509 -1.406*** -0.403 
School Level (1.389) (0.479) (0.525) (0.744) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexPublic (interaction) 0.014 -0.016* -0.024 -0.050 
School Level (0.042) (0.009) (0.015) (0.037) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexVoucher (interaction) -0.000 0.005 0.015** 0.004 
School Level (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
avgTest_2005 0.498*** 0.404*** 0.616*** 0.596*** 
School Level (0.032) (0.028) (0.036) (0.053) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent 0.211 1.900** -0.126 7.185 
School Level (1.259) (0.834) (2.669) (11.246) 
voucher_School 6.898 16.824*** 8.851* 17.994 
School Level (4.878) (3.784) (4.805) (15.618) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) -2.693 -8.872*** -1.548 -13.056 
School Level (2.307) (2.631) (3.646) (11.351) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree -0.006 -0.042 0.116 0.232* 
School Level (0.335) (0.203) (0.155) (0.130) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree -0.000 -0.497** 0.438** 0.123 
School Level (0.351) (0.240) (0.208) (0.148) 
avgIncome_Parents -3.573** 0.210 -2.175* 0.596 
School Level (1.531) (1.175) (1.160) (0.896) 
boys 20.637*** 10.056*** 0.392 9.876*** 
School Level (5.811) (1.614) (5.823) (3.643) 
girls (dropped) 7.663* 6.296*** 10.439*** 
School Level 
 
(3.936) (1.901) (1.549) 
fee -1.633 1.323** -0.002 -0.015 
School Level (4.266) (0.548) (0.124) (0.078) 
Density_5_14 years old -42.440*** 4.799 6.394 22.094 
Municipality Level (14.103) (7.808) (10.805) (16.588) 
% Poverty -0.133 -0.072 -0.087 0.130 
Municipality Level (0.177) (0.097) (0.151) (0.169) 
%_Indigenous -0.098 0.170* -0.194 -0.321 
Municipality Level (0.080) (0.097) (0.124) (0.245) 
MunicipalitySpending_EducPCapita -0.703*** -0.173 0.154 0.232** 
Municipality Level (0.254) (0.133) (0.099) (0.103) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.296 1.059*** 1.022** 1.565** 
Municipality Level (0.384) (0.346) (0.415) (0.612) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 -0.544 -0.172 -0.097 0.235 
Municipality Level (0.424) (0.310) (0.418) (0.464) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 131.249*** 134.702*** 96.611*** 82.720*** 
Municipality Level (8.972) (7.109) (10.625) (20.885) 
_cons 406 1,011 923 559 
  0.428 0.320 0.396 0.453 
Number of observations 406 1,011 923 559 
R2 0.430 0.320 0.409 0.453 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In terms of quantile regression estimations (see Appendix 3A3., Table 
3A3.9), the impact of public school competition increases with better school 
performance until a certain point around the median, but decreases thereafter, 
with no statistically significant effect amongst the best performing schools. Thus, 
it seems that competition does not lead to further improvements when a school 
is already among the best. This could be because better schools are already 
good, so for them to perform better than they are currently doing is more 
difficult than for schools that perform slightly worse. Similarly, the impact of 
public school competition for the worst schools is lowest - probably because the 
students attending those schools do not have the option of moving to other 
schools98, so competition has a weaker effect. See Graph 3.1. 
 
Graph 3.2: Quantile Regression Estimation (Public School on the Left and 
Voucher School on the right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
98
 Using some small surveys asking schools or parents directly in 1996 (Estudio Nacional de Opinion 
Publica Nov-Dec 1996), some parents wanted to move their children from public to voucher schools, 
but there was not enough availability to enrol them. That is whythe demand has grown but not at a 
higher speed because there are no incentives to create new voucher schools since the owners do not 
make enough profit from them (Lehmann and Hinzpeter, 1997). 
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3.7.4 Non-Linearity of the Competition Effects 
 
The possibility that competition does not affect school performance 
linearly has also been considered. First, competition indexes have been included 
in their squared form, obtaining the result that as the number of public schools 
increase in an area their effect on increasing the performance of schools 
becomes weaker (however, the necessary number of public schools to cause this 
turning effect is quite high, around 147 public schools for the IV results and 
around 318 schools for the OLS results, which is out of range for a radius of 3 
km99). Therefore the competition effect from public and voucher schools has a 
decreasing rate and there is a threshold where a higher number of public schools 
at some point produces a negative effect on school performance. On the other 
hand, a higher number of voucher schools at some point produces a positive 
effect on school performance. In fact, calculating the respective partial 
derivative, after around 146 voucher schools (for the IV result) or after 881 
voucher schools (for the OLS result) the negative effect of a higher number of 
voucher schools changes from negative to positive (these results are also not 
very feasible). These results are presented in Table 3.16. Moreover, spline 
variables have been included, to analyse in a different way the idea of a non-
linearity effect of school competition. Nevertheless, considering the previous 
results, the spline ranges would be too wide to be considered. Actually, when 
they are included, the effect from voucher schools is negative and from public 
schools is positive for all the splines, as it was expected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
99 For the IV estimation:  
            
     
                                   and  
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Table 3.16: Non-Linearity (Sq) of Competition Effects100 
  OLS IV 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public  1.913** 3.546** 
School Level (0.934) (1.579) 
CompIndex_Voucher -0.881* -2.049** 
School Level (0.468) (0.924) 
CompIndex_Public_sq -0.006 -0.024** 
School Level (0.006) (0.012) 
CompIndex_Voucher_sq 0.001 0.014** 
School Level (0.002) (0.007) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexVoucher (interaction) -0.021** -0.037** 
School Level (0.010) (0.018) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexPublic (interaction) 0.009 0.016 
School Level (0.005) (0.010) 
avgTest_2005 0.559*** 0.567*** 
School Level (0.018) (0.019) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent 0.480 -0.192 
School Level (0.752) (0.741) 
voucher_School 14.135*** 13.319*** 
School Level (2.141) (2.296) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) -5.506*** -5.062*** 
School Level (1.211) (1.294) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree 0.227** 0.197** 
School Level (0.094) (0.097) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.242** 0.243** 
School Level (0.095) (0.105) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.452 0.563 
School Level (0.515) (0.572) 
boys 9.240*** 9.433*** 
School Level (2.373) (2.672) 
girls 9.678*** 9.672*** 
School Level (1.332) (1.518) 
fee 0.042 0.018 
School Level (0.064) (0.078) 
Density_5_14 years old -1.044 -1.258 
Municipality Level (7.443) (16.863) 
% Poverty -0.006 -0.032 
Municipality Level (0.075) (0.098) 
%_Indigenous -0.040 -0.099 
Municipality Level (0.097) (0.284) 
MunicipalitySpending_EducPCapita -9.767 -33.260 
Municipality Level (21.555) (37.052) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.230 0.287 
Municipality Level (0.336) (0.540) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.860*** 0.793* 
Municipality Level (0.290) (0.452) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation -0.034 0.092 
Municipality Level (0.291) (0.324) 
_cons 99.912*** 103.286*** 
  (4.739) (6.218) 
Number of observations 2,909 2,578 
R2 0.659 0.652 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter started with the assumption that education could provide 
private benefits for children and their families in terms of increasing their 
incomes, but it would also increase public benefits as poverty would be reduced, 
the economy would grow, etc. (Card and Krueger, 1996). Having an educational 
system that promotes opportunities for the whole population should be 
fundamental in order to achieve better economic, cultural and social outcomes 
for a nation. With this in mind, privatisation and competition reforms that have 
been implemented in many countries are playing an important role in 
educational systems (Dee, 1998). Nevertheless, the negative effects of elitist 
educational systems have not been prevented effectively. In particular, the idea 
that educational systems could be associated with socio-economic segregation 
among pupils and reinforce and reproduce inequalities in society has been 
mentioned in the so-called equity-efficiency trade off, where more efficiency in 
terms of getting better results with fewer resources (for example, being more 
strict in terms of who can achieve higher educational attainment) could seriously 
damage some pupils in terms of giving them opportunities to achieve a better 
life, as children from poorer backgrounds will probably be left behind. 
 
 As regards the effect of competition on educational performance, very 
little is known and the results are diverse. From the theoretical point of view, the 
idea of making schools behave similarly to the private sector follows the logic 
that this would create the opportunity for schools to compete that would 
increase incentives for innovation in the way that children are taught, 
diversifying options and increasing effectiveness. Therefore, the objectives of the 
voucher system are to increase parental choice, increase motivation and the 
dedication to learn and increasecompetition bringing lower costs and increasing 
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quality (as opposed to having public schools present a monopolistic market). On 
the other hand, choice is considered something good in and of itself as an 
indicator of the freedoms that people can enjoy, but in more practical terms, 
that is more controversial.  
 
There is no unique voucher system; they differ in terms of their finance, 
regulation and information (how much information parents have about their 
alternatives). Therefore, critics of the privatisation idea suggest that educational 
systems that are privatised generate few benefits and produce segregation and 
sorting among students, limiting the possibilities for the poorest, mostly because 
the increase in efficiency is considered to be related with a decrease in equity, 
creating a trade-off problem (West, 1996).  
 
In terms of empirical evidence, the lack of data limits the possibility for 
analysis and in many cases, it still seems that the effect of 
privatisation/competition reforms are not conclusive, mostly because the results 
of voucher systems in terms of academic outcomes likely depend on how the 
reforms are structured in terms of funding, targeting (all the people, or only 
poor, or only women, etc.), admission regulations etc. Chile is an interesting 
case study, because a nationwide privatisation reform was implemented in the 
early 1980s. Nevertheless, the results of this research are not necessarily 
intended to be extended to other countries, understanding every case as unique, 
especially because voucher reforms are not necessarily unrelated to political and 
economic circumstances (Belfield, 2001). 
 
This research defines a competition index as the number of schools 
around each school that are within 3 km, considering public and voucher schools, 
and aims to analyse the effect of geographic competition between schools on 
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academic performance, assuming that academic tests are good proxies for the 
quality of education provided by schools. The OLS results suggest that increasing 
competition from public schools (increasing the number of public schools) 
increases the student academic performance of schools located in the area (3 
km) and that the performance decreases when the number of voucher schools 
(competition index of voucher schools) increases. In addition, it seems that 
when the public transportation system provides a wider coverage of its service, 
the effect of competition from public schools decreases, but the effect from 
voucher schools increases. Thus, effects tend to zero, as for the case of voucher 
schools, competition has a negativeimpact and the interaction with 
transportation has a positive one, and for public schools, the effect of 
competition is positive, but the interaction with public transportation is negative. 
These surprising results could be related to the fact that an increase of coverage 
of public transportation would decrease the quality of the service. These results 
were tested for robustness, considering the level of competition involved whitin a 
2 km and 4 km radius, obtaining similar results. 
 
Considering the competition index as relative to the population (between 
5 to 14 years old) of the municipality, the results suggest that the public school 
competition index coefficient is still positive and significant, but the voucher 
school competition index coefficient is not. It seems also that voucher schools 
provide a better quality of education than public schools, obtaining around 13 
points higher in the academic test used. However, the reasons behind this result 
could be related to sorting of better students into voucher schools, leaving more 
vulnerable children in public schools (although results control for previous school 
performance). 
 
Due to the possible voucher school competition endogeneity and the 
possibility of estimation bias in the OLS results, the instrumental variable 
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estimation using the Two Stages Least Squares estimator (2SLS) was also 
considered, using the number of Catholic churches in each municipality as the 
instrument for the number of voucher schools in the area. For this case, the 
results show a higher positive impact on academic performance when the public 
school competition increases than with the OLS estimation and a bigger decrease 
in academic performance when the voucher competition index increases in 
comparison to the OLS results. In addition, the OLS results show that public 
school competition has a positive impact on the performance of both public and 
voucher schools, but a significantly larger effect for voucher schools. In this 
respect, IV results are insignificant, suggesting that the effect of competition is 
similar regardless of type of school analysed, with the exception of the 
competition effect from public schools which has a slightly larger impact on other 
voucher schools than on public schools. 
 
Therefore, the major inference from this research has to be that voucher 
schools have not positively contributed to educational quality of public schools in 
Chile, raising doubts as to whether or not a privatised market of education really 
achieves its objectives. This is especially so considering that the benefits of 
competition could be enjoyed by implementing school choice without the need 
for implementing a strongly privatised educational system, as the Chilean one. 
In fact, public school competition seems to be working, obtaining a positive 
effect on academic performance in areas with a higher number of public schools. 
Even though this research did not expect to rule out the idea that competition 
through privatisation brings benefits, especially to the most disadvantaged of 
students, the results could be taken as an alert to other nations that want to 
implement similar educational reforms. The main impact of voucher schools 
seems to be a sorting one, with better pupils leaving public schools and therefore 
reducing the average performance of the latter schools. An alert that could help 
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policy makers to prevent failures in their systems and the consequences for the 
opportunities of children and families. 
 
This does not mean that creating competition between public schools has 
no positive effect. The results suggest that an increase in the number of public 
schools in an area is associated with an improved performance in schools in that 
area. The effect seems to be largest among middle-class families and in middle-
ranking schools, the inference being that rich families do not use public schools 
and more successful schools are not threatened by competition, while poorer 
pupils in low-performing schools are less likely to move between schools to 
better performing ones. 
 
In addition, issues related to differences in preferences between parents 
and a lack of information are relevant for this research as they suggest that 
parents perhaps do not select the best quality schools for their children, but 
maybe they care more about the school’s infrastructure, or the treatment 
children receive at that school (for example, a more familiar relationship with 
teachers) or the type of children attending schools considering their 
socioeconomic background as mentioned by Gibbons and Telhaj (2005), which 
would also tend to generate much more stratification in the educational system. 
This situation seems to be happening in Chile, where the school choice reform 
seems to have been associated with an exodus of middle-class families from 
public schools to private schools. That could influence school choice to produce 
stratification where high ability children attend better (more productive) schools. 
In any case, it is not possible to neglect the idea that public schools are more 
effective for more disadvantaged students, but voucher schools are more 
effective for more advantaged students (Bravo et al., 2010).  
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Finally, further research could be conducted to analyse the impact of 
profit and non-profit institutions providing education; will profit organisations try 
to reduce the quality of the service in order to reduce their cost, attracting 
students by others means? In fact, such non-profit organisations would exist to 
serve people who are less informed who need someone to trust. However, it 
could also be that non-profit organisations do not have the incentive to act more 
efficiently because the earnings have to be reinvested and the quality of the 
service could also deteriorate as teachers for example do not enjoy benefits such 
as overtime that employees from other professions might. The increasing 
research in this area should open up a lot of discussion and will probably show 
the need for innovative ideas to reduce the social gap in education (Perry and 
Francis, 2010). 
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Appendix School Competition 
3A1. International Academic Performance 
Table 3A1.1:PISA Results 
Country 
Overall 
Reading Mathematics Science 
 
Country 
Overall 
Reading Mathematics Science 
OECD average 493 496 501 
 
Spain 481 483 488 
Shanghai 556 600 575 
 
Czech Republic 478 493 500 
Korea 539 546 538 
 
Slovak Republic 477 497 490 
Finland 536 541 554 
 
Croatia 476 460 486 
Hong Kong 533 555 549 
 
Israel 474 447 455 
Singapur 526 562 542 
 
Luxemburg 472 489 484 
Canada 524 527 529 
 
Austria 470 496 494 
New Zealand 521 519 532 
 
Lithuania 468 477 491 
Japan 520 529 539 
 
Turkey 464 445 454 
Australia 515 514 527 
 
Dubai 459 453 466 
Netherlands 508 526 522 
 
Russian 
Federation 459 468 478 
Belgium 506 515 507 
 
Chile 449 421 447 
Norway 503 498 500 
 
Serbia 442 442 443 
Estonia 501 512 528 
 
Bulgaria  429 428 439 
Switzerland  501 534 517 
 
Uruguay 426 427 427 
Poland 500 495 508 
 
Mexico  425 419 416 
Iceland 500 507 496 
 
Romania 424 427 428 
United States 500 487 502 
 
Thailand 421 419 425 
Liechtenstein 499 536 520 
 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 416 414 410 
Sweden 497 494 495 
 
Colombia  413 381 402 
Germany 497 513 520 
 
Brazil 412 386 405 
Ireland 496 487 508 
 
Montenegro 408 403 401 
France 496 497 498 
 
Jordan 405 387 415 
Tapei (China) 495 543 520 
 
Tunisia 404 371 401 
Denmark 495 503 499 
 
Indonesia 402 371 383 
United Kingdom 494 492 514 
 
Argentina 398 388 401 
Hungary 494 490 503 
 
Kazakhstan 390 405 400 
Portugal 489 487 493 
 
Albania 385 377 391 
Macao (China) 487 525 511 
 
Qatar 372 368 379 
Italy 486 483 489 
 
Panama 371 360 376 
Latvia 484 482 494 
 
Peru 370 365 369 
Slovenia 483 501 512 
 
Azerbaijan 362 431 373 
Greece 483 466 470 
 
Kyrgyzstan 314 331 330 
Source: OECD (2010), PISA 2009 Results: Executive Summary 
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Table 3A1.2:TIMSS Average Mathematics Scale Scores of 8th Grade Students, 
by Country (2003) 
Country Average Score 
Singapore 605 
South Korea 589 
Hong Kong 586 
Chinese Taipei 585 
Japan 570 
Belgium-Flemish 537 
Netherlands 536 
Estonia 531 
Hungary 529 
Malaysia 508 
Latvia 508 
Russian Federation 508 
Slovak Republic 508 
Australia 505 
United States 504 
Lithuania 502 
Sweden 499 
Scotland 498 
Israel 496 
New Zealand 494 
Slovenia 493 
Italy 484 
Armenia 478 
Serbia 477 
Bulgaria 476 
Romania 475 
Norway 461 
Moldova 460 
Cyprus 459 
Macedonia 435 
Lebanon 433 
Jordan 424 
Iran 411 
Indonesia 411 
Tunisia 410 
Egypt 406 
Bahrain 401 
Palestinian National Authority 390 
Chile 387 
Morocco 387 
Philippines 378 
Botswana 366 
Saudi Arabia 332 
Ghana 276 
South Africa 264 
Average 466 
Source: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement 
(2003) 
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3A2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3A2.1: Descriptive Statistic Restricted Sample (Voucher Schools) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
N. Churches 1,643 7.89 5.95 1.00 28.00 
Spending Education per capita (Thousands of Chilean Pesos) 1,988 61.57 29.73 9.39 251.97 
Density (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality Population by Km2 2,007 4,381 6,354 0.64 29,654 
fee 2,007 11,464 15,299 0.00 76,402 
average Income Parents 2,007 380,036 229,942 50,000 1,631,429 
% Mother University Level 2,007 7.02 9.73 0.00 100.00 
% Father University Level 2,007 8.74 11.69 0.00 100.00 
Total Population  by Municipality 2,007 153,062 127,406 5,138 492,915 
Population (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality 2,007 27,690 24,618 806 102,760 
% Indigenous by Municipality 2,007 5.92 9.88 0.30 70.02 
% Vulnerable Students by School 1,989 67.22 16.07 14.57 100 
% Catholics by Municipality 2,007 69.52 8.29 23.04 90.38 
Average Schooling Population by Municipality (years) 1,921 8.31 1.41 5.57 13.63 
% Infant Mortality 1,935 8.86 8.11 0.00 76.90 
IDH 2003 1,974 0.72 0.05 0.51 0.94 
% Poverty 2,007 14.04 6.29 2.30 36.10 
Weekly Classes Working Hours Total Teachers per Students 2,007 1.43 0.50 0.31 7.28 
Score_Language8_2009 2,007 252.86 24.86 158.00 329 
Score_Math8_2009  2,007 260.09 27.95 180.00 340 
Score_Language8_2005 1,970 258.91 27.45 150.00 329 
Score_Math8_2005 1,971 250.25 29.05 150.00 326 
avgSIMCE_2009 2,007 256.48 25.66 182.50 334 
avgSIMCE_2005 1,969 254.60 27.80 150.00 325 
Total Teachers per 20 Student by School 2009 2,007 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 
Size School 2009 (number of Students 2,007 609.65 501.69 25.00 5,107 
% Illiteracy 1,935 3.52 2.58 0.30 14.09 
CompIndex_Public 2,007 1.59 3.62 0.00 33 
CompIndex_Voucher 2,007 9.65 11.50 0.00 66 
CompIndexVoucher_free 2,007 1.64 2.70 0.00 24 
CompIndexVoucher_fee 2,007 8.01 10.20 0.00 61 
% Positive Perception Public Transportation 1,669 84.98 7.96 43.20 99 
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Table 3A2.2: Descriptive Statistic Restricted Sample (Public Schools) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
N. Churches 1,886 6.39 6.07 1.00 28.00 
Spending_Education per capita (Thousands of Chilean Pesos) 2,427 84.57 40.68 9.39 297.84 
Density (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality Population by Km2 2,450 2,487 5,698 0 29,654 
fee 2,450 29.26 491.04 0 15,130 
average Income Parents 2,348 201,826 82,522 50,000 911,667 
% Mother University Level 2,348 1.48 3.81 0.00 100 
% Father University Level 2,348 1.71 4.06 0.00 100 
Total Population  by Municipality 2,450 94,936 97,860 507 492,915 
Population (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality 2,450 17,022 17,756 80 102,760 
% Indigenous by Municipality 2,450 5.13 9.04 0.18 78.11 
% Vulnerable Students by School 2,426 82.64 10.31 18.39 100 
% Catholics by Municipality 2,450 71.69 10.34 23.04 95.62 
Average Schooling Population by Municipality (years) 2,095 8.38 1.50 5.57 13.63 
% Infant Mortality 2,123 9.25 9.79 0.00 76.90 
IDH 2003 2,426 0.70 0.05 0.51 0.94 
% Poverty 2,448 15.41 6.95 0.60 50.90 
Weakly Classes Working Hours Total Teachers per Students 2,450 1.98 0.75 0.43 5.13 
Score_Language8_2009 2,450 236.37 19.85 154 317 
Score_Math8_2009  2,450 239.83 19.27 183 340 
Score_Language8_2005 2,416 242.00 20.45 166 323 
Score_Math8_2005 2,411 233.14 22.46 155 312 
avgSIMCE_2009 2,450 238.10 18.45 175 328.50 
avgSIMCE_2005 2,411 237.59 20.80 164.50 309.00 
Total Teachers per 20 Student by School 2009 2,450 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.09 
Size School 2009 (number of Students) 2,450 395.17 323.30 20.00 3,959 
% Illiteracy 2,123 4.81 3.07 0.30 14.09 
CompIndex_Public 2,450 3.61 5.77 0.00 41 
CompIndex_Voucher 2,450 8.63 12.38 0.00 66 
CompIndexVoucher_free 2,450 1.85 3.17 0.00 25 
CompIndexVoucher_fee 2,450 6.78 10.47 0.00 63 
% Positive Perception Public Transportation 1,456 85.23 7.02 43.20 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
Table 3A2.3: Descriptive Statistic Restricted Sample (IV) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
N. Churches 3,529 7.08 6.06 1.00 28.00 
Spending Education per capita (Thousands of Chilean Pesos) 3,510 69.38 36.17 9.39 282.06 
Density (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality Population by Km2 3,529 4,174 6,576 0 29,654 
fee 3,529 5,995 12,441 0 76,402 
average Income Parents 3,463 300,451 190,738 50,000 1,501,333 
% Mother University Level 3,463 4.17 7.64 0.00 100 
% Father University Level 3,463 5.30 9.39 0.00 100 
Total Population  by Municipality 3,529 138,071 119,484 2,356 492,915 
Population (5 to 14 years old) by Municipality 3,529 24,735 22,718 216 102,760 
% Indigenous by Municipality 3,529 3.26 3.95 0.18 60.75 
% Vulnerable Students by School 3,499 74.20 14.94 14.57 100.00 
% Catholics by Municipality 3,529 70.87 9.85 23.04 95.62 
Average Schooling Population by Municipality (years) 3,300 8.24 1.42 5.57 12.60 
% Infant Mortality 3,334 9.60 9.53 0.00 76.90 
IDH 2003 3,480 0.72 0.05 0.57 0.94 
% Poverty 3,528 13.68 5.92 2.30 37.50 
Weekly Classes Working Hours Total Teachers per Students 3,529 1.67 0.68 0.43 7.28 
Score_Language8_2009 3,529 244.14 23.99 154.00 329 
Score_Math8_2009  3,529 250.28 25.68 183.00 340 
Score_Language8_2005 3,474 251.11 24.88 164.00 329 
Score_Math8_2005 3,472 242.86 26.23 152.00 321 
avgSIMCE_2009 3,529 247.21 24.02 175.00 334 
avgSIMCE_2005 3,470 246.99 25.10 160.50 325 
Total Teachers per 20 Student by School 2009 3,529 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.09 
Size School 2009 (number of Students 3,529 525.27 443.22 20.00 5,107.00 
% Illiteracy 3,334 3.56 2.36 0.30 13.59 
CompIndex_Public 3,529 3.21 5.43 0.00 41 
CompIndex_Voucher 3,529 10.67 12.62 0.00 66 
CompIndexVoucher_free 3,529 1.78 2.64 0.00 14 
CompIndexVoucher_fee 3,529 8.89 11.04 0.00 63 
% Positive Perception Public Transportation 2,747 85.21 7.47 43.20 99 
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3A3. Results 
 
Table 3A3.1: Comp.Index OLS Regressions: Number of Schools (Other 
Specifications)101 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public 2.098*** 2.064*** 1.762*** 1.598** 1.762*** 1.602** 1.450** 
School Level (0.755) (0.745) (0.635) (0.625) (0.634) (0.690) (0.610) 
CompIndex_Voucher -0.523 -0.917** -0.809** -0.763** -0.809** -0.773* -0.761** 
School Level (0.370) (0.409) (0.381) (0.377) (0.391) (0.451) (0.376) 
%_PerClosetoPublicTran
ort 
0.106             
Municipality Level (0.084)             
PerceptionTranport_Co
mpIndexVoucher 
(interaction) 
0.004 0.009** 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008 0.008* 
School Level (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
PerceptionTranport_Co
mpIndexPublic 
(interaction) 
-0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.019** -0.018** 
School Level (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
avgTest_2005 0.559*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.559*** 0.558*** 0.564*** 0.559*** 
School Level (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
ContractHoursClass_Per
Student 
0.498 0.475 0.458 0.460 0.458 0.798 0.309 
School Level (0.708) (0.725) (0.707) (0.712) (0.707) (0.679) (0.731) 
voucher_School 14.323*** 14.399*** 14.145*** 
13.903**
* 
14.144*** 14.253*** 13.077*** 
School Level (2.015) (2.027) (2.009) (2.014) (1.993) (1.968) (2.269) 
voucher_ContractHourC
PS (interaction) 
-5.551*** -5.591*** -5.545*** -5.455*** -5.545*** -5.698*** -5.236*** 
School Level (1.122) (1.137) (1.129) (1.119) (1.130) (1.103) (1.141) 
ComIndexPublic_Vouche
rSchool (interaction) 
            0.284* 
School Level             (0.149) 
ComIndexVoucher_Vouc
herSchool (interaction) 
            -0.039 
School Level             (0.045) 
%_Father_UniversityDe
gree 
0.228*** 0.228** 0.228** 0.228** 0.228*** 0.251*** 0.227** 
School Level (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) 
%_Mother_UniversityDe
gree 
0.236** 0.238** 0.236** 0.240** 0.236** 0.292*** 0.244** 
School Level (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.450 0.447 0.455 0.451 0.455 -0.086 0.481 
School Level (0.508) (0.511) (0.509) (0.517) (0.505) (0.510) (0.515) 
boys 9.144*** 9.211*** 9.293*** 9.320*** 9.293*** 9.515*** 9.452*** 
School Level (2.365) (2.360) (2.326) (2.328) (2.334) (2.356) (2.306) 
girls 9.551*** 9.627*** 9.570*** 9.604*** 9.570*** 9.725*** 9.829*** 
School Level (1.287) (1.297) (1.288) (1.287) (1.292) (1.272) (1.289) 
fee 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.040 
School Level (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) 
% Poverty 0.005 -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012   -0.004 
Municipality Level (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)   (0.073) 
Density_5_14 years old 0.065 0.453 -0.016 -1.158     -1.687 
Municipality Level (5.321) (5.437) (5.417) (6.071)     (5.944) 
%_Indigenous -0.040 -0.037 -0.038 -0.040 -0.038 -0.005 -0.039 
Municipality Level (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.053) (0.060) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.200*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.222** 0.207*** 0.164*** 0.223** 
Municipality Level (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.096) (0.066) (0.042) (0.094) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.826*** 0.828*** 0.846*** 0.869*** 0.846***   0.860*** 
Municipality Level (0.230) (0.232) (0.239) (0.253) (0.237)   (0.251) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.016 -0.053 -0.034 -0.022 -0.034   -0.017 
Municipality Level (0.249) (0.235) (0.239) (0.243) (0.240)   (0.242) 
CompIndex_P_sq -0.006 -0.006           
School Level (0.005) (0.005)           
CompIndex_V_sq 0.001 0.001           
School Level (0.001) (0.001)           
MuniSpdng_EducPCapita       -6.894     -8.382 
Municipality Level       (19.103)     (18.841) 
HumDevelopIndex_2003           -2.529   
Municipality Level           (12.602)   
_cons 89.532*** 99.654*** 99.413*** 
99.609**
* 
99.412*** 103.265*** 100.120*** 
  (9.278) (4.453) (4.495) (4.532) (4.466) (10.183) (4.573) 
Number of observations 2,927 2,927 2,927 2,909 2,927 2,944 2,909 
R2 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.656 0.659 
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Table 3A3.2: First Stage Estimation (IV)102 
Comp.Index 1st Stage Regressions 
 CI_Voucher coef/se 
Number of Catholic Churches 0.256** 
Municipality Level (0.109) 
CompIndex_Public 1.012*** 
School Level (0.153) 
avgTest_2005 0.030*** 
School Level (0.010) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent -0.546 
School Level (0.513) 
voucher_School 0.698 
School Level (1.589) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) -0.637 
School Level (0.639) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree -0.070 
School Level (0.062) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.019 
School Level (0.035) 
avgIncome_Parents -0.308 
School Level (0.333) 
boys 1.000 
School Level (1.620) 
girls 0.977 
School Level (1.261) 
fee -0.002 
School Level (0.029) 
Density_5_14 years old 47.062*** 
Municipality Level (11.636) 
% Poverty -0.134 
Municipality Level (0.093) 
%_Indigenous -0.000 
Municipality Level (0.094) 
MunicipalitySpending_EducPCapita -77.556*** 
Municipality Level (21.491) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.169 
Municipality Level (0.149) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 -0.386** 
Municipality Level (0.188) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.004 
Municipality Level (0.391) 
_cons 6.690* 
  (3.818) 
Number of observations 3,092 
R2 0.586 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3A3.3: Comp.Index Regressions: Robustness (2 Km)103 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public 2.468** 2.955** 2.933** 2.705** 2.931** 2.716** 2.623** 
School Level (0.962) (1.314) (1.211) (1.216) (1.203) (1.256) (1.179) 
CompIndex_Voucher -0.130*** -1.424** -1.334** -1.290** -1.300* -1.276* -1.349** 
School Level (0.046) (0.672) (0.647) (0.646) (0.664) (0.750) (0.632) 
%_PerceptionClosetoPu
blicTransport 
0.133*             
Municipality Level (0.074)             
PerceptionTranport_Co
mpIndexVoucher 
(interaction) 
  0.014* 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.013 0.014* 
School Level   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
PerceptionTranport_Co
mpIndexPublic 
(interaction) 
-0.029** -0.034** -0.034** -0.031** -0.034** -0.032** -0.032** 
School Level (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
avgTest_2005 0.560*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.559*** 0.559*** 0.565*** 0.558*** 
School Level (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
ContractHoursClass_Per
Student 
0.480 0.387 0.452 0.451 0.464 0.829 0.232 
School Level (0.694) (0.729) (0.712) (0.717) (0.713) (0.688) (0.738) 
voucher_School 14.067*** 14.198*** 14.154*** 13.893*** 14.105*** 14.206*** 12.466*** 
School Level (2.068) (2.109) (2.076) (2.079) (2.061) (2.039) (2.335) 
voucher_ContractHourC
PS (interaction) 
-5.506*** -5.540*** -5.540*** -5.443*** -5.549*** -5.705*** -5.089*** 
School Level (1.119) (1.146) (1.136) (1.126) (1.136) (1.111) (1.147) 
ComIndexPublic_Vouch
erSchool (interaction) 
            0.689** 
School Level             (0.279) 
ComIndexVoucher_Vouc
herSchool (interaction) 
            -0.022 
School Level             (0.077) 
%_Father_UniversityDe
gree 
0.225** 0.222** 0.222** 0.222** 0.225*** 0.250*** 0.224** 
School Level (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) 
%_Mother_UniversityDe
gree 
0.236** 0.240** 0.237** 0.241** 0.239** 0.299*** 0.245** 
School Level (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.450 0.454 0.464 0.461 0.452 -0.117 0.502 
School Level (0.507) (0.512) (0.510) (0.518) (0.505) (0.504) (0.516) 
boys 9.284*** 9.426*** 9.357*** 9.381*** 9.370*** 9.599*** 9.604*** 
School Level (2.322) (2.334) (2.313) (2.316) (2.318) (2.343) (2.304) 
girls 9.713*** 9.889*** 9.773*** 9.808*** 9.819*** 10.059*** 10.079*** 
School Level (1.284) (1.288) (1.288) (1.286) (1.291) (1.271) (1.273) 
fee 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.049 0.042 
School Level (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) 
% Poverty 0.002 -0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011   0.003 
Municipality Level (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)   (0.071) 
Density_5_14 years old -2.235 -1.891 -2.311 -3.554     -4.251 
Municipality Level (5.117) (5.178) (5.114) (5.887)     (5.718) 
%_Indigenous -0.041 -0.041 -0.040 -0.042 -0.039 -0.006 -0.038 
Municipality Level (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.060) (0.063) (0.053) (0.060) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.183*** 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.206** 0.193*** 0.142*** 0.211** 
Municipality Level (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.093) (0.064) (0.039) (0.090) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.839*** 0.820*** 0.840*** 0.864*** 0.855***   0.851*** 
Municipality Level (0.234) (0.227) (0.232) (0.248) (0.229)   (0.245) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.070 -0.039 -0.033 -0.021 -0.031   -0.008 
Municipality Level (0.249) (0.232) (0.235) (0.241) (0.234)   (0.238) 
CompIndex_P_sq   -0.004           
School Level   (0.018)           
CompIndex_V_sq   0.004           
School Level   (0.003)           
MuniSpen_EducPCapita       -6.927     -8.693 
Municipality Level       (19.059)     (18.632) 
HumDevelopIndex_200
3 
          -2.351   
Municipality Level           (12.316)   
_cons 86.628*** 99.888*** 99.446*** 99.645*** 99.276*** 102.992*** 100.454*** 
  (8.556) (4.449) (4.437) (4.478) (4.366) (9.926) (4.512) 
Number of observations 2,927 2,927 2,927 2,909 2,927 2,944 2,909 
R2 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.656 0.660 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
103
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 200 
 
Table 3A3.4: Comp.Index Regressions: Robustness (4 Km)104 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public 0.005 1.352** 1.150** 1.024** 1.151** 1.028** 0.966** 
School Level (0.034) (0.562) (0.469) (0.460) (0.470) (0.517) (0.455) 
CompIndex_Voucher 0.124 -0.647** -0.520* -0.485* -0.527* -0.496 -0.490* 
School Level (0.193) (0.298) (0.271) (0.272) (0.277) (0.326) (0.268) 
%_PerceptionClosetoPublic
Transport 
0.108             
Municipality Level (0.089)             
PerceptionTranport_CompI
ndexVoucher (interaction) 
-0.002 0.006* 0.006* 0.005 0.006* 0.005 0.005* 
School Level (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
PerceptionTranport_CompI
ndexPublic (interaction) 
  -0.015** -0.013** -0.012** -0.013** -0.012** -0.012** 
School Level   (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
avgTest_2005 0.560*** 0.557*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.564*** 0.559*** 
School Level (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
ContractHoursClass_PerSt
udent 
0.570 0.420 0.488 0.484 0.486 0.831 0.368 
School Level (0.698) (0.723) (0.712) (0.716) (0.712) (0.680) (0.730) 
voucher_School 14.335*** 14.266*** 14.192*** 13.965*** 14.219*** 14.361*** 13.330*** 
School Level (1.997) (1.992) (1.996) (1.990) (1.980) (1.947) (2.231) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS 
(interaction) 
-5.602*** -5.560*** -5.564*** -5.468*** -5.560*** -5.718*** -5.300*** 
School Level (1.118) (1.132) (1.130) (1.119) (1.131) (1.101) (1.136) 
ComIndexPublic_VoucherS
chool (interaction) 
            0.183** 
School Level             (0.093) 
ComIndexVoucher_Vouche
rSchool (interaction) 
            -0.036 
School Level             (0.031) 
%_Father_UniversityDegre
e 
0.224** 0.229** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.251*** 0.228** 
School Level (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegr
ee 
0.236** 0.239** 0.237** 0.240** 0.236** 0.290*** 0.243** 
School Level (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.099) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.460 0.440 0.455 0.450 0.462 -0.070 0.471 
School Level (0.511) (0.512) (0.511) (0.511) (0.507) (0.514) (0.518) 
boys 9.483*** 9.296*** 9.261*** 9.279*** 9.250*** 9.471*** 9.335*** 
School Level (2.326) (2.382) (2.324) (2.339) (2.337) (2.361) (2.325) 
girls 9.589*** 9.647*** 9.494*** 9.516*** 9.474*** 9.592*** 9.672*** 
School Level (1.304) (1.295) (1.286) (1.287) (1.292) (1.273) (1.285) 
fee 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.045 0.040 
School Level (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) 
% Poverty -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012   -0.005 
Municipality Level (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)   (0.073) 
Density_5_14 years old 0.675 2.387 1.363       0.036 
Municipality Level (5.531) (5.620) (5.708)       (6.239) 
%_Indigenous -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 -0.037 -0.036 -0.003 -0.037 
Municipality Level (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.052) (0.060) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.211*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.236** 0.222*** 0.187*** 0.235** 
Municipality Level (0.071) (0.072) (0.074) (0.103) (0.071) (0.048) (0.101) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.847*** 0.807*** 0.863*** 0.880*** 0.859***   0.871*** 
Municipality Level (0.241) (0.233) (0.243) (0.257) (0.243)   (0.256) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.051 -0.051 -0.027 -0.020 -0.027   -0.025 
Municipality Level (0.266) (0.239) (0.245) (0.246) (0.247)   (0.245) 
CompIndex_P_sq   -0.002           
School Level   (0.002)           
CompIndex_V_sq   0.001           
School Level   (0.001)           
MuniSpen_EducPCapita       -5.652     -6.917 
Municipality Level       (18.520)     (19.098) 
HumDevelopIndex_2003           -3.237   
Municipality Level           (12.814)   
_cons 88.623*** 
100.026**
* 
99.133*** 99.347*** 99.187*** 103.629*** 99.795*** 
  (10.123) (4.493) (4.555) (4.591) (4.564) (10.291) (4.595) 
Number of observations 2,927 2,927 2,927 2,909 2,927 2,944 2,909 
R2 0.658 0.659 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.656 0.659 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3A3.5: Comp.Index Regressions: Public, Voucher with/without Fee105 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public 2.032*** 1.375*** 0.006 1.859** 1.553** 1.455** 1.455** 
School Level (0.747) (0.517) (0.054) (0.746) (0.619) (0.701) (0.622) 
CompIndex_Voucher_free 0.202 -0.060 1.031 -0.261 -0.323 0.323 -0.308 
School Level (1.285) (0.113) (1.247) (1.134) (1.127) (1.260) (1.122) 
CompIndex_Voucher_fee -0.615 
-
0.082*** 
-0.047 -0.964* -0.831 -0.891 -0.844* 
School Level (0.449) (0.031) (0.344) (0.542) (0.507) (0.578) (0.504) 
%PerceptionClosetoPublicTra
nsport 
0.108 0.131 0.105         
Municipality Level (0.086) (0.080) (0.088)         
PerceptionTranport_CIndexP
ublic (interaction) 
-0.022*** -0.016***   -0.020** -0.018** -0.017** -0.018** 
School Level (0.008) (0.006)   (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
PerceptionTranport_CIndexV
oucherFree (interaction) 
-0.003   -0.012 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.004 
School Level (0.014)   (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
PerceptionTranport_CIndexV
oucherFee (interaction) 
0.005   -0.000 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
School Level (0.005)   (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
avgTest_2005 0.559*** 0.560*** 0.560*** 0.559*** 0.559*** 0.564*** 0.558*** 
School Level (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStud
ent 
0.511 0.488 0.550 0.491 0.467 0.818 0.306 
School Level (0.708) (0.689) (0.695) (0.728) (0.712) (0.681) (0.727) 
voucher_School 14.364*** 14.050*** 14.279*** 14.172*** 13.913*** 14.288*** 13.187*** 
School Level (2.012) (1.999) (2.005) (2.028) (2.014) (1.972) (2.293) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS 
(interaction) 
-5.560*** -5.508*** -5.590*** -5.513*** -5.461*** -5.707*** -5.236*** 
School Level (1.122) (1.110) (1.117) (1.127) (1.119) (1.104) (1.143) 
ComIndexPublic_VoucherSch
ool (interaction) 
            0.291* 
School Level             (0.151) 
ComIndexVoucherFree_Vouc
herSchool (interaction) 
            -0.171 
School Level             (0.240) 
ComIndexVoucherree_Vouch
erSchool (interaction) 
            -0.019 
School Level             (0.052) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree 0.228** 0.227*** 0.224** 0.227** 0.228** 0.250*** 0.228** 
School Level (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.238** 0.235** 0.241** 0.243** 0.242** 0.294*** 0.249** 
School Level (0.098) (0.099) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.442 0.455 0.438 0.446 0.444 -0.085 0.464 
School Level (0.510) (0.506) (0.514) (0.519) (0.520) (0.515) (0.514) 
boys 9.180*** 9.271*** 9.558*** 9.271*** 9.347*** 9.561*** 9.470*** 
School Level (2.376) (2.330) (2.330) (2.374) (2.336) (2.369) (2.322) 
girls 9.528*** 9.494*** 9.630*** 9.658*** 9.602*** 9.676*** 9.865*** 
School Level (1.297) (1.301) (1.318) (1.305) (1.304) (1.285) (1.305) 
fee 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.042 0.043 0.047 0.038 
School Level (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) 
% Poverty 0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014   -0.005 
Municipality Level (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)   (0.073) 
Density_5_14 years old 0.060 0.040 -0.798 -1.052 -1.217   -1.681 
Municipality Level (5.343) (5.385) (5.290) (6.016) (6.052)   (5.915) 
%_Indigenous -0.044 -0.041 -0.039 -0.044 -0.039 -0.010 -0.039 
Municipality Level (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.056) (0.064) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.200*** 0.206*** 0.190*** 0.230** 0.219** 0.161*** 0.222** 
Municipality Level (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.098) (0.097) (0.043) (0.094) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.808*** 0.836*** 0.814*** 0.844*** 0.863***   0.848*** 
Municipality Level (0.239) (0.243) (0.243) (0.256) (0.259)   (0.258) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.010 0.066 0.049 -0.042 -0.019   -0.017 
Municipality Level (0.262) (0.268) (0.272) (0.255) (0.257)   (0.256) 
CompIndex_P_sq -0.007     -0.006       
School Level (0.005)     (0.005)       
CompIndex_V_sq 0.001     0.001       
School Level (0.001)     (0.001)       
MuniSpend_EducPCapita       -9.766 -6.823   -7.772 
Municipality Level       (19.637) (19.185)   (18.893) 
HumDevelopIndex_2003           -1.371   
Municipality Level           (12.301)   
_cons 89.541*** 86.833*** 89.294*** 100.084*** 99.608*** 102.398*** 100.208*** 
  (9.460) (9.303) (9.935) (4.523) (4.583) (10.029) (4.627) 
Number of observations 2,927 2,927 2,927 2,909 2,909 2,944 2,909 
R2 0.659 0.659 0.658 0.659 0.659 0.656 0.659 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3A3.6: Comp.Index Regressions: Average Quality of Schools106 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public 0.293 0.149*** 0.635 0.303 0.203 0.216 0.283 
School Level (0.415) (0.037) (0.660) (0.396) (0.387) (0.402) (0.371) 
CompIndex_Voucher -0.063 -0.031 -0.323 -0.164 -0.063 -0.073 -0.117 
School Level (0.039) (0.416) (1.461) (0.344) (0.334) (0.345) (0.333) 
%_PerceptionClosetoPublic
Transport 
0.310 0.013           
Municipality Level (1.098) (1.283)           
PerceptionTranport_CompI
ndexVoucher (interaction) 
  -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
School Level   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
PerceptionTranport_CompI
ndexPublic (interaction) 
-0.002   -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
School Level (0.005)   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
avgTest_2005 0.562*** 0.562*** 0.562*** 0.564*** 0.565*** 0.573*** 0.563*** 
School Level (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
ContractHoursClass_PerSt
udent 
-0.359 -0.354 -0.303 -0.362 -0.368 -0.009 -0.469 
School Level (0.980) (0.979) (0.971) (0.982) (0.976) (0.947) (0.981) 
voucher_School 14.513*** 14.536*** 14.734*** 14.054*** 13.988*** 14.269*** 15.900 
School Level (2.506) (2.502) (2.534) (2.480) (2.499) (2.431) (21.290) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS 
(interaction) 
-3.941** -3.971*** -4.049*** -3.785** -3.796** -3.908** -3.668** 
School Level (1.545) (1.540) (1.559) (1.541) (1.552) (1.531) (1.526) 
ComIndexPublic_VoucherS
chool (interaction) 
            -0.102 
School Level             (0.071) 
ComIndexVoucher_Vouche
rSchool (interaction) 
            0.084 
School Level             (0.070) 
%_Father_UniversityDegre
e 
0.208 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.220 0.273* 0.216 
School Level (0.141) (0.140) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.146) (0.140) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegr
ee 
0.335* 0.332* 0.334* 0.344* 0.343* 0.382** 0.340* 
School Level (0.179) (0.185) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) (0.180) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.958 0.969 0.984 0.943 1.054 0.164 1.118 
School Level (0.720) (0.726) (0.725) (0.729) (0.740) (0.736) (0.735) 
boys 9.027*** 9.011*** 9.100*** 8.994*** 9.109*** 9.439*** 9.290*** 
School Level (2.488) (2.486) (2.465) (2.495) (2.458) (2.492) (2.440) 
girls 8.458*** 8.491*** 8.468*** 8.446*** 8.379*** 8.500*** 8.411*** 
School Level (1.689) (1.701) (1.690) (1.691) (1.665) (1.663) (1.654) 
fee -0.133 -0.133 -0.133 -0.133 -0.146 -0.116 -0.150 
School Level (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.094) (0.093) (0.095) 
% Poverty 0.103 0.099 0.097 0.098 0.044   0.063 
Municipality Level (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.093) (0.095)   (0.092) 
Density_5_14 years old 1.544 1.675 1.713 -0.023 -4.995 -3.501 -5.690 
Municipality Level (5.223) (5.445) (5.363) (6.268) (5.173) (6.422) (5.149) 
%_Indigenous -0.038 -0.039 -0.036 -0.035 -0.055 -0.002 -0.062 
Municipality Level (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.096) (0.089) (0.092) (0.085) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.075 0.072 0.064 0.102 0.172** 0.067 0.172** 
Municipality Level (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.072) (0.077) (0.066) (0.073) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 1.076*** 1.081*** 1.075*** 1.126*** 0.895***   0.860*** 
Municipality Level (0.271) (0.278) (0.274) (0.283) (0.271)   (0.267) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.380 0.390 0.388* 0.441* 0.404   0.411 
Municipality Level (0.235) (0.246) (0.234) (0.246) (0.265)   (0.252) 
CompIndex_P_sq     -0.001         
School Level     (0.001)         
CompIndex_V_sq     0.000         
School Level     (0.003)         
MuniSpend_EducPCapita       -14.762 -25.408 7.587 -26.369 
Municipality Level       (18.907) (18.490) (18.526) (17.983) 
HumDevelopIndex_2003 27.719** 27.171* 28.030** 26.086*   0.026   
Municipality Level (14.047) (14.165) (14.138) (14.453)   (13.694)   
_cons 25.734 51.461 31.523 51.109*** 67.776*** 71.431*** 63.191*** 
  (99.513) (107.830) (174.887) (16.657) (13.442) (17.033) (17.715) 
Number of observations 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,755 1,755 1,761 1,755 
R2 0.660 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.659 0.656 0.660 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Standard errors are in brackets. 
 203 
 
Table 3A3.7: Com.Index Regressions: Number of Schools (by Population 5-14 
years old) 107 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public_pop 0.418*** 0.202** 0.382** 0.291** 0.323** 0.303** 0.301** 
School Level (0.150) (0.101) (0.157) (0.141) (0.141) (0.147) (0.137) 
CompIndex_Voucher_pop -0.092 -0.003 -0.153* -0.136 -0.147 -0.149 -0.142* 
School Level (0.072) (0.005) (0.083) (0.088) (0.090) (0.097) (0.086) 
%_PerceptionClosetoPublicTr
ansport_2010 
0.100 0.111           
Municipality Level (0.081) (0.078)           
PerceptionTranport_CompInd
exVoucher (interaction) 
-0.005*** -0.002** -0.004** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
School Level (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PerceptionTranport_CompInd
exPublic (interaction) 
0.001   0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002* 
School Level (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
avgTest_2005 0.559*** 0.559*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.565*** 0.560*** 
School Level (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStud
ent 
0.715 0.743 0.628 0.630 0.691 1.249* 0.621 
School Level (0.693) (0.680) (0.718) (0.708) (0.700) (0.665) (0.705) 
voucher_School 14.503*** 14.299*** 14.331*** 14.165*** 14.342*** 14.739*** 14.597*** 
School Level (1.997) (1.981) (2.010) (1.986) (1.987) (1.946) (2.087) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS 
(interaction) 
-5.611*** -5.598*** -5.532*** -5.491*** -5.617*** -5.899*** -5.539*** 
School Level (1.126) (1.120) (1.125) (1.118) (1.133) (1.101) (1.117) 
ComIndexPublicPop_Voucher
School (interaction) 
            0.328** 
School Level             (0.135) 
ComIndexVoucherPop_Vouch
erSchool (interaction) 
            -0.116*** 
School Level             (0.037) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.266*** 0.230*** 
School Level (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.091) (0.087) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.239** 0.237** 0.242** 0.240** 0.237** 0.305*** 0.243** 
School Level (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.098) (0.101) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.467 0.466 0.434 0.428 0.470 -0.179 0.462 
School Level (0.507) (0.504) (0.518) (0.516) (0.508) (0.515) (0.509) 
boys 9.288*** 9.350*** 9.367*** 9.410*** 9.395*** 9.653*** 9.683*** 
School Level (2.318) (2.295) (2.327) (2.311) (2.302) (2.329) (2.317) 
girls 9.649*** 9.569*** 9.708*** 9.610*** 9.609*** 9.830*** 9.853*** 
School Level (1.313) (1.305) (1.307) (1.295) (1.300) (1.284) (1.292) 
fee 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.045 0.041 
School Level (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) 
% Poverty 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008   -0.009 
Municipality Level (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)   (0.072) 
%_Indigenous -0.040 -0.041 -0.033 -0.035 -0.036 0.004 -0.039 
Municipality Level (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.053) (0.061) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.196*** 0.188*** 0.200** 0.179** 0.194*** 0.143*** 0.183** 
Municipality Level (0.070) (0.068) (0.097) (0.088) (0.068) (0.049) (0.088) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.946*** 0.968*** 0.904*** 0.907*** 0.951***   0.898*** 
Municipality Level (0.233) (0.238) (0.251) (0.250) (0.233)   (0.249) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation 0.027 0.098 -0.063 -0.037 -0.004   -0.070 
Municipality Level (0.263) (0.262) (0.251) (0.252) (0.252)   (0.252) 
CompIndex_P_pop_sq -0.000**   -0.000*         
School Level (0.000)   (0.000)         
CompIndex_V_pop_sq 0.000*   0.000         
School Level (0.000)   (0.000)         
MuniSpend_EducPCapita     3.394 6.530     3.443 
Municipality Level     (17.275) (16.758)     (16.974) 
HumDevelopIndex_2003           -2.927   
Municipality Level           (12.736)   
_cons 88.537*** 86.799*** 98.379*** 97.976*** 97.618*** 101.760*** 98.049*** 
  (9.276) (9.032) (4.508) (4.554) (4.428) (10.405) (4.583) 
Number of observations 2,927 2,927 2,909 2,909 2,927 2,944 2,909 
R2 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.657 0.657 0.654 0.658 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 3A3.8: Comp.Index Regressions: Chilean Regions108 
 a: II b:V d: VIII e: XIII 
School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public  0.256 2.631 -0.607 0.246 
School Level (2.151) (2.831) (2.013) (0.668) 
CompIndex_Voucher -12.109*** 0.077 0.816 -0.218 
School Level (3.127) (0.916) (2.625) (0.259) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexVoucher 
(interaction) 
0.001 -0.034 0.008 -0.002 
School Level (0.017) (0.032) (0.025) (0.008) 
PerceptionTranport_CompIndexPublic 
(interaction) 
0.128*** -0.000 -0.010 0.001 
School Level (0.033) (0.011) (0.032) (0.003) 
avgTest_2005 0.599*** 0.582*** 0.569*** 0.574*** 
School Level (0.096) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) 
ContractHoursClass_PerStudent -2.124 -0.971 -1.017 0.588 
School Level (3.494) (1.552) (1.762) (1.979) 
voucher_School 22.770 3.068 16.802*** 12.833*** 
School Level (27.397) (6.388) (5.131) (3.919) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS (interaction) -9.883 -1.712 -6.119* -5.195** 
School Level (18.819) (3.900) (3.451) (2.346) 
%_Father_UniversityDegree 0.149 0.055 0.030 0.086 
School Level (0.404) (0.129) (0.381) (0.136) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegree 0.034 0.409* 0.444*** 0.399*** 
School Level (0.556) (0.209) (0.155) (0.132) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.123 2.238* -1.249 1.190 
School Level (1.205) (1.336) (2.221) (0.961) 
boys (dropped) 15.070*** 3.489 9.500*** 
School Level   (4.068) (7.094) (3.366) 
girls 13.808*** 4.178 13.783*** 10.319*** 
School Level (3.955) (2.627) (4.056) (2.096) 
fee 0.310*** -0.081 0.404*** -0.061 
School Level (0.048) (0.127) (0.119) (0.128) 
Density_5_14 years old (dropped) 212.925** -133.827 -5.566 
Municipality Level   (106.296) (241.131) (8.192) 
% Poverty (dropped) -0.923** -0.107 0.142 
Municipality Level   (0.432) (0.699) (0.142) 
%_Indigenous 1.365*** 4.773 -3.173 -0.686 
Municipality Level (0.362) (5.000) (2.758) (0.531) 
MuniSpend_EducPCapita (dropped) -279.141*** 25.057 -3.596 
Municipality Level   (54.322) (109.547) (58.567) 
BooksperCapita_2001 (dropped) -1.209 -0.572 0.195 
Municipality Level   (1.740) (0.457) (0.192) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 (dropped) 5.262** -0.676 0.466 
Municipality Level   (2.512) (1.465) (0.555) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation (dropped) 1.558 -0.237 -0.032 
Municipality Level   (1.000) (0.712) (0.532) 
_cons 85.717*** 91.891*** 117.703*** 97.039*** 
  (8.271) (13.422) (13.981) (8.937) 
Number of observations 71 369 348 1,214 
R2 0.797 0.685 0.726 0.646 
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Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 3A3.9: Quantile Regression Results109 
  OLS BSQR_10 BSQR_25 BSQR_50 BSQR_75 BSQR_90 
 School Performance coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
CompIndex_Public 1.598** 1.205 1.623* 2.396*** 1.408* 0.423 
School Level (0.625) (1.779) (0.895) (0.702) (0.768) (1.876) 
CompIndex_Voucher -0.763** -0.827 -0.621 -0.981*** -0.479 -0.440 
School Level (0.377) (0.796) (0.417) (0.331) (0.358) (0.534) 
PerceptionTranport_CompI
ndexPublic (interaction) 
-0.018** -0.012 -0.018* -0.028*** -0.017* -0.006 
School Level (0.007) (0.020) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) 
PerceptionTranport_CompI
ndexVoucher (interaction) 
0.008* 0.009 0.007 0.010*** 0.005 0.004 
School Level (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
avgTest_2005 0.559*** 0.518*** 0.541*** 0.542*** 0.572*** 0.595*** 
School Level (0.017) (0.037) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.029) 
ContractHoursClass_PerSt
udent 
0.460 -0.649 -0.547 0.461 1.963** 2.786* 
School Level (0.712) (1.528) (0.794) (0.734) (0.942) (1.554) 
voucher_School 13.903*** 13.341*** 14.468*** 15.179*** 15.669*** 14.894*** 
School Level (2.014) (4.116) (2.395) (2.264) (2.249) (3.570) 
voucher_ContractHourCPS 
(interaction) 
-5.455*** -7.482*** -6.476*** -6.112*** -4.969*** -4.843** 
School Level (1.119) (2.751) (1.518) (1.489) (1.377) (2.281) 
%_Father_UniversityDegre
e 
0.228** 0.170 0.318*** 0.224*** 0.164 0.130 
School Level (0.089) (0.211) (0.098) (0.087) (0.119) (0.123) 
%_Mother_UniversityDegr
ee 
0.240** 0.261 0.372*** 0.329*** 0.265** 0.155 
School Level (0.100) (0.173) (0.114) (0.095) (0.104) (0.112) 
avgIncome_Parents 0.451 0.111 0.105 0.243 0.861 1.087 
School Level (0.517) (0.844) (0.545) (0.414) (0.693) (0.734) 
boys 9.320*** 10.301** 7.005 9.590*** 4.741 9.993** 
School Level (2.328) (4.610) (4.403) (1.820) (4.839) (4.861) 
girls 9.604*** 14.729*** 11.317*** 9.775*** 6.916*** 4.463* 
School Level (1.287) (2.905) (2.078) (1.514) (1.607) (2.665) 
fee 0.043 0.152* 0.055 0.074 -0.022 0.000 
School Level (0.068) (0.087) (0.062) (0.055) (0.067) (0.069) 
Density_5_14 years old -1.158 1.467 -6.154 0.556 -2.216 3.295 
Municipality Level (6.071) (11.048) (6.193) (5.274) (7.308) (11.908) 
% Poverty -0.013 -0.086 0.021 0.047 -0.020 -0.108 
Municipality Level (0.072) (0.122) (0.075) (0.084) (0.087) (0.123) 
%_Indigenous -0.040 0.081 -0.040 -0.053 -0.057 -0.044 
Municipality Level (0.060) (0.123) (0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.102) 
MuniSpend_EducPCapita -6.894 5.895 3.264 14.506 -15.244 -34.535 
Municipality Level (19.103) (28.590) (18.582) (17.620) (17.160) (29.139) 
BooksperCapita_2001 0.222** 0.261 0.088 0.190** 0.182* 0.213 
Municipality Level (0.096) (0.168) (0.163) (0.097) (0.110) (0.185) 
%_Illiteracy_2006 0.869*** 0.780* 0.834*** 0.564** 0.703** 1.072*** 
Municipality Level (0.253) (0.404) (0.257) (0.223) (0.283) (0.383) 
AvgSchoolingPopulation -0.022 -0.012 0.031 -0.251 0.054 0.093 
Municipality Level (0.243) (0.419) (0.252) (0.241) (0.245) (0.428) 
_cons 99.609*** 94.408*** 95.705*** 104.633*** 102.350*** 104.653*** 
  (4.532) (9.727) (6.417) (4.807) (4.884) (8.695) 
Number of observations 2,909 2,909 2,909 2,909 2,909 2,909 
R2 0.659  0.659 0.658   0.659 0.657   0.659 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4 Is Assortative Mating a Limitation for Intergenerational Mobility? : The 
Role of the Chilean Privatisation Educational Reform  
 
4.1 Summary Chapter 4 
 
 The way that couples are formed could influence the socioeconomic 
openness in society. Assortative Mating is understood as the level of 
association between socioeconomic characteristics of couples in 
education, income, occupation, etc.  
 Assortative Mating has been suggested as a consequence of people’s 
interaction in similar environments and educational institutions could be 
one of the most common contexts where people meet and interact. 
 Chile seems to present a high level of assortative mating, and it could be 
playing a role in terms of intergenerational earnings dependency. If 
individuals reproduce the socioeconomic condition of their parents, and 
their parents have similar characteristics (similar education, earnings and 
background), then the intergenerational earnings dependency could be 
even higher. 
 The data utilised is the Cross-sectional CASEN survey (National Socio-
economic Characterisation Survey) of 1990 and 2009, a nationally 
representative survey used as the main instrument to design and 
evaluate social policies in the country. The interesting aspect of these 
data is that the 2009 survey asked individuals about their parents when 
they were 15 years old, including information about education, occupation 
and age (but not income). This data set is the same as the one utilised in 
the chapter 2 of this research.  
 The results found indicate that assortative mating explains 20% of 
intergenerational earnings dependency variance. 
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 In addition, the influence of father-in-law’s earnings is similar to the 
influence of father’s earnings on an individual’s earnings, which would 
suggest that individuals marry individuals with similar parents. 
 Finally, the Chilean 1980s educational reform had an impact on the level 
of assortative mating in the country, increasing segregation of individuals 
at least those with lesser education. 
 
4.2 Introduction to Chapter 4 
 
 The way that couples, in particular married ones, are conjoined could play 
an active role in terms of reproducing and confirming the levels of income 
transmission between parents and their offspring. If richer and well educated 
individuals get married to similar individuals and similarly for the way that 
poorer individuals, in terms of income and/or education, are matched, the 
socioeconomic condition of these individuals could be reinforced into the next 
generation. In particular, if people also reproduce their parents’ socioeconomic 
condition, the level of homogenisation will help perpetuate the level of inequality 
in society (Hirvonen, 2008). Therefore, there could exist a relationship between 
the level of association between the socioeconomic characteristics of couples, 
also called ‘assortative mating’ or matching, and the level of intergenerational 
mobility. This could become relevant for analysing one of the causes of the level 
of intergenerational mobility in societies, especially if it is considered that “the 
transmission of economic success across generations remains something of a 
black box” (pp. 2, Bowles and Gintis, 2002). In this respect, it is believed that if 
the level of assortative mating is high, intergenerational mobility will be lower, 
because if couples are not formed randomly in terms of their education or 
income then the persistence and reproduction of the socioeconomic status of 
their parents seems more likely. 
 
 208 
 
Assortative mating and more specifically marital homogamy can be 
understood as the partnership between individuals of the same (or similar) social 
background, ethnic group or religious affiliation, or the level of human capital 
(Birkelund and Heldal, 2003), among other things. Educational assortative 
mating seems to be one of the most important types because of the role that 
education plays in determining future earnings and socioeconomic situation 
(Schwartz and Mare, 2005). It has been suggested, therefore, that educational 
assortative mating can be one of the channels through which intergenerational 
mobility can be limited (Raaum et al., 2007). On the other hand, the benefits of 
heterogeneous marriages can be given by the fact that children will grow up in 
wider diversity and more tolerance, potentially promotingan openness in society. 
 
Non-random sorting among couples has been suggested as being a 
consequence of people’s interaction in similar environments, where individuals 
meet people with similar interests, values and in many cases, with similar 
socioeconomic status (Kalmijn and Flap, 2001). Educational institutions have 
been mentioned to be one of the most important contexts where people meet 
and interact, in particular peer group effects would be very important in terms of 
influencing educational outcomes, creating social networks and as small clubs of 
individuals with high entry barriers. In particular, if an educational system is 
characterised by sorting of students by family background or income, or student 
ability, then the peer group will likely be homogenous and the members of 
potential couples formed in that environment will also be alike as shown by 
Nielsen and Svarer (2006) who for the case of Denmark find that levels of 
educational assortative mating are due to individuals’ opportunities in the 
marriage market. 
 
The empirical evidence related to assortative mating is plentiful in 
descriptive terms, considering that the levels of correlation between 
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characteristics of members of couples has been analysed not only from the 
economics perspective, but is also commonly in sociological and psychological 
research (see for example, Nakosteen and Zimmer, (2001)). The change over 
time of this phenomenon has also been considered, with a general consensus 
that assortative mating has been increasing over time. In this respect, Benardi 
(2003) analyses different levels of assortative mating in Europe concluding that 
in Italy, for example, levels of educational homogamy have increased over time, 
and Halpin and Chan (2003) propose the possibility that the change in the 
patterns of educational mating could be a result of the increase of women’s 
participation in the labour market in the UK. However, very few researchers have 
focused on the effect of educational reforms and the impact on assortative 
mating and intergenerational mobility, and on the differences between the level 
of assortative mating considering the income distribution (see Hussain et al., 
(2011) who found that assortative mating at the top of the income distribution is 
higher than in the lower part).  
 
Blanden (2005) analyses the relationship between assortative mating and 
intergenerational mobility for the case of Canada, concluding that a daughter’s 
and her partner’s income are influenced by her parent’s income, suggesting that 
assortative mating tends to increase income persistence between generations. 
She found that individuals that get married later in life seem to be more 
homogeneous in terms of parental income, and married couples are more 
homogeneous than those that are only cohabiting. Couples living in urban areas 
also seem also to be more homogenously matched. In addition, she shows that if 
male partners contribute in a larger proportion to the total income of their 
related household, assortative mating has a higher influence on the 
intergenerational income dependency of daughters. 
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In addition, analysing the effect that assortative mating has on 
intergenerational mobility, Lam and Schoeni (1993), using a Brazilian working 
male sample between 30 and 55 years old, conclude that schooling of an 
invidual’s parents-in-law has a larger effect on their earnings than the schooling 
of their own father. Chadwick and Solon (2002) who expanded upon this idea, 
analysing the effect of a daugther’s parents’ income and her income or her 
husband’s income in the US finding that assortative mating in earnings (a similar 
level of correlation between the daughter’s income and her parents’ income and 
between the daughter’s husband and his parents-in-law’s earnings) plays an 
important role in terms of intergenerational earnings dependency. They conclude 
that the elasticity of the couple’s combined earnings with respect to the wife’s 
parents’ earnings would be influenced by the share of husband’s earnings in 
combined earnings, therefore if the proportion of the household’s earnings 
attributed to the man is higher, then the level of dependency between him and 
his parents-in-law will be higher as well, probably due to the fact that richer 
individuals fervently want to keep their social status. Finally, Ermisch et al. 
(2006), using British and German data found that, on average, around 40-50% 
of the intergenerational income dependency between individuals and partner’s 
joint income and that of the individual’s parents is produced by the level of 
assortative mating in human capital. 
 
Trying to contribute to the previous research, this investigation presents 
a theoretical model that describes the impact that assortative mating on 
schooling could have on intergenerational mobility of earnings, as well as some 
empirical evidence in the context of Chilean society. In particular, the model 
developed for this research is based on several previous models such as Solon 
(2004), which describes the earnings dependency coefficient between child and 
parents in terms of earnings return to human capital, the heritability ability 
coefficient between parents and child, the technology that translates investment 
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in human capital and the progressivity of social policy, but not on the level of 
assortative mating among members of a couple. In addition, the model 
developed by Ermisch et al. (2006) has been considered, which analyses the 
effect of schooling assortative mating on the level of intergenerational mobility. 
Their model implies an initial separate evaluation of the intergenerational 
dependency between a child’s earnings and their parents’ and a child’s partner’s 
earnings and his/her parents-in-laws. The first depends on the level of altruism 
of parents and the price of human capital investment and earnings return to 
human capital and the second depends on the same variables plus the level of 
assortative mating in human capital. They then calculate a joint dependency of 
the child’s and his/her partner’s earnings, calculating the intergenerational 
earning dependency between child and partner’s earnings (joined) and the 
child’s parents’ earnings, concluding that it only depends on the level of 
assortative mating of the couples and the child and partner’s earnings returns to 
human capital (which are assumed to be different considering the differences in 
terms of earnings between women and men in the labour market). This differs to 
the model presented in this research, as there is no initial separation of effects, 
but a relationship between individual and partner’s joint earnings and the 
individual’s father’s earnings is considered. 
 
Holmlund (2008) also considers assortative mating in terms of human 
capital of the members of couples (developing a very similar model to the one 
developed in this research), but considering 2 options of matching: The human 
capital is perfectly matched (non-random) with probability p (also understanding 
it as the level of assortative mating), or the human capital is matched randomly 
with the average peer group human capital with probability 1-p. Using these 
specifications the intergenerational mobility is calculated between individuals and 
their own parents and between partners and their parents-in-law as in Ermisch 
et al. (2006). The former would depend on earnings returns to human capital 
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(which are not different between women and men), on the technology that 
translates investment into human capital and on the level of progressivity of the 
educational policy. The latter would depend on the same variables but includes a 
positive effect of assortative mating (as all the other models mentioned before 
predict). Therefore, for the partners and his/her parent-in-law’s earning 
dependency, more assortative mating produces a decrease in intergenerational 
mobility.  
 
Hence, this investigation combines the models above, in a way that there 
is a clear causality of levels of dependency in school among members of a couple 
on the level of intergenerational earnings dependency is established. In addition, 
and considering that the Chilean educational reforms of the 1980s110 could have 
influenced a change in the way that Chilean couples sort with each other 
(especially due to potential segregation effects mentioned above) the effect of 
the reform on the level of assortative mating in society has also been analysed. 
This seems to be worth analysing as high levels of assortative mating in society 
could indicate a lack of interaction between people from different social groups, 
so it would be a good indicator of social openness and integration (Birkelund and 
Heldal, 2003). Certainly, if marriage selection is random then intergenerational 
mobility will be higher. This would be particularly important in the Chilean 
context where the 1980s educational reform seems to have created higher levels 
of segregation between the socio-characteristics of students. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 Characteristics and consequences of the 1980s Chilean educational reform have been discussed in 
the introduction of this research, and in Chapter 3, where an analysis of school competition after this 
reform has been included. 
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4.3 Out of Sight, Out of Reach: How People Choose a Mate 
 
People tend to live most of their lives as couples; the explanation could 
be purely biological and related to the instinct of reproduction, other reasons 
could be related to sharing experiences, ideals, hopes and dreams and enjoying 
the benefits of not being alone - something that could be called love. As 
mentioned earlier, Becker (1973) formalised this and explained that people get 
married when it is supposed that their utility increases compared to staying 
single (but this potential increase in utility would not only be related to the 
benefits given by economies of scale, because these kinds of benefits could be 
obtained by living with friends or relatives without necessarily getting married). 
The reasons for choosing a partner are varied, for example physical attraction, 
chemical and hormonal reactions, similar religion, values or race. On the other 
hand, reasons could be related to levels of human capital accumulated by 
individuals, their income or social background, and in the most undesirable 
cases, by force or early family arrangements. Therefore, ‘love’ may not operate 
arbitrarily (Birkelund and Heldal, 2003).  
 
In terms of assortative mating, two complementary perspectives have 
been described that explain the choice process: Demand-side theories focus on 
the preferences that individuals have in order to choose their ideal partner, this 
theory is also called cultural matching, as people match with similar individuals, 
those that share the same religious or cultural values and interests. On the other 
hand, the supply-side perspective explains that people participate in different 
social contexts, which shapes their options in terms of potential partners 
(Torche, 2010). Therefore, assortative mating could be influenced not only by 
preferences of individuals, but also by structural constraints. The second 
perspective is of particular relevance to this research, as it is founded in the 
belief that people spend most of their time in determined contexts, for example 
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at work, in a club, in their neighbourhood and at school or university. This 
setting, where individuals want to find a partner and they choose (based on their 
preferences) between their possibilities, is understood as a marriage market, 
where people interact, meet and potentially find a partner taking account of 
some criteria and considering certain limitations like age, for example Becker 
(1973).   
 
Environments where people spend most of their time become relevant as 
one of the places where people could likely meet and form a couple. These 
settlements could differ in the level of opportunities that they offer in order to 
find a spouse. Contexts where people interact are obviously not designedly 
created to give couples opportunities, but they give the opportunity for 
individuals to be in contact with each other. If these social environments suffer 
from segregation, it is likely that people choose people with similar 
characteristics, especially if they are very segregated into groups that are 
difficult to penetrate (Kalmijn and Flap, 2001). In particular, societies become 
more stratified when individuals interact to a greater extent with relatively 
similar people than with relatively different people (Fernandez and Rogerson, 
2001). For example, in societies with high social segregation it would be more 
difficult for someone with a low level of education to meet someone with a high 
educational attainment (Fernandez, 2001). But also, people may only have the 
opportunity to meet potential spouses with similar educational backgrounds, so 
the homogeneity of a couple’s human capital will naturally be influenced by the 
proportion of individuals with the same level of education in the society (Lee, 
2008)111. This could be exacerbated even more if people prefer or feel obligated, 
                                                          
111 This has been classified as a macro-level interaction in terms of the opportunities to find a 
partner, which basically depends on the relative size of a particular group in terms of the whole 
population (Kalmijn and Flap, 2001). 
 215 
 
due to social pressure, to choose someone similar to them in terms of education, 
which could also delay marriage for a long time (Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2000). 
 
Schools would be an ideal place for people to meet as students are 
normally homogenoeus within them, normally with similar ages and there are 
usually similar numbers of girls and boys. Kalmijn and Flap (2001) point out that 
schools promote most of the types of couple homogeneity, finding that in the 
Netherlands 15% of couples attended the same school, findings similar to those 
of Laumann et al. (1994) who found that 23% of couples in the US attended the 
same school.  On the other hand, the workplace could be a less favourable 
environment because people are more segregated by gender and there is a 
lower female labour force participation.  
 
Mare (1991) points out that the age at which people decide to get 
married could affect the probability that they will find a partner with similar 
socioeconomic characteristics. So, people who marry many years after finishing 
school will decrease their chances to find someone alike. But, if the same is true 
in terms of different levels of educational attainment, each level of education 
creates barriers to marriage, that is, people who attended university will 
probably meet many more people who also attended university than people that 
did not finish secondary school. Because of the consecutive schooling process, a 
couple who met at school would have less probability of having educational 
homogeneity than a couple that met at university because in the first case one 
member of the couple can decide to stop studying at secondary level but the 
other member might decide to carry onto a degree at university. Furthermore, 
the second couple would be much more likely to be homogeneously matched, as 
university degrees are among the last levels of education possible to achieve. In 
this sense, schools/universities play an important role as most of them are 
homogeneous in terms of age, level of education, or social situation of students 
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(that is particularly true in the Chilean case) and it could be possible that a 
bigger educational attainment gap between members of a couple will be more 
common amongst those who met at lower levels of schooling. 
 
4.3.1 Assortative Mating and Human Capital 
 
As was mentioned before, assortative mating can be understood as the 
level of association between members of a couple in terms of age, education, 
class destination, class background and religious background, among others. It 
is also possible that people focus on psychological aspects, for example, Vaillant 
and Wolff (2011) using data from France and focusing on the non-desirable 
characteristics of partners, find that men reject women that seem vulgar or 
unfaithful because of potential infidelity in the marriage, and women avoid 
alcoholic, selfish or violent men. In spite of all the potential dimensions in which 
assortative mating can be found, educational homogamy among members of a 
couple is what will be mainly considered for the extent of this research, as if it is 
positive it may increase and reinforce social and earnings inequality between 
families (Becker, 1974). In particular, if individuals are likely to care about their 
future socioeconomic condition, so they will prefer a partner that potentially 
offers them the best possibility for fiscal security.  Therefore, if education is 
considered a better predictor of the future social position than other 
characteristics such as social origin or race, then spouse selection will be mostly 
driven by educational levels of potential partners, therefore increasing the levels 
of educational assortative mating (Smits et al., 1998), especially if it is 
considered that some women seek to attain levels of human capital as a signal of 
their abilities in order to find better partners. 
 
The best way to design an educational system is controversial, especially 
because even though education creates benefits by itself, it could also create an 
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elitist society where there are fewer opportunities for children from poorer 
backgrounds (Cremer et al., 2010). Therefore, the way in which educational 
systems are organised has implications for economic and social outcomes and 
for the distribution of welfare in society (Machin, 2004), for example, separating 
children among streams in early stages can make differences in terms of the 
levels of mobility in society but also in terms of assortative mating of couples 
(Ermisch et al., 2006). 
 
 The Chilean educational system has been suggested as being very 
segregated (Elacqua, 2009c). In particular, it has been claimed that the 1980s 
Chilean educational reform exacerbated the levels of segregation among 
students, where children from better socioeconomic backgrounds are 
concentrated in to voucher schools and poorer children into public schools, and 
that could be playing an important role in terms of the level of association 
between the characteristics of members of a couple. Furthermore, if it is 
considered that each member of a couple will bring their social networks to the 
partnership, then this could reinforce the segregation among individuals as they 
do not necessarily prefer a partner with a similar level of education, but they 
would like to secure a better social status through an homogeneous marriage 
(Blossfeld and Tim, 2003).  
 
4.3.2 Differences between Cohabitating and Married Couples 
 
Cohabitating can be understood as an informal marriage, so partner 
choice in a cohabitational context should be similar to the partner preferences in 
marriage, but if cohabitation is understood as a light version of marriage, so, 
cohabitating couples could be more heterogeneous than married couples (Halpin 
and Chan, 2003). However, it is possible to think that the cohabitating choice 
should give more importance to short term and achieved characteristics such as 
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education, and less importance to characteristics such as age, religion and race 
because cohabitation normally involves less commitment (at least financially) 
and more independency. Schoen and Weinick (1993), point out that it could be 
possible that married women are more interested in the economic characteristics 
of men. On the other hand, men pay more attention to non-economic 
characteristics such as age, race or looks. Education should be very important 
for men, as education is highly correlated with earnings. Therefore, women will 
marry men with more education than their own in a larger proportion than men 
would get married with women with more education than themselves. In the 
case of cohabitating couples, there could be more homogeneity in terms of 
education, because in general both members of the couple contribute to 
household income, so they will probably care about education, and less 
homogeneity with regards to religion and age. In this respect, Hamplova (2005), 
studying cohabitating and marriage patterns in some European countries finds 
that among individuals with higher levels of education, cohabitating partners are 
more educationally homogenous than partners when they are married, but the 
opposite is found among couples with lower levels of education.  
 
4.4 A Theoretical Model of Assortative Mating and Intergenerational 
Mobility 
  
This section develops a simple model that presents a formal relationship 
between assortative mating and intergenerational earnings dependency. It has 
been considered that the education of members of a couple is positively 
correlated. It is clear that reality is much more complex than a model can try to 
represent, but for the purposes of simplicity, the main assumptions considered 
are: 
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 Individuals live 2 periods of time (t and t+1). In the former, parents 
consume part of their income and invest in their offspring’s human 
capital. In the second period, their child is an adult and has his/her own 
household, earnings and a partner. 
 
 Couples have only 1 child. 
 
 Assortative mating is positive (more educated people mate with people of 
a similar educational level and similarly for less educated people). 
 
 Richer parents have the same level of altruism compared to poorer 
parents (it could be the case that richer parents face a social pressure for 
investing more in their children)112.  
 
The utility function of individual i’s parents depends on their own 
consumption at periodt (cit) and their child’s future permanent household income 
(     
         ). The proportion of concern between one and the other 
(understanding that for budget constraint reasons they will act as substitute 
goods) will be expressed as    (the level of altruism of parents), where         
 
(1)                                     
           
 
The total household permanent income of the child i when adult in t+1 
will be the joint individual permanent income       
            and his/her 
partner’s permanent income (     
 ). 
 
                                                          
112 Mulligan (1997) suggests the possibility that altruism could be influenced by the economic status 
of parents. 
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(2)        
                       
  
 
Educational homogamy has been considered,because in general, women 
are part of the labour market in a small proportion, especially in the oldest 
cohorts, therefore this will be a more suitable factor for couples to match on that 
than on earnings (Birkelund and Heldal, 2003). Originally, the role of assortative 
mating is understood as the correlation between the human capital of the 
individual i (        and the human capital of his/her partner (     
  :   
                
  . However, this association between human capital held by the 
members of the couple will be interpreted as a selection process, where 
individuals who normally take human capital decisions before establishing a 
formal relationship (marriage or cohabitation) choose a partner with a relative 
homogeneity in human capital among the possible candidates in the “marriage 
market”, which is supposed to exist as individuals compete to find their partners 
(Becker, 1973). 
 
The aim is not to claim an unlikely causality between couple members’ 
human capital (which could exist, in the sense that many individuals could meet 
at university for example and decide to extend their undergraduate studies to 
masters or doctorate degrees simply because their partner decided to do so), but 
simply to represent the process of picking up a partner with similar educational 
characteristics (human capital will be understood as the level of education, more 
specifically as the number of years of schooling of individuals). The benefits in 
terms of schooling due to marriage will therefore depend on the decision of other 
individuals, who also have to decide how much schooling to achieve. 
Nevertheless, because most of the schooling decisions effectively take place 
before marriage, potential partners cannot agree on their levels of investment in 
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education, so they take their decision considering that it may affect their choice 
in the future as regards their appropriate partner (Chiappori et al., 2009). 
 
Unmarried men and women interact in a marriage market, where 
individuals consider different characteristics of their potential partners. A 
potential wife’s human capital would be attractive for men because it could give 
husbands access to wider networks and they can be useful in terms of a 
husband’s career (Kalmijn, 1998). Therefore, the level of assortative mating will 
be represented by   , or how much influence the human capital of the partner 
has when the individual chooses them over other potential partners (in the same 
spirit as Ermisch et al. (2006)).  
 
(3)         
                     
 ,            (positive assortative mating) 
 
In equation (3),      
   represents the other factors that influence the 
matching process decision (other factors that affect the partner’s decision of 
acquiring more human capital).  
 
In addition, the human capital of an individual plays an important role on 
the level of earnings, so the earnings of the individual i’s household would be 
mostly determined by their own human capital and their partner’s human 
capital. This will be represented in a semi-logarithm earnings function in 
equation (4), where       and      represents the individual i’s and their partner’s 
returns to education respectively, assuming that there is a disparity between 
returns to human capital for men and women113. It is also believed that 
                                                          
113 Specifically for the case of Chile, the returns to years of schooling for female individuals are higher 
(9.4% per year of schooling) than for male individuals (8.2% per year of schooling) according to 
Psacharopoulos and Chu (1992). 
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“husband’s wage and wife’s education are positively correlated, because maybe 
a wife’s education contributes to her husband’s earnings, as mothers’ education 
contributes to her children’s earnings.” (Becker, 1973), therefore a partner’s 
human capital would have a double effect: Increasing the household’s earnings 
through their own earnings and increasing the household’s earnings through 
his/her spouse’s earnings. 
 
(4)          
                              
  
 
A traditional budget constraint for parents is considered, assuming that 
they divide their income (or earnings) between their own consumption and the 
amount of monetary resources invested in their child’s human capital ( ). 
 
(5)              
 
Following Solon (2004), the technology that translates the parental 
investment (private investment) and public investment in education (   ) into 
their child’s human capital is represented by equation (6), where      is 
considered to obtain positive marginal productivity of human capital and 
      corresponds to the child’s attributes which are solely influenced by nature. 
 
(6)                           
 
Additionally, to include the child’s endowment dependency with his/her 
parents endowment, equation (7) represents a first-order autoregressive process 
(AR), where    represents the heritability coefficient between parents and their 
offspring. 
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(7)                      
 
In order to maximise the utility function described in equation (1), it has 
been left in terms of parents’ investment as this will represent a decision made 
by the parents. Therefore replacing equation (4) and (5) in the utility function 
(1): 
 
(8)                                                   
   
 
 Replacing (3) and (6) in (8): 
 
(9)                                                               
                     
    
 
Replacing (6) in (9): 
 
(10)                                                    
                                     
    
 
Rearranging (10) 
 
(11)                                                     
                                             
  
 
To obtain the family investing behaviour, the utility function in (11) is 
maximised: 
(12)  
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Therefore, the first order condition involves: 
 
(13) 
           
    
  
      
       
 
    
       
 
      
       
= 0 
 
Solving equation (13): 
 
   
     
       
 
    
       
 
      
       
 
 
                       (                                 
 
                                    (                       
 
                                (                       
 
Obtaining the optimal level of private (parental) investment in 
human capital of their child: 
 
(14)    
    
                        
                   
 
 
 Therefore, it is possible to see that parental investment would 
depend on their income (   ), their level of altruism ( ), the technology 
that translates public and private investment into human capital ( ), the 
returns to education of the members of the couple (   and    ), the 
government spending on education (   ) and the level of human capital 
assortative mating (  ). The effect of each of them on the optimal level of 
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private investment in human capital is calculated by estimating the first 
derivative of (14) with respect to the variables mentioned above: 
 
 
    
  
 
    (        )[                 ]                                        
                   
  
 
 
                   
                 
            
      
            
                     
                    
 
 
 
                   
                               
                    
 
 
 
                                       
                    
 
 
(15) 
    
  
 
      (        )               
                   
 
  
   0 
 
Therefore, an increase in the efficiency of the technology that translates 
public and private investments into human capital is associated with an increase 
in the private investment. 
 
 
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(16) 
    
   
 
                      
                     
   0 
 
 
    
   
 
                                                         
                   
 
 
 
            
                 
                    
 
 
 
                         
                    
 
 
(17) 
    
   
 
                        
                     
   0 
 
 Both returns to education (individual and their partner) are positive, so 
an increase in them results in more private investment in education. 
 
 
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(18)
    
       
   
                       
                     
   0 
 
 Therefore, parental altruism affects their investment in human capital 
positively. 
 
 
    
   
  
                                                                
                    
 
 
  
         
                     
                    
 
 
   
                          
                    
 
 
       
    
   
  
    (   )                 
   (   ) (        ) 
 
  
   0 
 
Finally, the level of assortative mating affects the level of investment in 
education positively, therefore an increase in the level of homogeneity in human 
capital increases how much parents invest in their child’s education. On the 
other hand, to ensure the maximisation of the private investment in education, 
the second order condition is given by: 
 
(20)    
   
     
   [
   
          
     
            
          
]        0 
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 Therefore, it is ensured that the optimal level of private investment in 
education is a maximum of the utility function described previously. 
 
 Taking into account equation (4), the implication given by the optimal 
level of private investment in human capital in equation (14) would imply:  
 
(21)                
                                              
                               
   
 
     
    
          
  
 
  
 
                            
   
 
 
 
                        
   
 
     
  
 
                                                              
  
 
Replacing by the optimal level of investment: 
 
(22) 
l        
                             
              (
                       
                  
    )                     
  
 
         
          (
                                                 
                   
)
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                 (
                               
                   
)           
                   
  
 
Where                  
 
                 (
  (        )         
                   
)                         
  
 
                 (
            
                   
)                        
                          
  
 
(24) 
         
                                          
 
When                          (
            
                   
)and 
 
(26)                                
  
 
It is important to note that       corresponds to the sum of an 
autoregressive process or AR(1),      , and a white noise error      
  which is 
equal to an AR(1) process (see Granger and Morris (1976)). 
 
(27)          
                
 
  
 
 
 
      
  
(   
   
   
)         
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 It is assumed that the ratio  
   
   
   is small, i.e. that the public investment in 
education per child i at timet should be smaller than the child i’s parents’ 
permanent income. So, Taylor’s approximation can be used: 
 
(28)          
                
 
  
 
 
 
    ( 
  
)     
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
        
 
In addition, following Solon (2004), an empirical social policy 
implementation is utilised, which will be described as a “Policy Rule”: 
 
(29)         
   
   
          
  
   , with          
  
Using this policy rule, if    is more positive, the largest effect of the policy 
would be thaton the income of children from low income families. Therefore,   
corresponds to the degree of progressivity of the education policy (Holmlund, 
2008). The idea is that if    is larger, the        
   
   ratio is smaller, which means that 
the relationship between government spending on education and parental 
income will decrease or that government spending will be lower when parental 
income increases. A higher public spending on education will increase 
intergenerational income mobility as the higher resources will benefit poorer 
children more than richer children, that is because richer children will be able to 
get a high level of education with or without public investment (because their 
parents can increase their private investment). 
 
 Taking equation (29) and replacing it into equation (28): 
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(30)  
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(32) 
         
                
 
  
 
 
 
         ( 
  
)        
 
With      (33)                     
 
Therefore, the intergenerational earnings dependency coefficient 
(between a parent’s permanent earnings and their child’s household earnings), 
using equation (32) is:                   and it depends on the technology 
that translates investment into human capital ( ), the returns to education 
(     ), the progressivity of the educational policy ( ) and the level of 
assortative mating (  ). However, it is interesting to note that intergenerational 
dependency does not depend on the levels of parental altruism. A simple 
interpretation of this coefficient is that when the educational policy progressivity 
increases (when a larger proportion of the public spending on education goes to 
poorer families) the level of intergenerational mobility increases (the 
intergenerational earnings dependency decreases) as would be expected. On the 
other hand, higher levels of earnings return to education would decrease 
intergenerational mobility. If technology translates human capital in a more 
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efficient way, then the levels of intergenerational mobility also decrease. Finally, 
the level of human capital homogeneity among the members of the couple 
increases the level of earnings dependency between a child’s household earnings 
and the child’s parents’ earnings. It is important to consider that even though 
assortative mating can take values equal to zero (  =0), intergenerational 
dependency will take values which are non-zero, depending only on the 
technology, the individual’s earnings returns to human capital and the 
progressivity of the educational policy:           . Also note that differences 
in the parameters of the model could make a difference in terms of the level of 
intergenerational mobility in countries.  
 
Table 4.1 gives a summary of the direction of the effect that each factor 
has on the level of private investment in human capital and the level of 
intergenerational earnings dependency.   
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Effects on Private Investment in H.C and 
Intergenerational Earnings Dependency 
Variable Effect 
Private Investment in Human Capital 
( ) 
  : + 
   : + 
      : + 
        : + 
Intergenerational Earnings Coefficient 
(   
  : - 
          : + 
      : + 
        : + 
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4.5 Data 
 
The data used for this research come from the cross-sectional National 
Socio-economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN) of 1990 and 2009, collected by 
the Ministry of Social Development of Chile. These surveys are used as the main 
source for social policy decisions and were also used in the second chapter of 
this research, but for this chapter information related to individual’s partners and 
partner’s parents will be included. The data consist of information about 
households and individual characteristics in terms of education, occupation, 
income and living conditions and are suitable for analysing the effect that 
educational assortative mating has on intergenerational earnings dependency, 
but also for analysing the effect of the 1980s educational reform in Chile and its 
impact in terms of educational assortative mating among couples. The survey in 
2009 is particularly interesting for the first analysis because it asked individuals 
for information about their parents when the individuals were 15 years old. The 
questions are related to educational level, occupation and age. However, the 
survey does not include information related to income or earnings of parents. 
Therefore, individuals in 1990 are used as potential parents in a process that is 
fully detailed in the methodology section, respecting of course some restriction 
of age (not all individuals in 1990 could be parents of individuals in 2009 as they 
might have been too young or even too old).  The sample in 1990 is therefore 
called ‘the synthetic parents’ sample. 
 
 As the synthetic father/parents survey of 1990 is totally independent of 
parents described by individuals in 2009, it is important to have a sample that is 
consistent in terms of age, the proportion of people with a determined level of 
education and the occupation that they describe. It is particularly important as 
earnings of parents will be predicted using these characteristics. Table 4.2 
presents a comparison between the average age of male individuals’ fathers 
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reported by the individuals in 2009 and the age of their synthetic father 
(reported by the fathers themselves in 1990). It is possible to see that the 
average age of fathers of male individuals in 2009 is 60 years old, which is the 
same average age of the synthetic fathers observed in 1990 (once the 19 years 
difference between surveys is allowed). In addition, it is important to consider 
consistency between fathers of female individuals observed in 1990 and the ones 
reported by their daughters in 2009, in particular, this is relevant because the 
assortative mating relationship will include an analysis of the father in law of 
male indivduals. Table 4.3 presents the average father’s age in 2009, which is 
claimed by their daughters (partner of male individual) and then compared to 
the age of the synthetic fathers in 1990 and again it is possible to see that these 
are very similar (see Appendix 4A1., Table 4A1.1 and Table 4A1.2 for the age of 
mothers reported by sons and daughters in 2009 respectively). The daughter’s 
report now becomes important (in contrast to the analysis in the second chapter 
of this research) as the analysis of individuals (son when adult) and their 
partner’s (daughter when adult) earnings is considered to analyse the effect of 
intergenerational earnings dependency. It is important to notice that this 
congruency in terms of the 1990 and the 2009 sample is similar, but not the 
same as the one presented in the second chapter of this investigation, because 
now the female partner’s information (and her father’s) has been included as 
explained above, therefore the congruency is a bit more complicated as it also 
included individuals, partners, individual’s parents and individual’s partner’s 
parents. 
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Table 4.2: Father’s Age in 2009 (reported by sons) versus 1990 
Age of Father in 2009 
2009 (reported by sons)  1990 (synthetic fathers) 
t=0 t1=t+19 
Mean Age 59.98 Mean  Age 59.7 
Min Age 40 Min Age 44 
Max Age 68 Max Age 84 
St Dev. 5.93 St Dev. 11.45 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 4.3: Father’s Age in 2009 (reported by daughters) versus 1990 
Age of Father in 2009 
2009 (reported by daughters)  1990 (synthetic fathers) 
t=0 t1=t+19 
Mean Age 58.89 Mean  Age 57.46 
Min Age 40 Min Age 34 
Max Age 73 Max Age 102 
St Dev. 6.75 St Dev. 8.66 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
The individual’s and their partner’s age is also important, and it should 
also be consistent with the age of their parents, but also with the age that they 
would be in 1990, because that year they are supposed to be 15 years old (as 
the survey asks individuals information about their parents at that age). Table 
4.4 shows that the average age of sons in the 2009 sample was 34.53 years old; 
this figure should be congruent with the expected average age of sons if fathers 
in the 1990 sample are considered. That is, if the synthetic fathers in 2009 (the 
ones obtained using the sample in 1990 pushed forward 19 years) were on 
average 59.98 years old, then they must have been born in 2009-59.98=1949 
and it is supposed that they have a child at the age of 25 years old (which was 
also checked as the most popular age on average to have children in the survey) 
then, the sons were born on average around 1949+25=1974. Therefore, sons in 
the year 2009 should be 2009-1974=35 years old, which is in fact the average 
age of children observed in 2009 (34.53). In addition, sons in 1990 were on 
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average 16 years old, being consistent with the correspondent survey question.  
A similar consistency can be seen for daughters in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.4: Son’s Age 
Son’s Age in 2009 
Mean 34.53 
Min 25 
Max 56 
St Dev. 5.86 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
Table 4.5: Daughter’s (Partner) Age 
Daughter’s Age in 2009 
Mean 32.11 
Min 15 
Max 57 
St Dev. 6.66 
Source: CASEN Survey, 2009 
 
Graphically, this relationship between the parent’s and child’s age can be 
understood using a time line: 
 
Figure 4.1 Time Line for Son and his Father 
    Father’s age =0          Father’s age=25    Father’s age=41    Father’s age= 60 
                                 Son’s Age=0         Son’s age=16       Son’s age=35 
                    + 25 years 
 
          1949                       1974                   1990                    2009 
 (Fathers are born)    (Sons are born) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Time Line for Daughter and her Father 
Father’s age =0       Father’s age=25    Father’s age=41    Father’s age= 60 
Daughter’s Age=0   Daughter’s age=13   Daughter’s age=32 
                    + 25 years 
 
          1952                       1977                   1990                    2009 
 (Fathers are born)    (Daughters are born) 
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The procedure is very similar to the one used in Chapter 2 of this 
research, but with a modification of the limits on age for parents, as now 
congruency with a partner’sand partner’s parents’ age is also required. Working 
individuals have been included independent of their partner’s employment 
status. 
  
Using the samples mentioned above, in total it is possible to find 4,926 
male individuals and female partner and father pairs, 5,717 male individuals and 
fathers-in-law pairs, and 4,664 male individuals and female partner and parent 
pairs, these figures are presented in Table 4.6: 
 
Table 4.6: Sample Sizes with Information of Occupation, Education and Age of 
Fathers/Parents 
Sub-Sample size 
Number of Son & Partner Pairs 6,763 
Number of Daughter & Partner Pairs 1,811 
Number of Father & Son Pairs 5,110 
Number of Father in Law&Son Pairs 5,717 
Number of Father & Daughter Pairs 1,517 
Number of Father_Son & Partner Pairs  4,926 
Number of Father_Daughter & Partner Pairs 1,481 
Number of Parents & Son Pairs 4,841 
Number of Parents & Daughter Pairs 1,462 
Number of Parents_Son & Partner Pairs 4,664 
Number of Parents_Daughter & Partner Pairs 1,427 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 4.7 shows some additional descriptive statistics, where for 
example, the number of married couples compared to cohabitating ones are 
presented, or the proportion of rural households in the year 2009 for the sample 
of male individuals, his partner and his father. 
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Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics 
Avg. Number of people in the household (St.Dev.) 4.3 (1.53) 
Avg. Number of children in the household (St.Dev.) 1.6 (1.10) 
% Rural 32.31% 
Avg. Number years of SchoolingMale Individuals(St.Dev.) 11.01 (3.32) 
Avg. Number years of SchoolingFemale Partners(St.Dev.) 11.06 (3.21) 
Avg. Number years of SchoolingFathers of Male Individuals(St.Dev.) 8.30 (4.24) 
Avg. Number years of SchoolingMothers of Male Individuals(St.Dev.) 8.15 (4.11) 
% Married 64.18% 
% Cohabitating 35.82% 
Income ratio of richest to poorest decile(couples) 16.79 
Income ratio of richest to poorest decile(individual) 25.28 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
In addition, when the role of the educational reform is considered, only 
the data of the year 2009 is utilised, using 47,825 couples between the ages of 
25 and 90 years old. However, this sample is also restricted to compare closer 
generations of couples, limiting their age to between 40 and 55 years old 
reducing the sample to 24,279 couples. 
 
4.6 Methodology 
 
One of the most important aims of this research is to analyse the effect 
that human capital assortative mating has on the level of intergenerational 
earnings dependency between a father’s earnings (or parents’) and their child’s 
household’s earnings, following the idea that parents that have higher incomes 
will invest a larger amount of resources on their offspring’s human capital; 
allowing their children, when adults, to get better jobs and higher earnings, but 
also be able to choose a higher quality partner (a partner with higher human 
capital and potentially higher earnings too) reinforcing the pure human capital 
effect in terms of the level of association between parents’ earnings and their 
child’s household’s earnings, and this is shown in Figure 4.3: 
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Figure 4.3:  Assortative Mating 
Parents’ Earnings           1                       Child’s Human Capital 
 
                                      2 (Assortative Mating)                                            3         Child&Partner’s 
                                                                       Earnings 
 
                                 Child’s Partner’s Human Capital 
 
4 
 
 
 In particular, the number of years of schooling of male individuals and 
their female partner has been considered (understanding marriage beyond 
legalisation, but as living in the same household as a couple) to analyse the 
effect of assortative mating on human capital, and to measure the levels of 
intergenerational dependency between the joined earnings of male individuals 
and their female partner and their father’s (or their parents’). But also, 
intergenerational earnings dependency has been considered using female 
individuals and their male partner’s earnings with the female individual’s father 
(or parents). 
 
4.6.1 The impact of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Mobility 
 
In order to analyse the effect that assortative mating has on the level of 
intergenerational mobility in society, the level of intergenerational dependency 
between male individuals plus their partners’ earnings and the father’s (or 
parents’) earnings has to be available. The main problem of estimating this 
intergenerational dependency is that as was mentioned before, individuals in 
2009 gave information related to education, occupation and age of their parents, 
but not of their earnings. 
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Therefore, the Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (2STSLS) 
estimation is employed. This technique allows the connection of two totally 
independent data sets, in this case the 1990 and 2009 surveys. The first will 
represent the parents of individuals in 2009 as was explained in the first chapter 
of this research. Therefore, the main relationship used is the following (including 
control variables for the age of father, individual and partners): 
 
 
 
Where   corresponds to the intergenerational earnings dependency 
between the individual’s and partner’s earnings and his father’s predicted 
earnings (details of the calculation were explained in Chapter 2). In the general 
case, only male individuals are considered with their respective female partner, 
but the analysis also considers a case using female individuals with their 
respective male partners114.  
 
 It is also necessary to estimate the level of assortative mating in society, 
understanding it as the level of dependency between the years of schooling of 
individuals and their partners (controlling for their age), estimated using OLS. 
 
 
 
 
Finding the value of  should be of interest by itself. However, a focus on 
the level of intergenerational mobility has already been done in Chapter 2 of this 
                                                          
114 Homosexual couples were not included in Chilean surveys until very recently, as it is a less open 
situation than in more developed economies. 
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research, and also one of the most important aims is actually to calculate how 
much assortative mating impacts the level of intergenerational dependency. 
 
Therefore, the first stage was to create two bi-dimensional pairs of 
matrices, one containing 40 different cells with 40 different intergenerational 
earnings coefficients and the other containing 40 different cells with 40 different 
levels of assortative mating. The dimensions to create these matrices have been 
chosen with the expectation that different levels for each cell will be obtained. 
Hence, creating variability between the 40 cells. It is expected that, 
intergenerational mobility could change across age (because it could increase 
over time) and across the earnings distribution (as shown with the quantile 
estimation in Chapter 2 of this research). Similarly, assortative mating could also 
vary with age (because marriage market structure could vary over time due to 
the implementation of specific social policies) and with the level of earnings of 
the members of a couple (as people with higher earnings, probably are also 
more educated and have likely been around people with similar level of 
schooling). Four age cohorts and municipality earnings per capita deciles 
(considering first the earnings of male individuals in the household, but also, in a 
robustness check, the joint earnings of individuals and their partner) were 
originally utilised. In terms of the municipality earnings per capita deciles, they 
were calculated considering male individuals, with the average earnings per 
capita calculated for the municipality in which they live, so every individual in a 
municipality will have the same earnings municipality per capita, and then 
earnings deciles are calculated. Considering this calculation, the possibility that 
the dimensions chosen (age and particularly, deciles of earnings by municipality) 
could create an endogeneity problem, that is, the variability created by them 
within the 40 cells follows a pattern seems unlikely, because individual’s 
earnings are considered for the estimation, and this breaks the link between the 
estimation and the dimension of every cell . 
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 For the assortative mating matrix, an individual’s age and partner’s age 
were used as control variables and the relationship estimated using the OLS 
technique. For the intergenerational earnings dependency matrix, the control 
variables considered were the individual’s age, individual’s age squared, 
partner’s age, partner’s age squared, individual father’s age and individual 
father’s age squared (using the OLS technique). In addition, the age cohorts only 
included individuals between 25 and 45 years old, because if they were too 
young they would not have earnings, and if they were too old, their parents 
would also be too old to consider their earnings or likely it will not even be 
possible to find them in the data available. 
 
These dimensions were also modified to test the robustness of the 
results. For example, the addition of an extra dimension was considered, namely 
rural versus urban households. In that way 80 cells were obtained for the levels 
of assortative mating and for the intergenerational earnings coefficients. In 
addition, the municipality earnings deciles were replaced by the sectors of 
occupation in which invididuals worked. Finally, both parents instead of just 
fathers were used to obtain the intergenerational earnings coefficients (for this 
case, the intergenerational earnings matrix in the first stage adds to the control 
variables the mothers’ age and mothers’ age squared). 
 
An example of the assortative mating matrix is presented in Figure 4.4 
and an example of intergenerational earnings persistence is presented in Figure 
4.5. In both tables in the first cell of the matrix (k=1 and j=1); the level of 
assortative mating or intergenerational earnings dependency is found for 
individuals with ages between 25-30 and within the first deciles of individual’s 
earnings by municipality. 
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Figure 4.4: Assortative Mating in Schooling
115
 
 
 
Figure4.5: Intergenerational Earnings Dependency
116
 
  
 
Independent of the dimensions used to create the matrices, every value 
in each cell of the matrix of intergenerational earnings coefficients becomes an 
observation by itself, and each cell of the matrix of assortative mating becomes 
an observation on assortative mating. Hence, a simple OLS equation (controlling 
for mean age of individuals, their partners and their fathers/parents obtained in 
each cell of the first stage) is estimated using these observations, calling it the 
second stage regression: 
                                                          
115 In     , k corresponds to the age cohort utilised (1 for 25-30 years old, 2 for 30-35 years old, 3 
for 35-40 years old and 4 for 40-45 years old), j corresponds to the earnings deciles utilised, and it 
ranges from 1 to 10 for the first and 10th decile respectively. 
116 In     , k corresponds to the age cohort utilised (1 for 25-30 years old, 2 for 30-35 years old, 3 for 
35-40 years old and 4 for 40-45 years old), j corresponds to the earnings deciles utilised, and it 
ranges from 1 to 10 for the first and 10th decile respectively. 
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Where  corresponds to the change in the level of intergenerational 
earnings dependency that is produced by a change in the level of assortative 
mating in society117 and g corresponds to the 40 observations created by 4 age 
cohorts and 10 earnings deciles for the baseline case. The estimation of this 
equation is weighted, taking as weights the number of observations that were 
used to calculate the assortative mating values118 (i.e. the cell sizes in the 40 cell 
matrix described above).  
 
It is important to notice that the most important result of the previous 
regression will be the multiple coefficient of determination or R2, which 
corresponds to the proportion of the variation in the response variable that is 
explained by the model; that is how well the variance in the level of 
intergenerational earnings dependency is explained by the level of assortative 
mating together with the age of individuals, partners and fathers. Formally: 
 
R2=ESS/TSS 
                                                          
117 It would perhaps be interesting to analyse the effect of other factors (such as progressivity of 
social policy or returns to education mentioned in the theoretical model proposed previously), but it 
is not clear that these factors are going to vary by a pair of categories (dimensions). For example, it 
is not clear that progressivity of social policy will vary with age or by municipality per capita 
earnings. 
118 There were two possibilities, to use the number of observations used to create the cells for 
different values of assortative mating or to use the number of observations used to create the cell for 
different values of intergenerational earnings dependency (they should not be very different, but the 
first should be higher than the second, as information related to parental education and occupation 
to predict their income is more scarce than information related to schooling of individuals and their 
partners). 
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Where ESS corresponds to the Explained Sum of Squares, that is, the 
sum of the squared differences between the predicted y and the mean of y 
(    ∑  ̂   ̅  ) and TSS corresponds to the sum of the squared differences 
between the actual y and the mean of y (TSS=∑    ̅          ). In simple 
terms, ESS shows how much of the variation in the dependent variable y is 
explained by the model, and RSS or Residual Sum of Squares, corresponds to 
how much of the variation in the dependent variable y is not explained by the 
model, that is, the sum of the squared differences between the actual y and the 
predicted y (    ∑    ̂  ). 
 
When no control variables are included, the R2 will measure how much 
assortative mating explains the level of intergenerational earnings dependency. 
However, when more control variables are considered (average per cell of 
individuals’, partners’ and fathers’ age and age2) R2 needs to be re-considered, 
because it will by itself calculate the proportion of the variation in the response 
variable (intergenerational earnings dependency) that is explained by the whole 
model (which includes assortative mating and ages), therefore it would not 
measure the pure effect of assortative mating, which is the main interest. 
 
 Therefore, the partial R2 is needed. That allows us to obtain the 
proportion that one explanatory variable (x1) explains of the dependent variable 
(y) after removing the effect of the other independent variables (x2) on y and x1 
(Acock, 2008). For the case of y as the dependent variable and x1 and x2 as 
explanatory variables, the contribution of x1 to the variance of y is: 
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Partial119  R2y,x1/x2 = 
               
√         √    
 
     
   
 
The whole procedure described above has also been extended to the 
analysis of female individuals, their male partners and their fathers (and 
parents).  
 
4.6.2 The Impact of the Educational Reform on the Level of Assortative 
Mating 
 
To analyse the effect of the 1980s educational reform on the level of 
assortative mating (considering years of schooling), an OLS estimation is 
utilised, adding to the original estimation of assortative mating an interaction 
variable that considers years of schooling of the individual together with a 
dummy variable that indicates if the individual was affected (at least one year 
affected by the reform) and/or also fully affected by the reform, i.e the individual 
entered the new education system in the first year of primary education. 
Therefore, if it is considered that individuals enter primary education when they 
are 6 years old and leave secondary education when they are 17 years old, they 
will be fully affected by the reform if in 2009 they were younger than 36 years 
old and at least affected for one year if they are younger than 47 years old. 
Initially, the full sample of 2009 is utilised, but also a restricted sample 
(considering ages between 30 and 50) was used as 25 years old are likely very 
different to 90 years old and so a narrow range of ages was used. In addition, 
individuals are separated depending on the highest levels of education they have 
                                                          
119 The calculation of the partial coefficient of determination bearing several explanatory variables is 
not simple. However, STATA allows the possibility to obtain it easily as the semi-partial R2. 
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achieved (primary, secondary or tertiary) and the effect of the reform is 
evaluated taking this into account. In formal terms, the analysis of the effect of 
the educational reform is described below: 
 
                     
                                                     
                     
 
The coefficient of interest above corresponds to   , which captures the 
difference, in the level of assortative mating between members of a couple 
before and after the reform. Therefore, for an increase in the level of assortative 
mating in schooling for couples affected by the educational reform this coefficient 
is expected to be positive. 
 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Levels of Assortative Mating 
 
The level of assortative mating in terms of years of schooling seems to be 
high in Chilean society, and similarly within the age cohorts of individuals. For 
example, the correlation among individuals’ years of education and their 
partners' years of education is between 0.54 to 0.67 if all couples are considered 
where older couples seem to present slightly higher assortative mating levels 
than younger couples. When only individuals with no education or only primary 
education are taken into account (leaving the possibility that their partner’s 
years of schooling vary) the correlation is found to be between 0.20 to 0.35 and 
0.16 to 0.4 respectively, and again older cohorts seem to present slightly higher 
assortative mating levels.  It is important to notice that individual's education 
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but not their partner's has been considered in order to separate the couples into 
different levels of education. 
 
A different pattern is found when only individuals studying or that have 
finished secondary or tertiary education are considered, finding that over time, 
assortative mating has increased (See Graph 4.1). That could be associated with 
the educational reform implemented in the 1980s which concentrated pupils 
from similar backgrounds and maybe with similar expectations in life in terms of 
human capital achievement. However, it is important to notice that older couples 
are scarce in the sample; therefore there are few observations for the older 
cohorts (that is why only individuals below 75 years old have been considered).  
 
Graph 4.1: Assortative Mating (Years of Schooling Correlation) by Age 
Cohort 
 
 
Considering the correlation among members of couples, the correlation in 
terms of years of schooling is higher (between 0.57 to 0.71) than in terms of 
earnings (between 0.0165 and 0.289) (See Graph 4.2
120
). However, the 
correlation between individuals’ earnings by deciles is clearly higher in higher 
                                                          
120 More details in Appendix 4A2., Graph 4A2.1. 
25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75
Total 0.5438 0.6198 0.6488 0.6291 0.6285 0.6495 0.6650 0.6632 0.6646 0.6755
Non-Education 0.1961 0.2695 0.2041 0.2809 0.2675 0.3093 0.2973 0.2732 0.3549 0.3344
Primary 0.2167 0.1601 0.2781 0.2394 0.1893 0.2192 0.2695 0.3296 0.3131 0.4050
Secondary 0.2787 0.2126 0.2675 0.2134 0.2047 0.2083 0.2734 0.1219 0.1627 0.1652
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deciles, particularly for the last deciles. This is surprising, as it was expected that 
many female individuals only study more in order to find a “better” husband, and 
that they do not enter effectively into the labour market. However, this does not 
seem to happen, probably due to the fact that the last decile of earnings is 
composed of individuals that are not the richest in the country but are probably 
upper-middle class and due to the empowerment of Chilean women - they 
believe that working not only gives them back their investment in education, but 
also gives them more bargaining power in the household. This could be related 
to the neoliberal reforms that Chile has experienced in the ‘70s and ‘80s (when 
Pinochet was in power), where many male workers lost their jobs in state 
companies and women felt forced to support their households in monetary terms 
which was also encouraged by the creation of some social programmes (Bosch, 
1998). It is therefore possible, that younger couples have higher levels of 
earnings assortative mating than older couples (the correlation between 
members of a couple aged 35-40 years old is around 0.40 which is twice the 
correlation that couples aged 60-65 years old exhibit).  
 
Graph 4.2:  Earnings and Years of Schooling Correlations by Individual’s 
Earnings Decile 
 
 
It has been suggested that these high levels of schooling assortative 
mating are due to the educational reform implemented nationwide in the country 
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in 1980, which was based on privatisation and decentralisation of the educational 
market. 
 
4.7.2 How the Educational Reform affected the Level of Assortative 
Mating 
 
 The 1980s Chilean educational reform, which has previously been claimed 
to have produced sorting among children and segregation of pupils depending on 
their social status and parents’ background, seems to have increased the levels 
of assortative mating in terms of schooling. These results are presented in Table 
4.8, where an interaction variable was created to establish this relationship 
between years of schooling of the individual together with a dummy variable that 
indicates if the individual was affected at least one year by the reform (partially 
affected) and/or also fully affected by the reform, i.e the individual entered the 
new education system in the first year of primary education. That is, an 
individual is partially affected if he was younger than 47 years old in 2009 and 
fully affected if he was 36 years old or younger in 2009. See equation (1) in 
section 4.6.2 of the methodology for more details. In column 1, the total effect 
of the reform on the level of aassortative mating is found for individuals that 
have been partially affected by it, indicating that when individuals are affected 
by the reform, the schooling of their partner increases by 0.031 years more for 
each additional year of the individuals’ schooling compared to older individuals 
who were unaffected by the reform. In column 2, only individuals with primary 
education or lower are considered, in columns 3 and 4, individuals with 
secondary (or lower, but with higher than primary education) and tertiary 
(completed or not completed) education are found. Similarly, in columns 5 to 8, 
the results obtained when those individuals were fully affected by the reform are 
considered (if they started school in 1980 or later, which is if they were 36 years 
old or younger in 2009), finding that the schooling of the partner increases by 
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0.056 years more for each year of the individual schooling compared to those 
unaffected by the reform. Both sets of results are quite similar in terms of 
direction of the effect caused by the reform on assortative mating and in terms 
of the size of the effect. This analysis has also been done considering individuals 
that have been partially affected for a different period of time by the reform 
(individuals that were affected for only 4 years or less, individuals that were 
affected by 5 to 8 years and individuals that were affected by 9 to 10 years), but 
no significant correlation was found. 
 
In addition, when the pure dummy variable (which indicates if the 
individual has been affected by the reform) is considered, the chance of getting 
an educated partner seems to be higher if the individual has zero years of 
schooling and they were (partially or fully) affected by the reform, compared to 
individuals that were not affected. One interpretation of this could be that 
individuals with no education have been given the chance to establish 
relationships with people that have higher years of schooling than themselves, 
probably because there are more educated people in society. In fact, looking at 
the dummy variables “partially affected” or “fully affected” in column 1 and 
column 5 respectively, individuals that have been affected by the reform match 
with a partner with 0.315 and 0.711 years of schooling more than if the 
individual was not affected by the reform.These results are similar when different 
levels of education are considered. However, they are independent of the years 
of education of individuals. That is why the interaction variable previously 
analysed isof much more interest to analyse.  
  
 Similar results were found when restricting the sample size by age in 
Table 4.9, so only individuals between 30 and 50 years old were included, 
considering that very young and very old couples could be dramatically different. 
The results show that the schooling of a partner increases by 0.012 years more 
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for each additional year of an individual’s own schooling if individuals were 
partially affected by the reform. See column 1 of Table 4.9 for partially affected 
and column 5 of Table 4.9 for fully affected. 
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Table 4.8: Effect of the 1980’s Chilean Educational Reform on Assortative Mating Levels121122 
 Y=Partner’ Schooling Partially Fully 
  Total Primary Secondary Tertiary Total Primary Secondary Tertiary 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Individual’ Schooling 0.580*** 0.455*** 0.643*** 0.572*** 0.576*** 0.450*** 0.643*** 0.576*** 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.021) (0.041) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) (0.031) 
Individual’s age 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.019*** -0.029*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.020*** -0.030*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
age_Partner -0.091*** -0.113*** -0.063*** -0.017*** -0.091*** -0.113*** -0.063*** -0.017*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Individual’s Earnings 0.025*** 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.004 0.025*** 0.055*** 0.043*** 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Earnings_Partner 0.166*** 0.242*** 0.219*** 0.112*** 0.166*** 0.245*** 0.219*** 0.112*** 
  (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) 
Married 0.399*** 0.263*** 0.462*** 0.556*** 0.410*** 0.283*** 0.488*** 0.551*** 
  (0.032) (0.048) (0.048) (0.097) (0.033) (0.048) (0.049) (0.099) 
affected1980_Partially 0.315*** 0.310** 0.742* 0.591         
  (0.082) (0.132) (0.385) (0.861)         
schooling_Affected_Partially 0.031*** 0.049*** 0.056* 0.038         
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.033) (0.053)         
affected1980_Fully         0.711*** 0.938*** 1.546*** 1.067 
          (0.125) (0.238) (0.522) (0.950) 
schooling_Affected_Fully         0.056*** 0.094*** 0.116*** 0.066 
          (0.011) (0.033) (0.045) (0.060) 
_cons 5.993*** 7.518*** 4.284*** 5.969*** 5.935*** 7.345*** 4.209*** 5.966*** 
  (0.111) (0.164) (0.299) (0.713) (0.086) (0.129) (0.252) (0.514) 
Number of observations 46,928 23,692 18,372 4,864 46,928 23,692 18,372 4,864 
R2 0.551 0.364 0.197 0.194 0.551 0.364 0.198 0.194 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
121 The dummy variable, for the status of being affected by the reform, and the other control variables in the regressions, correspond to the individuals (males) instead of 
their partners. In any case, most of the couples have been affected equally by the reform (97% and 78% for partially and fully affected by the reform). Most of the couples 
have similar ages and also, even though the members of the couple may not meet at school, their networks influenced by the reform could help them find their partner, 
although the partner was not affected by the reform (because of their respective age gap). 
122 Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 4.9: Effect of the 80’s Educational Reform on Assortative Mating Levels (30 to 50 Years Old)123 
 Y=Partner’ Schooling Partially Fully 
  Total Primary Secondary Tertiary Total Primary Secondary Tertiary 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Schooling 0.551*** 0.416*** 0.666*** 0.528*** 0.562*** 0.419*** 0.631*** 0.589*** 
  (0.010) (0.025) (0.049) (0.078) (0.006) (0.015) (0.026) (0.039) 
Age 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.027** 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.003 -0.027* 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.014) 
age_Partner -0.064*** -0.086*** -0.052*** -0.013 -0.064*** -0.086*** -0.052*** -0.013 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
Earnings 0.021*** 0.052*** 0.049*** -0.005 0.021*** 0.052*** 0.049*** -0.005 
  (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) 
Earnings_Partner 0.149*** 0.215*** 0.243*** 0.100*** 0.149*** 0.216*** 0.242*** 0.100*** 
  (0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.008) 
Married 0.345*** 0.252*** 0.427*** 0.381*** 0.350*** 0.256*** 0.431*** 0.386*** 
  (0.042) (0.068) (0.057) (0.115) (0.042) (0.068) (0.057) (0.115) 
affected1980_Partially 0.152 0.219 0.892 -1.649         
  (0.120) (0.204) (0.629) (1.369)         
schooling_Affected_Partially 0.012 0.010 -0.078 0.107         
  (0.012) (0.030) (0.056) (0.085)         
affected1980_Fully         0.300** 0.208 1.356** -1.422 
          (0.152) (0.304) (0.638) (1.130) 
schooling_Affected_Fully         0.009 0.027 0.108* 0.092 
          (0.013) (0.041) (0.055) (0.071) 
_cons 6.417*** 8.100*** 4.534*** 6.720*** 5.725*** 6.773*** 4.640*** 5.788*** 
  (0.230) (0.403) (0.616) (1.349) (0.219) (0.364) (0.423) (0.783) 
Number of observations 22,202 9,017 10,384 2,801 22,202 9,017 10,384 2,801 
R2 0.439 0.170 0.148 0.197 0.439 0.171 0.148 0.197 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
123
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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 The results seem to indicate that the educational reform has increased 
the levels of educational assortative mating at all of the levels of educational 
achievement. However, there is a possibility that in the segments that the 
educational reform increased the level of assortative mating, it was not due to 
segregation, but rather due to increasing the educational attainment of the 
whole population. If this is the case, more educated individuals would create a 
more homogenous society in terms of schooling, especially among the youngest 
(who were affected by the educational reform which increased sorting, but also 
increased the level of educational attainment, in particular for lower income 
individuals), that could be associated with an increase in assortative mating, but 
in a positive way, because everyone would have a similar level of education.  
Therefore, it would be useful to determine whether the higher levels of 
assortative mating observed amongst younger cohorts affected by the reform 
was due to increased segregation, or due to higher attainment leading to an 
increased homogenisation of educational performance. 
 
Looking towards the bottom of the educational distribution should help us 
distinguish between the causes of the increase in assortative mating after the 
educational reform. If most individuals become more educated, it would be 
difficult for those that stay at low levels of education to find a partner with 
similar levels of education, and so the ‘higher general attainment’ effect would 
cause assortative mating to decrease in this section of the schooling distribution. 
On the other hand, if these lesser-educated individuals become more isolated 
from society and are unable to meet and interact with individuals with higher 
levels of education, assortative mating would increase in this part of the 
schooling distribution. In contrast, for highly educated individuals, if they 
become more segregated then assortative mating increases for them not only 
because of a larger proportion of similar, more educated people in society 
(increasing the number of potentially similar partners) but also because they 
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become more isolated from lesser-educated individuals, reinforcing the former 
effect, so leaving us unable to distinguish between the two effects in this section 
of the schooling. 
 
It was first checked whether the distribution of attainment did change 
after the reforms. Therefore, the distribution of years of schooling between 
individuals who were affected by the reform and those who were not affected 
was analysed. Graph 4.3 presents the distribution of years of schooling among 
the two groups - the young, or those that have been affected by the educational 
reform, who therefore have a potential possibility of achieving a better 
education, and the older generations, who were not affected by the reform. 
 
Graph 4.3: Pre- and Post- Reform Years of Schooling Distributions 
 
 
Both distributions have been tested to check their similarity using the 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of equality in distribution (p-value>0.000). It is 
possible to see that the reform is associated with a change in the distribution of 
education in society. Nevertheless, what is of more interest for the analysis here 
is whether or not the post-reform distribution was more homogenous than the 
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pre-reform one (more people achieved a higher level of schooling), giving a 
positive explanation of why the reform increased assortative mating levels. This 
is what actually seems to be happening: the post-reform distribution of years of 
schooling is more homogenous than the pre-reform one, which can be seen in 
the graph above, where obvious peaks are seen, which indicates that there are 
more young individuals with 12 years of education (finished secondary 
education) than amongst older individuals. The same situation is observed for 
those with 8 years of schooling (finishing primary education). On the other hand, 
there are fewer individuals affected by the reform that have lower levels of 
schooling than individuals that were not affected by the reform. This could sound 
positive in terms of giving new generations more opportunities and hopes in life. 
However, it could be possible that the reform caused, as mentioned previously: 
a) a general increase in the level of education of the whole population, but also 
b) a higher level of segregation of people that have a lower level of education 
from those that obtained higher education, as mentioned previously. 
 
The analysis above only considers male individuals, therefore it would not 
be complete without considering the change in the proportion of female 
individuals (which in the previous analysis were considered as partners) 
achieving different levels of education pre- and post- reform. This is imperative 
as the actual levels of assortative mating for a determined level of education will 
depend not only on the number of males available, but also the number of 
female individuals, as more men in one category will be meaningless if the 
number of females has been kept constant or has decreased. In Table 4.10, the 
proportion of female and male individuals at each level of education is presented 
for individuals partially affected and not affected by the reform (the proportion of 
individuals is enough to represent the change in the number of female and male 
individuals as they are equal in number due to heterosexual couple’s 
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formation124). First, it is important to check that the number of female 
individuals available does not restrict the possibility of matching. That is, if the 
increase of attainment of male individuals was not followed by an increase of 
attainment of female individuals, a higher number of males would not increase 
the level of assortative mating if it is not followed by a similar increase in the 
number of females in the same category. Table 4.10 shows that the proportion 
and therefore the number of female individuals “available” for male individuals 
does not restrict the potential matches with similar individuals, that is, a similar 
proportion of female and male individuals are found at each level of education. 
 
Therefore, the main concern is to analyse if the change in assortative 
mating was or was not caused by social segregation or by an increase of 
educational attainment. As can be seen in the case of individuals that have 
primary education, they have decreased in number after the reform. This should 
mean that assortative mating is reduced after the reform for this group because 
of fewer potential individuals (male and female) to match with. However, in 
column 2 of Table 4.8, the results indicate that assortative mating increased for 
this level of education. Therefore, it is possible to say that the likely cause was 
an increase in segregation for lower educated individuals. On the other hand, in 
the case of individuals with secondary education, the number of male and female 
individuals increased after the reform. Therefore, it would be expected that the 
levels of assortative mating increased in this segment, which is confirmed in 
Table 4.8, column 3. In this case, the increase in the level of assortative mating 
could be caused by more individuals able to match or because of an increase in 
the level of segregation. 
                                                          
124
 This includes married and cohabitating couples. 
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Table 4.10: Percentage of Male and Female Individuals by Level of Education, Affected (R=1)/Not Affected (R=0) by the 
Reform125 
Level of 
Education 
R=1 
(male) 
R=0 
(male) 
Difference 
Male 
R=1 
(female) 
R=0 
(female) 
Difference 
Female 
Expected 
AM 
Estimated 
on Table 
4.8 Explanation 
No Education + 
Primary Not 
Completed/Co
mpleted 35.57 61.77 -26.2 34.27 64.16 -29.89 - +*** 
Sign of Segregation, 
fewer Male individuals 
(and female), but AM 
increased 
Not 
Completed/Co
mpleted 
Secondary, Not 
Completed/Co
mpleted 
Vocational 50.57 30.5 20.07 52.28 29.18 23.1 + +* 
Double Effect: A) More 
People in this category 
therefore AM incresed 
B) More segregation 
Not 
Completed/Co
mpleted 
Tertiary 13.86 7.74 6.12 13.46 6.66 6.8 + + 
Double Effect: A) More 
People in this category 
therefore AM incresed 
B) More segregation, 
but Not Siginificant 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
125 The similar proportion of females and males in each educational category was preliminarily thought to have left the levels of assortative mating unchanged pre- and 
post- reform. However, similar proportions of male and female individuals only ensured that they could potentially match, but not that they will in fact match. 
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To isolate the segregation effect, for the higher levels of education, and 
avoid the results being affected by the number of individuals with this level of 
attainment, an alternative is to divide the population into equal sized groups 
(chosen as quintiles), rather than into levels of attainment (so that the average 
attainment levels within quintiles will change over time). This is done in Graph 
4.4, where quintiles of schooling of individuals and their partners have been 
compared for those in education before and after the reform (individuals partially 
affected have been considered). The results show that the proportion of males in 
the top quintile of the education attainment distribution, who married a woman 
in the same quintile, increased from 53% before the reform to 62% after the 
reform.  This increase of assortative mating in the highest quintile of schooling 
could be produced by elitism and lack of contact with individuals of lower 
schooling. Therefore, the increase in assortative mating at the higher levels of 
education was likely produced by an increase in segregation of individuals, rather 
than by a pure effect of an increase of educational attainment. Graph 4.4 also 
shows that in the lower levels of education, particularly in the first quintile, the 
level of assortative mating has increased by almost double for individuals 
partially affected by the reform compared to those not affected by it. This shows 
that segregation is focused at the extremes of the schooling distribution. 
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Graph 4.4: % of Individuals in the Same Quintile of Years of Schooling as their 
Partner when Partially Affected/Not Affected by the Educational Reform at each 
Quintile of Schooling 
 
 
In summary, couples from the cohorts of people born after the 
educational reforms seem to have a closer match of years of education, 
compared to those born before the reforms, with each year of additional 
schooling for the male partner being associated with a larger increase in his 
female partner’s education.  This seems to happen for all levels of education 
analysed. However, if the reform also increased the level of attainment of the 
whole population, lower levels of education would consist of fewer people and 
therefore, it would be more difficult to match in this category expecting therefore 
a decrease in assortative mating. However, it actually increased in this segment 
of attainment. Therefore, it is possible that the increase in schooling matching 
after the reform was due to an increase in social segregation that forced lesser 
educated individuals together. On the other hand, at higher levels of education, 
more people are found after the reform, therefore the probability of matching 
with someone similar seems higher. This would be associated withan increase in 
assortative mating, which is actually happening. However, the increase in 
assortative mating can also be due to the possibility that higher educated 
individuals are not only larger in number, but also they are segregated from 
those that are lesser educated both effects will increase assortative mating. In 
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order to separate these effects, a quintile analysis has been done, finding that 
individuals from higher quintiles (those with a higher education) are matched to 
highly educated individuals after the reform excluding the issue that more 
individuals are able to be matched with. Therefore, it is possible to suggest that 
higher educated individuals also experience from segregation, which could be 
undesirable in terms of promoting fluidity in society126. 
 
4.7.3 The Effect of Assortative Mating on the Levels of Intergenerational 
Earnings Dependency 
  
One of the most important aims of this research is to measure the impact 
that assortative mating in schooling has on the level of intergenerational mobility 
of earnings. This is particularly important as it could help social policy makers to 
identify some of the determinants of intergenerational social dependency in 
society, preventing higher levels of it.  
 
The results indicate that the impact of assortative mating (in terms of 
schooling) on the levels of intergenerational earnings dependency seem to be 
around 20% as shown by the R2 values when no control variables are included 
and by the same amount when age control variables are included (which 
corresponds to the mean ages in each cell utilised in the estimation) as shown 
by the semi-partial R2 (see column 1 of Table 4.11 and column 1 of Table 4.12). 
The impact of assortative mating is obtained in different ways to calculate the 
dimensions of the cells used. Therefore, in column 1 of Table 4.11 the 
                                                          
126
 The relationship between school competition and assortative mating has also been considered 
estimating the same equation used in Table 4.8 for 2 separated samples: High level of churches and 
low level of churches municipalities. Considering that when the reform was implemented there was 
likely an increase of voucher schools in areas with a high level of churches, it is expected that there 
would be a segregation effect and an attainment effect in these municipalities, but only an 
attainment effect in low level of churches municipalities. The findings suggest that the segregation 
effect is larger than the attainment effect after the reform, as assortative mating increased more in 
areas with high level of churches than in those with low level of churches. 
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dimensions utilised were the earnings per capita by municipality decile and the 
four age cohorts, obtaining 40 observations of intergenerational earnings 
dependency between the father’s earnings and the individual and his partner’s 
joint earnings, and 40 observations of assortative mating. For this case, first 
stage regressions are found in Table 4.13 (for assortative mating) and Table 
4.15 (for intergenerational earnings dependency). 
 
Table 4.13 shows that assortative mating has increased with age, which 
is somewhat surprising as the opposite result was found previously in this 
chapter. This could be due to the fact that a larger sample was used for the 
former result, as restrictions on the age of parents were not required there; 
because the effect of the reform was calculated controlling for earnings and 
marital status of individuals and/or because the average assortative mating 
between every decile in the assortative mating matrix could be different to the 
overall average effect considered in the reform effect regression. Table 4.14 
shows the estimation of assortative mating by age cohorts for the Restricted 
Sample (as used in the assortative mating matrix, first stage) and for the non-
restricted sample (corresponding to the one used in the reform effect regression 
in section 4.7.2). These results show that it is not the change in sample size or 
the disaggregation of results by income decile that is driving the difference. In 
addition, the previous results related to those partially affected or not by the 
reform are not comparable with this part of the chapter, as all individuals in the 
matrix of assortative matrix have been partially affected (all of them are below 
47 years old). Moreover, in Table 4.15, it is possible to see that higher levels of 
intergenational earnings dependency are present in the higher earnings deciles. 
 
In column 2 of Table 4.11, the level of intergenerational earnings 
dependency has been calculated using fathers’ and mothers’ joint earnings 
instead of only fathers’ earnings, obtaining an impact of assortative mating of 
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28% on the level of intergenerational earnings dependency. In column 3 of Table 
4.11, one of the dimensions used to calculate the different levels of assortative 
mating and earnings dependency is changed. In this case, the calculus of the 
earnings per capita by municipality has been done by taking into account an 
individuals’ and partners’ joint earnings (not only individuals’) and the 
intergenerational earnings dependency has been obtained using the parents’ 
earnings instead of only the father’s earnings. The proportion of the variance in 
intergenerational earnings dependency that is explained by differences in 
assortative mating for this case is between 16% and 25%, quite similar 
compared to the previous cases. Similar results are obtained when only the 
earnings dimension of the matrix definition is modified (column 4, Table 4.11) 
while the earnings coefficients themselves are obtained using only the fathers’ 
earnings (not parents). Similar results can be found in Table 4.12, where age 
control variables are included. These results are presented in column 3 of Table 
4.16 and are consistent in terms of the direction of the effects with the ones 
given by the theoretical model presented in section 4.4, Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.11: Estimation of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (Not Including Control Variables)127 
Using Assortative Mating Weights 
 Intergenerational 
Earnings 
Dependency 
1st stage uses Individual 
Earnings (A.M128) & uses 
Individuals and Father’s 
Earnings (I. M129) 
1st stage uses Individual 
Earnings (A.M) & uses 
Individuals and Parents’s 
Earnings (I.M) 
1st stage uses Individual and 
Partner Joint Earnings (A.M) 
& uses Individuals and 
Parents’ Earnings (I.M) 
1st stage uses Individual 
and Partner Joint Earnings  
(A.M) & uses Individuals 
and Father’s Earnings (I.M) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 1.020*** 1.153*** 0.966*** 0.904*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
_cons -0.183*** -0.217*** -0.126*** -0.140*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
N. Obs Total 6,711 6,711 6,711 6,711 
N obs 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.237 0.284 0.214 0.217 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127
Standard errors are in brackets. 
128 A.M corresponds to assortative mating levels. 
129 I.M corresponds to intergenerational earnings dependency. 
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Table 4.12: Estimation of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (Including Control Variables)130 
Using Assortative Mating Weights
131
 
 Intergenerational 
Earnings Dependency 
1st stage uses Individual 
Earnings (A. M) & uses 
Individuals and Father’s 
Earnings (I.M) 
1st stage uses Individual 
Earnings (A. M) & uses 
Individuals and Parents’s 
Earnings (I. M) 
1st stage uses Individual and Partner 
Joint Earnings (A. M) & uses 
Individuals and Parents’ Earnings 
(I.M) 
1st stage uses Individual and 
Partner Joint Earnings  
(A. M) &uses Individuals and 
Father’s Earnings (I.M) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 1.336*** 1.399*** 1.159*** 1.073*** 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.026) 
Age -0.442*** -0.574*** 0.144*** 0.554*** 
  (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) 
Age_Partner 0.850*** 0.893*** -0.093*** -0.208*** 
  (0.033) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) 
Age_Dad -1.160*** -1.639*** -2.555*** -1.357*** 
  (0.087) (0.142) (0.093) (0.082) 
Age_Mum   0.473*** 1.760***   
    (0.083) (0.085)   
Age_sq 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.001* -0.008*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Partner_sq -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.001** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Dad_sq 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Mum_sq   -0.003*** -0.016***   
    (0.001) (0.001)   
_cons 27.730*** 28.814*** 25.183*** 34.915*** 
  (2.201) (2.758) (2.435) (2.122) 
N. Obs Total 6,711 5,312 6,711 6,711 
R2 0.338 0.427 0.345 0.295 
N. Observations 40 36 40 40 
SemiPartial R2
132
 0.2457 0.2128 0.1613 0.1789 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
130
 Standard errors are in brackets. 
131 Estimates using Intergenerational earnings dependency weights are found in the Appendix 4A2., Table 4A2.1 and Table 4A2.2 
132 Semi-Partial R2 of the Assortative Mating variable. 
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Table 4.13: Matrix Assortative Mating Levels in 40 Cells 
Assortative Mating (Ω) 
With Control Variables Age + Age_Partner 
Coefficients Schooling/Schooling Partner   
Age/Decil Muni 
(Individual=Husband) I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
25-30 0.328*** 0.327*** 0.602*** 0.457*** 0.480*** 0.585*** 0.465*** 0.563*** 0.564*** 0.570*** 
N. Obs 110 107 97 132 387 174 187 159 148 122 
30-35 0.432*** 0.505*** 0.603*** 0.606*** 0.648*** 0.645*** 0.551*** 0.704*** 0.606*** 0.697*** 
N.Obs 134 145 145 161 425 204 204 189 191 211 
35-40 0.608*** 0.558*** 0.420*** 0.712*** 0.630*** 0.608*** 0.607*** 0.582*** 0.584*** 0.668*** 
N.Obs 134 144 158 204 394 189 199 188 176 193 
40-45 0.562*** 0.594*** 0.554*** 0.510*** 0.642*** 0.706*** 0.596*** 0.565*** 0.764*** 0.771*** 
N.Obs 60 92 74 93 93 91 139 134 115 109 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.14: Estimation of Assortative Mating by Age Cohort133 
Age/Decil Muni 
(Husband) 
Restricted by Age 
of Parents 
Not Restricted by Age 
of Parents 
25-30 0.501*** 0.515*** 
N. Obs 1623 2860 
30-35 0.629*** 0.610*** 
N.Obs 2009 4025 
35-40 0.623*** 0.631*** 
N.Obs 1979 5036 
40-45 0.653*** 0.605*** 
N.Obs 1100 6077 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
133 When these estimations include the same control variable used by the reform effect analysis, the 
results do not vary too much. 
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Table 4.15: Level of Intergenerational Earnings Dependency in 40 Cells  
Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (μ) 
With control Variables Age + Age_Father 
Coefficients Log(Individual_Earnings)/Log(Father_Earnings)  
Age/Decil Muni 
(Individual=Husband) I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
25-30 -0.078 0.259* -0.158 0.517** 0.392*** 0.453*** 0.210 0.325** 0.515*** 0.655*** 
N. Obs 72 81 73 96 271 119 132 122 113 90 
30-35 0.083 0.241 0.470*** 0.470*** 0.468*** 0.523*** 0.160 0.711*** 0.655*** 0.652*** 
N.Obs 85 101 91 115 278 137 133 143 139 154 
35-40 0.484*** 0.444*** 0.082 0.374*** 0.410*** 0.457*** 0.287** 0.448*** 0.346*** 0.645*** 
N.Obs 94 109 107 143 261 146 126 133 128 142 
40-45 -0.029 0.135 0.812 0.828*** 0.425** 0.546*** 0.475** 0.512*** 0.267 0.610*** 
N.Obs 42 72 42 66 112 64 94 93 77 79 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finally when only those individuals that are employed are considered, the 
influence of assortative mating is around 18% (see Table 4.16 column 1). 
Similar results are found in Table 4.17 when age control variables are included. 
In the next robustness check, a third dimension to estimate the first stage was 
included, the rural or urban nature of the household where individuals and their 
partners live. The finding is that the influence of assortative mating is around 
15%, which is found in column 2 of Table 4.16. Finally, other variants were 
considered to calculate the first stage of the estimation. When the earnings 
dimension is changed to industry of activity of individuals (including agriculture, 
army, etc.) the impact that assortative mating has on the level of 
intergenerational earnings dependency is between 12% and 15% (depending on 
whether control variables are considered or not).  
 
Table 4.16: Other Estimations of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational 
Earnings Dependency (Not Including Control Variables)134 
Assortative Mating Weights 
 Intergenerational 
Earnings Dependency 
Employed Urban&Rural Industry 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 0.838*** 0.884*** 0.883*** 
  (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) 
_cons -0.082*** -0.133*** -0.071*** 
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
N. Obs Total 6,427 5,939 5,681 
N obs 40 80 37 
R2 0.178 0.147 0.153 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
134
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 271 
 
Table 4.17: Other Estimations of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational 
Earnings Dependency (Including Control Variables)135 
Alpha_Weights (control variables) 
 Intergenerational 
Earnings Dependency 
Employed Urban&Rural Industry 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 1.002*** 1.029*** 0.965*** 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) 
Age 0.069** -0.688*** 0.091** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.043) 
Age_Partner 0.151*** 0.729*** 0.092** 
  (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) 
Age_Dad -0.982*** -0.319*** -0.279*** 
  (0.079) (0.032) (0.108) 
Age_sq -0.002*** 0.009*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age_Partner_sq -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Dad_sq 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
_cons 24.826*** 8.207*** 7.258*** 
  (2.043) (0.875) (2.743) 
N. Obs Total 6,427 5,939 5,681 
R2 0.210 0.219 0.216 
N. Observations 40 80 37 
SemiPartial R2 0.1272 0.1565 0.1207 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Previous results have considered male individuals and their female 
partner, and their relationship with the individual’s father’s earnings. When 
female individuals and their male partners are considered, the effect of 
assortative mating seems to be lower than when male individuals are used.  In 
column 1 of Table 4.18, the female version of column 1 of Table 4.11, an impact 
of assortative mating of 19% is observed (versus a 24% effect for the male 
variant). Column 2 of Table 4.18, the female version of column 2 of Table 4.11, 
finds a lower impact of assortative mating with respect to the male version (5% 
                                                          
135
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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versus 28%). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.18 correspond to columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4.12 where the values for male individuals are higher than the values for 
female individuals (16% versus 25% and 0% versus 21% respectively). These 
results are consistent with the idea that the father of the male individual’s 
earnings are more likely to explain the earnings of his son and wife’s joint 
income, as most of the time these joint earnings are driven by the husband 
rather than the wife. 
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Table 4.18: Effect of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (Including Control Variables) for Female 
Individuals
136137 
Intergenerational Earnings 
Dependency  
Without Controls With Controls 
Female: 1
st
 stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. M) & 
uses Individuals and Father’s 
Earnings (I.M) 
Male: 1
st
 stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. M) & 
uses Individuals and 
Father’s Earnings (I.M) 
Female: 1
st
 stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. M) 
& uses Individuals and 
Parentsr’s Earnings (I.M) 
Male: 1st stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. 
M) & uses Individuals 
and Parents’s Earnings 
(I.M) 
Female: 1st stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. 
M) & uses Individuals 
and Father’s Earnings 
(I.M) 
Male: 1st stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. 
M) & uses Individuals 
and Father’s Earnings 
(I.M) 
Female: 1
st
 stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. M) 
& uses Individuals and 
Parents’s Earnings (I.M) 
Male: 1
st
 stage uses 
Individual Earnings (A. M) 
& uses Individuals and 
Parents’s Earnings (I.M) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 2.624*** 1.020*** 0.531*** 1.153*** 2.961*** 1.336*** 0.055 1.399*** 
  (0.067) (0.022) (0.052) (0.022) (0.076) (0.027) (0.060) (0.032) 
Age         -1.602*** -0.442*** 0.344*** -0.574*** 
          (0.073) (0.027) (0.090) (0.035) 
Age_Partner         1.341*** 0.850*** 1.207*** 0.893*** 
          (0.112) (0.033) (0.134) (0.038) 
Age_Dad         2.021*** -1.160*** 1.480*** -1.639*** 
          (0.140) (0.087) (0.290) (0.142) 
Age_Mum             -1.755*** 0.473*** 
              (0.194) (0.083) 
Age_sq         0.024*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.007*** 
          (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Partner         -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.014*** 
          (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age_Dad_sq         -0.018*** 0.010*** -0.013*** 0.014*** 
          (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age_Mum_sq             0.016*** -0.003*** 
              (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.010*** -0.183*** 0.037 -0.217*** -56.614*** 27.730*** -19.184*** 28.814*** 
  (0.040) (0.013) (0.036) (0.013) (3.618) (2.201) (5.588) (2.758) 
N. Total Obs 6,711 6,711 1,778 6,711 6,711 6,711 1,778 5,312 
R2 0.187 0.237 0.054 0.284 0.309 0.338 0.265 0.427 
N. of observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Semi-Partial R2         0.1584 0.2457 0.0004 0.2128 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
136 The standardised coefficient of male and female individuals, considering that the earnings distribution can differ by gender can be found in Appendix 4A2., Table 4A2.3 
(the relevance for this research is minimal as the main interest is the coefficient of multiple determination (or its partial version) instead of the estimation coefficient. 
137 Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Finally a different perspective in the analysis of the effect of assortative 
mating on the level of earnings reproduction was also analysed. That is, the idea 
that there could be a relationship between an individual’s earnings and the 
corresponding father-in-law’s earnings is taken into account which would also 
show the way in which assortative mating plays a role on the level of 
intergenerational mobility. That is, male individuals would have similar earnings 
to their own fathers, but also to their fathers-in-law. Table 4.19 presents the 
levels of intergenerational dependency between an individual’s and their father’s 
earnings (column 1), and an individual’s and partner’s joint earnings and an 
individual’s parents’ earnings (column 2). Furthemore, the relationship between 
an individual’s earnings and his father-in-law’s and an individual’s and partner’s 
joint earnings and his parents-in-law are found in column 3 and 4 respectively.  
From these results it is possible to see that a father’s earnings and father-in-
law’s earnings explain, to a similar degree, an individual’s earnings (0.458 and 
0.422 respectively). Similarly, an individual’s and partner’s joint earnings are 
also explained to a similar degree by the individual’s parents’ earnings and his 
parents-in-law (0.595 and 0.618 respectively). That could suggest that people 
find a partner with similar characteristics to their parents. 
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Table 4.19: Intergenerational Earnings Dependency including Father and 
Parents-in-Law138 
Y= Ln_Y_Individual Ln_Y_Individual&Partner Ln_Y_Individual Ln_Y_Individual&Partner 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
ln_Income_Father(μ) 0.458***       
  (0.026)       
ln_IncomeFatherLaw     0.442***   
      (0.024)   
ln_IncomeParents   0.595***     
    (0.025)     
ln_IncomeParentsLaw       0.618*** 
        (0.025) 
age 0.079*** 0.027 0.076*** 0.034* 
  (0.020) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) 
age_Sq -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age_Partner   0.090***   0.087*** 
    (0.015)   (0.016) 
age_Partner_sq   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
age_Dad 0.029 0.024     
  (0.035) (0.035)     
age_Dad_sq -0.000 -0.000     
  (0.000) (0.000)     
age_Dad_Partner     0.014 -0.038* 
      (0.015) (0.021) 
age_Dad_Partner_sq     -0.000 0.000** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
age_mum   0.003     
    (0.017)     
age_mum_sq   -0.000     
    (0.000)     
age_Mum_Partner       0.032** 
        (0.015) 
age_Mum_Partner_sq       -0.000 
        (0.000) 
_cons 5.013*** 2.960*** 5.593*** 3.493*** 
  (0.974) (0.953) (0.554) (0.614) 
Number of observations 4,890 4,664 5,485 5,267 
R2 0.098 0.151 0.087 0.144 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
138 Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Notice that this analysis is only valid for the relationship of the 
intergenerational earnings coefficient, but not for analysing the effect of 
assortative mating by itself on the levels of intergenerational mobility, which is 
originally possible in Blanden’s (2005) estimation, as her model implies that the 
levels of intergenerational earnings dependency only depends on the levels of 
assortative mating. Therefore, only the estimated parameter μ will be important, 
instead of the partial R2 considered in previous results, as it corresponds to the 
impact of Father’s earnings on the joint earnings of his son and his son’s partner 
rather than the proportion of assortative mating influencing intergenerational 
earnings dependency. 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
 
Most of the economic research regarding to the impact of the level of 
association between couples’ characteristics has been focused on the level of 
association between the couples’ income or education and how these 
characteristics would be associated with some kind of rigidity in creating hopes 
for poorer people in society. In simple words, the problem with assortative 
mating is that highly educated people will pool together, and that will reinforce 
the possible reproduction of socioeconomic status from generation to generation. 
In terms of intergenerational earnings dependency, the focus has been on 
measuring it across countries and on the difficulties that usually arise (because 
of a lack of data availability) in obtaining the right factor to measure it. When, 
the possible causes of these levels of dependence between parents’ and 
children’s income has been considered, this has been largely in terms of the 
nature versus nurture analysis. However, the effect of assortative mating has 
not been analysed very often. In particular, considering what individuals consider 
as important in choosing their partner could have important implications in terms 
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of income distribution (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1984). Especially if interaction 
opportunities are not randomly distributed, people would generally choose a 
partner with similar characteristics (Kalmijn and Flap, 2001). In addition, 
previous research on educational assortative mating has shown that in modern 
societies, education plays an important role in choosing a partner (Ultee and 
Luijkx 1990), that is why, in this research, assortative mating has been 
understood as the relation between years of schooling of members of a couple. 
 
 Therefore, this investigation considers that a proportion of the variance in 
intergenerational earnings dependency is explained by the level of assortative 
mating in terms of schooling. The findings suggest that the assortative mating 
explain around 20% of the total intergenerational earnings correlation (when 
male individuals and their female partners are considered), which implies an 
important effect of how individuals match with their partners through education 
and how that could help reproduce the socio-economic background of the couple, 
and reinforce the earnings relation of an individual’s household and their parents’ 
earnings. On the other hand, when female individuals and their male partners 
are considered, the effect is lower than the former (between 5% and 16%). 
 
 In addition, it is interesting to see that the father’s and father-in-law’s 
earnings have a similar influence on the earnings of individuals, which could be 
indicative of assortative mating in society, where individuals match with 
individuals that are similar to their parents.  
 
The effect of the 1980’s Chilean educational reform was analysed, finding 
that it has increased the level of educational assortative mating among members 
of couples: if individuals have been affected by the educational reform, the 
schooling of their partner increases by 0.031 and 0.056 years for each additional 
year of their own schooling, for partially and fully affected by the reform 
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respectevely. In addition, the change in the average years of schooling of the 
partners of people with no qualifications are 0.315 and 0.711 for partially and 
fully affected respectively.These results give some support to the idea that the 
Chilean educational reform produced sorting among students, leaving the 
students with better social conditions (those with more parental support and with 
greater chances to achieve high levels of education) separated from those with 
fewer chances to progress in life. However, the effect of the reform might not 
only be associated with sorting, but also with the fact that the reform increased 
educational attainment, which in turn may also increase the level of assortative 
mating. As the whole population increases in terms of educational level 
achieved, different levels of attainment would produce different structural 
opportunities for individuals at each level to meet a similar partner. Therefore, if 
educational attainment increases over time, it could mean that younger cohorts 
would be more homogeneous in terms of education simply due to the general 
increase in the educational attainment of the whole population (which is true at 
least for more educated people, but not clear at lower levels of education). The 
further analysis in this respect shows, using quintiles of schooling that it is 
particularly at the bottom and at top of the distribution where couples have 
become more similar in terms of schooling after the reform, which could suggest 
segregation at the extremes of schooling distribution.  
 
In addition, if poorer individuals access tertiary education, the potential 
contact between children from different backgrounds would also increase 
intergenerational income mobility (Blossfeld and Tim, 2003). Nevertheless, a 
higher opportunity of meeting people from different backgrounds does not 
necessarily decrease prejudice in society hence they might not effectively meet, 
as in many cases within higher educational institutions, people only interact in 
groups by considering their socioeconomic status. 
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 Finally, the results presented seem to suggest that educational reforms 
could be very important in order to establish the mechanisms through which 
people find their partners. Considering that they allow for new generations to 
meet and interact amongst each other, the structure of educational systems 
would be essential to build a more open society, with more opportunities for 
people, but also to build a society where education not only means a degree, but 
also the understanding that people should be considered by their achievements 
and not simply by their parents’ status. In particular, assortative mating can 
increase intergenerational mobility, and so any education policy that increases 
asortative mating through schools can have implications for inequality and social 
mobility in the next generation. 
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Appendix Assortative Mating 
 
4A1. Mothers Sample 
 
Table 4A1.1: Mother’s Age in 2009 (reported by sons) versus 1990 
Age of Mother in 2009 
2009 (reported by sons)  1990 (synthetic Mothers) 
t=0 t1=t+19 
Mean Age 58.03 Mean  Age 58.25 
Min Age 37 Min Age 44 
Max Age 99 Max Age 79 
St Dev. 7.24 St Dev. 10.28 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
Table 4A1.2: Mother’s Age in 2009 (reported by daughters) versus 1990 
Age of Mother in 2009 
2009 (reported by daughters)  1990 (synthetic Mothers) 
t=0 t1=t+19 
Mean Age 56.55 Mean  Age 57.42 
Min Age 38 Min Age 40 
Max Age 99 Max Age 99 
St Dev. 7.13 St Dev. 7.23 
Source: CASEN Surveys, 2009 and 1990 
 
4A2. Results 
 
Graph 4A2.1:Assortative Mating (Decile Earnings) by Age Cohort 
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Table 4A2.1: Effect of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (Not Including Control Variables)139 
Intergenerational EarningsDependency_Weights 
 Intergenerational 
Earnings 
1
st
 stage uses 
Individual Earnings 
(A.M) & uses 
Individuals and 
Father’s Earnings 
(I.M) 
1
st
 stage uses 
Individual 
Earnings (A.M) & 
uses Individuals 
and Parents’s 
Earnings (I.M) 
1
st
 stage uses Individual 
and Partner Joint 
Earnings (A.M) & uses 
Individuals and Parents’ 
Earnings (I.M) 
1
st
 stage uses Individual 
and Partner Joint 
Earnings  
(A.M) & uses Individuals 
and Father’s Earnings 
(I.M) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 
1.014*** 1.141*** 0.965*** 0.893*** 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) 
_cons -0.178*** -0.209*** -0.123*** -0.130*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
N. Obs Total 4,675 4,435 4,435 4,675 
R2 0.234 0.277 0.209 0.211 
N obs 40 40 40 40 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
139 Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 4A2.2: Effect of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (Including Control Variables)140 
Earnings Dependency_Weights 
Intergenerational Earnings 
Dependency 
1
st
 stage uses Individual 
Earnings (A.M) & uses 
Individuals and Father’s 
Earnings (I.M) 
1
st
 stage uses Individual 
Earnings (A.M) & uses 
Individuals and 
Parents’s Earnings (I.M) 
1
st
 stage uses Individual and 
Partner Joint Earnings 
(A.M) & uses Individuals 
and Parents’ Earnings (I.M) 
1
st
 stage uses Individual and 
Partner Joint Earnings  
(A.M) & uses Individuals and 
Father’s Earnings (I.M) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Assortative Mating 1.377*** 1.522*** 0.605*** 0.526*** 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) 
Age -0.094*** -0.160*** -0.041 -0.060** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) 
Age_Partner 0.806*** 0.879*** 0.707*** 0.724*** 
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.041) (0.038) 
Age_Dad -2.217*** -2.282*** -1.873*** -1.213*** 
  (0.080) (0.098) (0.133) (0.090) 
Age_Mum   0.053 0.228***   
    (0.057) (0.079)   
Age_sq 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age_Partner_sq -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Dad_sq 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Mum_sq   -0.000 -0.003***   
    (0.001) (0.001)   
_cons 54.838*** 54.762*** 40.715*** 28.910*** 
  (2.009) (1.971) (2.786) (2.272) 
Number of observations 4,521 4,215 4,206 4,503 
R2 0.457 0.556 0.299 0.368 
N. Observations 38 37 37 38 
SemiPartial R2 0.258 0.309 0.258 0.328 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
140
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 4A2.3: Effect of Assortative Mating on Intergenerational Earnings Dependency (Including Control Variables) for Female and Male 
Individuals (Standardised Coefficients)141 
 Intergenerational Earnings 
Dependency 
Without Controls With Controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
  
Std 
coef/se 
Std 
coef/se 
Std coef/se 
Std 
coef/se 
Std coef/se 
Std 
coef/se 
Std coef/se Std coef/se 
Assortative Mating 0.432*** 0.487*** 0.233*** 0.533*** 0.488*** 0.638*** 0.024 0.605*** 
  (0.067) (0.022) (0.052) (0.022) (0.076) (0.027) (0.060) (0.032) 
Age         -1.602*** -0.442*** 0.344*** -0.574*** 
          (0.073) (0.027) (0.090) (0.035) 
Age_Partner         1.341*** 0.850*** 1.207*** 0.893*** 
          (0.112) (0.033) (0.134) (0.038) 
Age_Dad         2.021*** -1.160*** 1.480*** -1.639*** 
          (0.140) (0.087) (0.290) (0.142) 
Age_Mum             -1.755*** 0.473*** 
              (0.194) (0.083) 
Age_sq         0.024*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.007*** 
          (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age_Partner         -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.014*** 
          (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age_Dad_sq         -0.018*** 0.010*** -0.013*** 0.014*** 
          (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age_Mum_sq             0.016*** -0.003*** 
              (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.010*** -0.183*** 0.037 -0.217*** -56.614*** 27.730*** -19.184*** 28.814*** 
  (0.040) (0.013) (0.036) (0.013) (3.618) (2.201) (5.588) (2.758) 
N. Total Obs 6,711 6,711 1,778 6,711 6,711 6,711 1,778 5,312 
R2 0.187 0.237 0.054 0.284 0.309 0.338 0.265 0.427 
Number of observations 40 40 31 40 40 40 31 36 
Semi-Partial R2         0.1584 0.2457 0.0004 0.2128 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
141
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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5 Conclusions and Implications 
5.1 Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
 
This research has as its main aim to understand education as an 
important challenge to the process of intergenerational mobility in Chile, with the 
possibility of being a facilitator, but also a barrier to creating opportunities for 
new generations. In order to achieve this aim, this thesis has been divided into 
three main topics:  
 
 The measurement of the levels of intergenerational earnings and 
schooling dependency, to show that Chile experiences low levels of 
earnings mobility and that levels of dependency between father and 
individual’s earnings are lower than levels of schooling dependency. 
 
 The analysis of the effect of school competition in a highly privatised 
educational system, finding that competition from public schools has a 
positive impact on school performance and that voucher schools have the 
opposite effect, probably due to sorting of students.  
 
 The research of the effect that assortative mating has on the level of the 
cross-group variation in intergenerational earnings mobility, explaining 
around 20%. 
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5.1.2 Conclusion of Chapter 2 
 
High levels of social mobility are understood as living in a society where 
there are hope and beliefin opportunities. Chapter 2 focused on the 
measurement of intergenerational earning and schooling mobility. It is found 
that Chile has low intergenerational earnings mobility and high intergenerational 
education mobility compared to other countries. However, the former 
comparison is relative to high income countries and the last one relative to 
developing countries, due to alack of data availability. On the other hand, a 
child’s schooling seems to be very important in terms of reducing his father’s 
earnings influence on his own earnings, but children’s schooling would also 
depend strongly on their parents’ schooling. It is also found that 
intergenerational mobility has been maintained over time quite constantly, 
except for the youngest cohorts. In addition, it is found that a son’s earnings 
dependency is higher in the lowest quantiles of the sons’ earnings distribution 
and lower in the highest quantiles. The opposite is found when considering 
intergenerational schooling dependency. Finally, results suggest that, contrary to 
what was expected, that when comparing standardised estimation of schooling 
and earnings dependency, the first is higher than the later. 
 
5.1.3 Conclusions of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 focused on the effect of spatial competition through 
privatisation of the educational market, between schools in Chile. The major 
conclusion of this chapter is that an increasing number of voucher schools have 
negatively impacted the academic performance of other schools in the area, 
showing some of the dangers produced by a highly privatised educational 
market. This negative effect on performance from public schools seems to be 
due to sorting of students, concentrating less able or less supported students in 
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public schools. However, competition from public schools seems to have a 
positive effect from public schools, which shows that competition can alsobe 
beneficial. It is also found that these school competition effects seem to be 
largest amongst middle-class families and in middle-ranking schools, probably 
because rich families do not use public schools and more successful schools are 
not threatened by competition, while poorer pupils in low-performing schools are 
less likely to move between schools to better performing ones. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusions of Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 focused on finding how much intergenerational earnings 
dependency is explained by assortative mating of members of a couple in terms 
of schooling. It is found that assortative mating produced around 20% of the 
intergenerational earnings dependency betweenan individual and their partner’s 
joint earnings and the individual’s father’s earnings. Moreover, father’s and 
father-in-law’s earnings seem to have a similar impact on the earnings of 
individuals, suggesting some assortative mating effect on earnings transmission.  
In addition, this chapter found that the 1980s Chilean educational reform 
increased the level of educational assortative mating among members of 
couples. These results seem to be consistent with the idea explored in the 
previous chapter, where sorting was produced among students attending public 
and voucher schools. Nevertheless, the increase of assortative mating because 
of the reform could have other causes, such as a general increase of educational 
attainment in the whole population. 
 
5.2 Implication of Findings 
  
This research has been completed keeping always in mind that its 
implications may potentially be used for the development of social policies. In 
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particular, the measurement of the levels of intergenerational mobility in Chile 
confirms that the social fluidity in its society is not the best, and the need for 
policies that encourage it are necessary, in particular, in the educational level. 
The analysis of the educational market and the effect of competition are also 
interesting as the equity-efficiency trade off emerges when social policies 
struggle in trying to use the resources in the best way without leaving behind 
students from poorer backgrounds or with limited household support. Finally, the 
concentration of richer families into fee-based voucher schools could also cause 
social segregation and the impossibility of interaction among individuals from 
different backgrounds, therefore, confirming that the 1980s educational reform 
created sorting and increased the levels of assortative mating, in particular, 
within the least educated group. This in turn calls for government intervention 
and for changes in the current dynamic of the educational market in Chile. 
 
5.2.1 The Implications of the Level of Intergenerational Mobility 
 
The levels of intergenerational mobility in Chilean society reflect how 
much reproduction of inequality exists; this could influence how much people 
end up believing in an equal and fair system that allows them to progress in life 
according to their effort. The transmission of educational and economic levels 
from parents to children is of particular interest as these could affect other areas 
of individual welfare, such as health, occupation and position in society. On the 
other hand, intergenerational elasticity of earnings and/or education could also 
be affected by inheritance of health conditions that are transmitted from parents 
to children or affected by some ability or personality that the labour market is 
interested in. Nevertheless, social policy cannot do anything about that except to 
try to equalise opportunities for people that are obviously different.  
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For example, even though the health of an individual is largely 
determined by genetics, if the government provides better health care and child 
nutrition, then health should not be a hindrance. The same can be said of the 
educational system - obviously some people will be born more able than others 
and social policy cannot change that. However, if someone is of average ability 
but is poor and has never developed his/her abilities to their full extent because 
of the lack of educational quality and his/her outcome is lower than someone 
who was rich with the same natural ability but did develop it, then changing the 
situation of the poorer individuals should be the purpose of potential social 
policies in order to firmly achieve equality of opportunity. Therefore, educational 
policies and structure of educational systems that better understand the way 
that educational inequality arises and persists are necessary (Machin, 2004).  
 
In Britain, for example, there is evidence that intergenerational mobility 
has decreased over time (the same has been reported for Canada by Magee et 
al. (2000)) and that an increase in dependency between parental and child 
income has been parallel to the expansion of educational coverage, suggesting 
that maybe it is the richer children who actually benefit from it, instead of 
children from poorer backgrounds, reinforcing inequalities among generations. 
Even though poorer children could potentially improve their level of educational 
achievement, when they do it, richer children have already done it in advance, 
moving even further forward from the poorer individual educational achievement 
(Machin, 2004).  
 
 The levels of intergenerational earnings dependency in Chile seem to be 
quite high, in particular in the highest quantiles of income, suggesting that richer 
people transmit their social position to their offspring more than poorer people. 
For example, considering the transition matrix results, almost 28% of fathers 
that are located in the 10th decile of the earnings distribution had children that 
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were also in this position of the earnings distribution, contrasting with the middle 
and lower deciles in which around 10% of fathers have children in the same 
earnings position. This is consistent with the idea that Chile has high level levels 
of inequality explained by the highest part of the earnings distribution, which 
could create an elitist and segregated society. This could not only reduce 
opportunities for individuals from more disadvantaged backgrounds, but also 
reduce their hope and, with that, waste the effort that they could exert in order 
to have a better future. Chile also seems to have a high intergenerational 
earnings elasticity (0.46) in comparison to the average of other countries (to 
0.37), but it is important to notice that the majority of the countries with studies 
that measure the level of intergenerational earnings dependency are developed 
countries. Chile is experiencing a transitional process with higher levels of 
intergenerational earnings dependency together with a general process of 
economic development. However, not a lot of empirical evidence exists in 
relation to this point (OECD, 2010). 
 
The analysis of the level of intergenerational earnings dependency over 
time in Chile, is confounded by the lack of data, hence, only different age 
cohorts can be used. It is found that the levels of mobility have been maintained 
over time, and improved slightly in that the youngest cohorts present lower 
levels of earnings dependency than the oldest cohorts. This could mean that 
social policies have been working, but they have not been enough to equalise 
opportunities for individuals of new generations. However, this could be 
associated with a cohort effect, but not with a time effect. 
 
The transmission of education also seems to be very high at the highest 
levels of education - 60% of fathers have a son who has achieved the same level 
of education as themselves. Similarly, in Chile, the intergenerational educational 
dependency (average across the full distribution) is around 0.38 which is quite 
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low compared to the average intergenerational educational dependency across 
other countries (around 0.6). However, in comparing countries, one must be 
aware that this could be misleading, because in this case the majority of studies 
that measure the levels of intergenerational educational dependency have been 
done in developing countries, due to the lack of data in terms of parents-children 
earnings.   
 
An important aim of this research is to compare the levels of 
intergenerational earnings and educational mobility, expecting to find higher 
levels of educational mobility, but lower levels of earnings mobility, following the 
idea that even though social and educational policies have increased the 
educational level of individuals (giving the opportunity to have better jobs and 
better salaries in the future), the earnings mobility has not been improved. 
Therefore, a standardised version of intergenerational earnings dependency and 
educational dependency was considered, finding that educational mobility 
(around 0.31) is lower than earnings mobility (around 0.47), which is exactly the 
opposite of what was expected. These results indicate that one of the most 
important areas in which social policy could intervene in order to increase 
opportunities for new generations is to give them better educational chances, 
providing them with better schools and better access to higher education. 
However, this unexpected result could be due to the lack of data. In particular, 
there is no information about where individuals attended school or university, 
which could result in the estimated standard deviation of fathers’ earnings being 
lower than the real one (the former being predicted on the basis of their level of 
education, but not considering where it was obtained). Therefore, because of the 
measurement error, the standardised earnings coefficients potentially will be 
lower than the real coefficient obtained that if would have been if the effect of 
quality or prestige of the educational institution where the individual studied had 
been considered. 
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In terms of education, policy could be important, for example, in trying to 
reduce the elitism among schools or in trying to maintain a general good 
standard of education in the majority of them, instead of only a few of them. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand which segments of society have to be 
helped the most, and where social policy efforts could best be focused. For this 
case, the quantile regression estimation was useful, indicating that the earnings 
intergenerational elasticity increases with earnings decile. That is, richer people 
transmit their levels of earnings to a larger extent than poor people. On the 
other hand, educational levels are highly transmitted among poorer families. 
Poor families likely do not have the incentive to support their children to attend 
school or access higher levels of education, because they might not have enough 
money and education might be considered a luxury or because they do not 
believe that studying would actually take them out of poverty.  
 
In this respect, high levels of social mobility are desirable. However, the 
question of how to best to achieve them is a big challenge for social policy. 
Social policies that favour less qualified workers in terms of employment 
opportunities or salary would probably increase earnings mobility, but are 
associated with a high social cost. These policies would reduce the incentives and 
efficiency for human capital accumulation. Hence, they would not be particularly 
desirable. On the other hand, if a society presents low levels of social mobility 
and it is found that this is due to a big gap in educational investment or due to 
nepotism that would also be inefficient and undesirable. It is therefore suggested 
that social policy should be focused on reducing difference in terms of parental 
investment in education, increasing for example public spending on education, to 
give better educational opportunities to families with parents that would tend to 
invest less in human capital (due to their budget constraints) and that nepotism 
should be eradicated as it favours social connections and not personal ability. 
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In addition, even though more has been learnt about why 
intergenerational income/educational dependencies are at a particular level, 
there is an open debate about the transmission mechanisms that are involved 
(Solon, 1999). D’Addio (2007) suggests that educational systems and policies 
that governments decide to implement have an impact on the level of social 
mobility of their countries. In particular, public provision of education would 
increase social mobility by reducing the cost of education to individuals and 
removing credit constraints. It would also be a substitute for family income in 
the educational process. There is almost a general agreement that countries with 
better public education systems, in particular with higher expenditures on 
primary school education, have lower intergenerational earnings elasticity (Black 
and Devereux, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, the question ofwhether or not perfect mobility should 
be achieved becomes a basic one. With this in mind, Mulligan (1997) 
understands perfect mobility (measured as the intergenerational income 
elasticity) as perfect equality of opportunity, which is seen as desirable.  Weil 
(2005) explains that this is due to the impact that social mobility has in terms of 
economic growth as the allocation of talent would be more efficient and, due to 
the effect that social mobility has on political economy issues, as a high level of 
social mobility would balance the ‘class-fighting’ and the desire for redistribution, 
because of the hope that poor families have that their children become richer in 
the future. On the other hand, Ichino et al. (2008) suggest that mobility would 
not be desirable, because it would not just depend on nature and nurture, but 
also on redistributive institutions that emerge from their own society and which 
distort an individual’s incentives. Therefore, there would be costs associated with 
intergenerational mobility and there would be no reason to expect that the social 
optimal income intergenerational elasticity should be equal to zero. This is 
supported by Nunn (2011) who points out that even though social mobility is 
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desirable, an optimal level cannot be established and by Corak (2006) who 
states that a β=0 would require a huge governmental intervention that in 
manysocieties would not be possible. Therefore, political economy issues are 
relevant in influencing the level of social mobility in a country. 
 
As Solon (2002) points out, cross-country comparisons may help in 
understanding how income is transmitted generation by generation and the 
reasons why the level of intergenerational transmission varies among countries. 
In particular, it is of interest to know if the differences between countries are due 
to real differences among the elasticities in terms of social mobility or because of 
differences in the way that they were estimated. 
 
Therefore, since redistributive policies generate a trade-off between 
insurance and incentives, the optimal level of mobility is not necessarily zero and 
the amount of dependency between parent and child income in equilibrium 
would depend, for example, on the costs and benefits of public education (Ichino 
et al., 2010). 
 
 
5.2.2 Equity and Efficiency Implications of the 1980 Educational School 
Reform and School Competition 
 
Equity and efficiency have always been the aim of welfare policy in many 
countries. However, the idea that an increase in one of them will necessarily 
reduce the other is a permanent concern (Le Grand, 1990). In the educational 
policy context, efficiency is related to the best way in which resources are 
allocated (Wößmann and Schütz, 2006), in particular the level of output (for 
example, performance of students) relative to the resources utilised in obtaining 
them (for example, public spending in education). On the other hand, the 
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concept of equity could have many meanings, and defining it is controversial 
enough, but it is generally understood as equal opportunities (Roemer, 1998). 
That is, equity means a student can achieve irrespective of their background or 
family socio-economic characteristics. Therefore, the implementation of a 
privatised educational system has particular relevance in terms of efficiency and 
equity implications.  
 
The introduction of voucher school systems and school competition have 
been claimed to increase efficiency in the educational system, increasing the 
performance of students, in particular the ones attending public schools, without 
increasing spending on education, even more by decreasing it. In addition, the 
voucher school reform was implemented based on the belief that voucher 
schools will be able to administrate their resources in a way that favours their 
students the most and will have the incentive to attract students by offeringa 
quality service.  
 
Additionally, the 1980 Chilean educational reformwas also implemented 
to widen the coverage of education (without a high public burden) and increase 
the educational attainment of the population. This was probably based on the 
idea that better educated individuals reduced the possibility of their being 
unemployed, for example in OECD countries the unemployment rate among the 
lowest skilled workers is higher than amongst the highly skilled (OECD, 2011). 
The objective of widening the educational coverage and educational attainment 
seems to have been achieved rapidly, when many schools were opened during 
the first five years of the reform. The number of individuals finishing secondary 
education increased from 28.8% in 1990142 to 58.4% in 2006 in the poorest 
decile of income. This should have real importance, if it is considered that to 
                                                          
142
 There is no previous information related to educational attainment. 
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have a more educated society contributes not only to growth, but also to having 
‘better’ citizens - ones that create more social cohesion and more political 
stability in society (Russell, 1988). In particular, schooling is positively 
associated with reducing, for example, alienation and social inequalities and 
reducing levels of crime (Lochner and Moretti,2001). 
 
People also have the freedom to choose their school, which is difficult to 
measure, but considering that there was a big movement from public to voucher 
schools over time (enrolment in primary voucher schools increased from 31.8% 
in 1990 to 48% in 2008) this seems to indicate that people like to be able to 
choose and that voucher schools give them something that public schools do not. 
It was intended that the allocation of resources would be more efficient, as 
money destined to support public schools decreased, expecting that they would 
become more efficient when they suffer competition. However, this did not seem 
to happen because, even though voucher schools seem to obtain better results 
than public schools by around 13 points, they seem to negatively affect the 
quality of public schools (one more voucher school in the area reduces the exam 
results of local public schools by 0.761 points compared to their performance in 
the previous year) even when ruling out the possibility that this effect is 
produced by voucher schools locating in areas where public school experience a 
bad reputation and bad results or produced by voucher school locating in areas 
where students seem to have better results. 
 
On the other hand, as mentioned previously, equity is by itself a 
controversial concept, but normally involves the ideas of fairness and justice in 
society. It could be understood as equality of outcomes, thus aiming that 
everyone achieves the same grade at school. However, this definition of equality 
also seems unfair, because individuals exert different levels of effort in terms of 
learning or studying. It seems reasonable to believe that inequality of 
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outcomescan be tolerated if and only if it is a consequence of different levels of 
effort that individuals choose to put in to their activities, but not if it is a product 
of circumstances that are out of an individual’s control such as ethnic 
background, gender, parental characteristics, etc. (Wößmann and Schütz, 2006). 
Therefore, educational outcomes (measures such as academic test scores or 
labour market performance) could be different among individuals, but the 
opportunities given to them must be equally independent of their circumstances 
in life. Hence, equality in education is basically understood as the reduction of 
influence of family characteristics. 
 
Voucher systems could create more segregation, as students would be 
sorted according to their abilities or their socio-economic backgrounds. School 
choice educational systems would therefore divide students into more 
homogenous groups which would not be in line with the diversity of society 
(Hawley, 1996). This is precisely what seems to be happening in Chile - “better” 
children seem to be grouped together and do not integrate with children from 
different backgrounds: The public schools receive the poorest and the most 
vulnerable students (around 80% of their students), voucher schools without 
fees receive also some of the poorest (around 70%) and in contrast, voucher 
schools with fees accept the middle class (around 86%) and the private schools 
obviously take the richest students. Moreover, it is likely that these socio-
economic inequalities among students attending schools are reflected in terms of 
academic performance, in fact, public schools obtain the worst results in the 
SIMCE academic test (238 points). In contrast voucher schools that take fees 
obtain 25 points more (263 points). It could also be possible that initial 
inequalities can be reproduced, as peer effects could play an important role and 
thusbeing associated with a polarisation of the political power that some families 
can exert. Students with parents who are more educated or have higher 
earnings are likely to be in an advantageous position, because parents can 
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support them more. Therefore, if theyare all together, they will benefit from 
each other; the opposite will happen if students from low income families are put 
together. Hence, one aim should be to create equal opportunities in education, in 
order to avoid costly redistribution in the future (Ammermuller, 2005). 
 
 An educational policy that gives opportunities to children from different 
backgrounds to share schools would be particularly useful in the effort to reduce 
the problem of segregation (Acemoglu, 2003). In this respect, from a theoretical 
point of view, the increase in welfare through the implementation of a voucher 
system would be given by an apparent satisfaction of parents that decide to 
move their children from a public to a voucher school. However, the increase in 
welfare for those that can move can be cancelled out by the decrease in welfare 
for those that cannot, but want to (Carnoy, 1998). Actually, using economic 
theory, it is possible to suppose that competition would influence the allocation 
of resources positively and consumers would play an active role in choosing their 
favourite supplier. Nevertheless, free provision does not seem to be equal to free 
consumption as families have to incur some private costs such as transportation, 
and it is precisely these additional costs which make poorer families use 
educational services less than richer families, especially when many families 
move from one area or city to another whilst trying to find jobs and cheaper 
places to live, and educational choice would not be an important priority for 
them. Increasing commuting time for students (to move between houses to 
school), for example (which could also imply an extra-cost) could also be a 
concern among families who have to decide where to send their children to 
school. In terms of segregation related to school choice, Becker (1995) points 
out that poorer families in particular need better education to overcome their 
lack of family support and that they are normally destined to accept the schools 
in their neighbourhood as they cannot afford to move house, or the travelling 
costs. The author states his belief that a good voucher system should only be 
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limited to poor families because students from poorer backgrounds are those 
who receive the most benefits from voucher education and its competition 
effects. 
 
Moreover, an educational policy that changes financing characteristics of 
schools will affect the fundamental incentives schools face and, thus, over the 
long term, the goals they pursue (Hoxby, 1996). This has been largely debated 
in Chile, as ideological tendencies may claim that education cannot be privatised 
and that it is the role of the state to provide it to a high standard. On the other 
hand, others believe firmly in the right of choice and in the “invisible hand” that 
regulates markets, including the educational one. The reality is that incentives 
that encourage schools to offer a better service could potentially be beneficial for 
students and for school’s owners. However, because quality of education is 
difficult to measure or subject to a lack of information, schools with profit aims 
will be able to cheat and keep their benefit without caring about their student 
performance. School performance in Chile improves the most on average, 
amongst free voucher schools (63% improve at least 1 point between 2005 and 
2009) compared to public and fee voucher schools (around 50% improved at 
least 1 point between 2005 and 2009). This could be due to what was mentioned 
before, that schools that charge tuition fees have profit maximisation aims, and 
could change their incentives to provide a better quality service. 
 
Hence, the important issue will be to design and to implement a voucher 
system that faces the efficiency-equity trade-off, and challenge it, finding ways 
to increase both important aims, for example increasing information for parents 
and the level of regulation and financial incentives or limiting their school’s right 
to choose their students as in the Swedish educational reform, where voucher 
schools cannot select students (Björklund et al., 2004) and where the levels of 
intergenerational earnings mobility are much higher than in the Chilean case. In 
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addition, increasing the resources available for schools is important, and 
thoughthis does not increase the quality of the service by itself, focusing on 
areas that affect student achievement and therefore can raise educational 
outcomes, for example, teacher training, increasing teacher support equipment, 
among other thingsthat have an effect (Kazal, 1993). In addition, it has been 
suggested that in order to overcome segregational problems, the quality of 
teachers must be increased, in particular in schools with more disadvantaged 
pupils, or more facilities must be given to children in terms of access to 
technology and books, but it is also necessary to realise that better teachers will 
tend to go to better schools. 
 
In summary, the implications of an educational system based on school 
competition therefore becomes relevant, as it could bring efficiency to the 
educational system through choice (among other things), but at the same time 
increase the levels of inequality and social segregation in the country by sorting 
pupils from better backgrounds into certain schools. This sorting effect could put 
children from similar socio-economic backgrounds together in the same schools, 
which could meanthat they create networks and friendships with individuals that 
are very similar to them. Therefore, assortative mating issues become relevant, 
as members of a couple that share the same background could reinforce the 
transmission of their levels of education and income to their children, creating 
even more inequality in society and exacerbating the issue. Such issues are 
considered in Chapter 4 of this research. 
 
5.2.3 The Implication of High Levels of Assortative Mating 
 
Reasonable policy implications regarding the study of intergenerational 
social mobility are not clear (Blanden, 2009). They depend on the causes of the 
levels of intergenerational mobility found in society, for example if it is mostly 
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due to the transmission of genetic ability or other family characteristics, it would 
suppose a huge state intervention which could lead to huge inefficiencies. That is 
why knowing the precise factors that play a role in determining the level of 
intergenerational socioeconomic characteristics is very important.  
 
Assortative mating could be one of the explanations for the level of 
intergenerational earnings dependency found in society and it also seems to be a 
reinforcing process, because individuals tend to segregate themselves into 
socially similar groups (like neighbourhood, for example). These small groups 
will therefore become more homogenous, and people that could potentially 
become couples meet in that neighbourhood, and would be even more 
homogenous than if they were never to meet in an already similar context. 
Actually, parents provide the most immediate and influential “neighbourhood” for 
their children. Therefore, children of similar parents (in terms of social 
characteristics) are likely to narrow the range of social interactions compared to 
children with parents from different backgrounds (Mare, 2008), mostly because 
the latter would have the opportunity to make friends with individuals from 
different parts of society and they would widen their choices of potential future 
partner. 
 
Educational assortative mating could be considered one of the most 
important ways in which people socially separate themselves, in particular 
because the effect that education has on earnings and therefore in the 
transmission of socioeconomic conditions from one generation to another (Mare, 
2008). This situation is particularly worrying when individuals with higher levels 
of education and earnings are those that present higher levels of assortative 
maiting as in the case of Chile where the correlation in terms of earnings in the 
10th decile is around 0.29 compared to the 1st decile of earnings where the 
correlation is negative and in terms of years of schooling where the 10th decile of 
 301 
 
earnings has couples that have a correlation of 0.72 and the 1st decile has a 
correlation of 0.58. 
 
Additionally, the way that students are sorted in their schools could have 
an effect on intergenerational mobility levels, and for example, it is possible to 
assume that higher levels of education of both parents can be transferred to 
their children (d’Addio, 2007). The questions of whether or not schools are 
judged according to the kinds of children they are able to enrol or by the quality 
of the service they provide can be raised. This is particularly important because 
abilities and background of pupils can have an effect on the other pupils, and 
also group attributes can change the future decision of individuals, in particular 
in terms of education (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2005). Peer effects could be 
important in improving performance, but additionally, parents’ efforts to send 
their children to schools with good peers would probably be directed towards 
obtaining benefits that good quality peer groups can provide, such as more 
emotional security or familiarity or maybe simply a feeling of elitism and 
exclusivility. 
 
 Therefore, assortative mating could be one of the important factors that 
influence the levels of intergenerational earnings mobility. The Chilean case 
shows high levels of segregation in the educational market, as mentioned 
before; the poorest students attend public schools being in close contact with 
students that have very similar family backgrounds. It has been proved that this 
level of segregation has an impact on the level of intergenerational earnings 
dependency, in fact, around 20% of the variance on the latter can be explained 
by the level of assortative mating in terms of years of schooling among members 
of a couple, the other part could be given by the impact of returns to education 
(so, how much people are going to receive in return for their human capital 
investment), or the progressivity of social policies implemented among other 
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things. Therefore, in order to create a system that encourages integration and 
the possibility to create a varied enviroment, where people interact seems 
relevant, but also policy interventions would perhapsnot be enough to abolish 
firmly-established social institutions, such as the accent or last name that an 
individual has. 
 
Nowadays, due to increasing female representation in the labour market 
not only women areevaluating the education and therefore the potential 
partner’s potential future earnings, but men may also be doing the same. This 
would increase the educational assortative mating of couples even more (Mare, 
2000). Women with a higher earnings potential (using education as a proxy) 
would be more attractive in the marriage market and, of course, men with more 
education would be in a better position to attract them. This would produce 
higher levels of educational assortative mating (Halpin and Chan, 2003). 
However, women realise that education could be useful for attracting men as a 
sign of future earnings (even though they are not planning to have a job in the 
future), and education then becomes not only an investment in terms of 
personal earnings but also in terms of future husband’s earnings. In Mexico, for 
example, social institutions create a close relationship between schooling 
attainment and the marriage market, in particular for girls. Even more, in 
Mexican culture there exists an acronym “MMC” or “in the mean time, I am 
getting married” (mientras me caso) which demostrates the idea that girls 
should pursue higher levels of education in order to try to find a good husband 
(Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2012) 
 
On the other hand, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that individuals will 
have different preferences for finding a partner - religion, race, hobbies, physical 
characteristics, or potential economic success. However, if individuals only match 
with similar partners this could increase the variance of socioeconomic 
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characteristics among families and increase the gap of the socioeconomic 
characteristics of families of next generations, which could reinforce educational 
inequality (Mare, 2000). Individuals could marry similar individuals in terms of 
schooling because of their personal preferences, but also because of the 
structure of the marriage market (Mare, 1991). In this context, it is believed that 
the Chilean 1980 educational reform could have had an impact on the levels of 
assortative mating experienced in the country as it put together similar students 
into the same schools, narrowing their marriage market. In particular, if it is 
considered that relationships and friendships depend initially on the opportunities 
available for meeting people, including the contacts made at school, but also the 
friends of friends to whom they could potentially be introduced (Blossfeld, 2009), 
then the role of educational assortative mating becomes even more relevant. 
This research actually finds that when individuals are affected by the reform 
their partner’s schooling increases by 0.049 years more for each year of 
schooling of the individual when individuals achieve primary education, which 
would suggest an increase in segregation in this segment of educational 
achievement as the number of individuals with lower levels of education has 
decreased, therefore, one could expect a decrease in assortative mating. 
 
Increasing assortative mating over time could be due to an increasing 
average educational attainment (more homogeneity among individuals), or 
because of an increase in the age at which individuals leave school or an 
increase in the age of marriage, i.e. assortative mating in terms of schooling is 
more likely among highly educated individuals and among individuals who do not 
get married soon after leaving school (Mare, 1991). The effect of the Chilean 
reform on the level of assortative mating was probably a combination of all these 
possibilities.  
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Chile actually increased its level of educational attainment after the 
reform (this being one of the aims of the reform), therefore new generations 
achieved higher educational levels and became more homogenous, in particular 
at higher levels of schooling. This was associated with more people with higher 
levels of schooling finding partners with similar characteristics more easily (as 
there were more of them), increasing the level of assortative mating in that 
segment of the population. On the other hand, this increase in educational 
attainment would reduce the number of individuals with lower levels of 
education. Therefore the level of assortative mating should be reduced in this 
segment of population. However, if segregation of the least educated has 
increased, the level of assortative mating may be increased in this segment, 
suggesting educational segregation as this is actually what seems to have 
happened. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that a father-in-law’s earnings explains, 
to a similar degree, an individual’s  household earnings as the individual’s own 
father’s does, indicating assortative mating, especially if it is considered that 
household earnings are mostly driven by the male, meaning that women are 
getting married with individuals who are very similar to their fathers.  
 
 
5.3 Limitations of Theses and Future Research 
 
 Intergenerational Mobility has not been absent of controversy, in 
particular, as mentioned in Chapter 2, different age of fathers and/or parents 
can be associated with a significant variation in the measurement of 
intergenerational earnings dependency. The main limitation is not only related to 
the lack of data on parent’s earnings, because the TS2SLS has solved the 
problem of not having information in the same data set for individuals and their 
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father’s earnings, but the inability to predict father’s earnings using more 
information than their occupation (which is limited to only 6 categories) and level 
of education. It would be better to have information about the job experience of 
parents, place of living, and most importantly school and/or university where 
they study, as it would help to predict their earnings in a more accurate way. In 
particular, the place of study would be of importance, as it is believed that some 
schools and universities havemore prestige in Chile, therefore finishing a 
determined programme at a university with a good reputation would not be the 
same in terms of providing potential earnings or access to better jobs. In 
addition, the measurement of intergenerational earnings and schooling mobility 
is also limited to obtain a value at a determined point of time. Therefore, another 
limitation would be the impossibility of obtaining measurement over time, that 
would allow the analysis of potential improvements in terms of social mobility in 
the Chilean society. 
 
 Future research could involve to the analysis of the sources of 
intergenerational mobility, for example in addition to the impact of assortative 
mating which was analysed already in this research, the effect of taxes in 
particular, would be interesting to analyse as the effect of potential tax reforms 
has taken relevance in the country in the last few years, given that it could 
dramatically change the income redistribution. Additionally, the role of social 
institutions could be analysed, the role of having an indigenous background or 
last name, the importance of accents, Basque or European sounding last name 
or even physical appearance could be considered. In this context, Nunez and 
Perez (2007) found that certain types of last names which seem to be related to 
Basque-Castellan aristocracy are associated with high levels of socio-economic 
status and a combination between English origin first name and Spanish last 
name seems to be associated with low levels of income (these relationships 
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would be expressed subjectively by individuals when they are asked but also 
reflect the reality in Chilean society). 
 
 In chapter 3, the main aim was to find out if school spatial competition 
would effectively create an increase in student performance. However, in terms 
of empirical evidence, the lack of data limited the analysis, as for example 
information of school locations is available, but it is not possible to find 
information about student residential addresses which would certainly help to 
analyse separately the effect of school choice availability and the effect of school 
competition as done by Gibbons et al. (2008) for the case of primary schools in 
South East London, UK. Information related to the number of schools available 
for each student according to geographic constraints will be interesting to obtain 
to see the real situation of whether or not families can really exercise their right 
to choose any school. In addition, it would be interesting to have information 
about marketing strategies that schools could use to attract students, to 
evaluate if they are more cost-effective than increasing the quality provided to 
compete with surrounding schools. Urban density effects could also establish 
certain limitations for this research, that is certain areas will have more schools 
because more children live in the area, therefore competition indeces would 
depend on the population density of individualsof the age to attend to school. An 
attempt to solve this limitation has been to control for population density of 
individuals between 5 and 14 years of age by municipality, the problem is that 
the information is not found for narrow areas which would allow the specific 
calculation of population density where every school is located. For example, 
some cities such as Valparaiso, which is located in the Chilean Central Valley, 
has a small city centre and more than 40 hills surrounding it. Most of the families 
live on the hills, but they send their children to schools which are mostly located 
in the city centre. School size is also an important limitation as only the number 
of schools in the area was considered, but not the size of schools in the area. 
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Nevertheless, the most important limitation of this study is that its results 
are only applied to the Chilean case. There is no typical voucher system, they 
differ in terms of their finance, regulation and information (how much 
information parents have about their alternatives), and academic outcomes likely 
depend on how the reforms are structured in terms of funding, targeting (all the 
people, or only poor, or only women, etc.), admission regulations etc. Therefore, 
the results of this research are not intended to be extended to other countries, 
understanding every case as unique, especially because voucher reforms are not 
necessarily unrelated to political and economic circumstances (Belfield, 2001). 
 
Additionally, further research could be conducted to analyse the impact of 
profit and non-profit institutions providing education; will profit organisations try 
to reduce the quality of the service in order to reduce their cost, attracting 
students by other means? In fact, such non-profit organisations would exist to 
serve people who are less informed who need someone to trust. However, it 
could also be that non-profit organisations do not have the incentive to act more 
efficiently because the earnings have to be reinvested and the quality of the 
service could also deteriorate as teachers for example do not enjoy the benefits 
of working harder to provide a better service. The increasing research in this 
area should open up a lot of discussion and will probably show the need for 
innovative ideas to reduce the social gap in education (Perry and Francis, 2010). 
 
In terms of the analysis of one of the factors contributing to the levels of 
intergenerational mobility, chapter 4’s first limitation is about trying to create a 
model that simply connectsjoint earnings of individuals and their partners with 
the individual’s father and the way that individuals can choose their partner in 
life. First of all, assortative mating is reduced to merely schooling, and in real life 
individuals would take account of many other characteristics in choosing a 
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partner. However, to reduce the choice to a proxy of the human capital held by 
individuals helps to understand how similar members of a couple are, only 
considering their education, which is easy to identify and maybe can be affected 
by social and educational policy. Secondly, the relationship between earnings 
and human capital of individuals is also simplified, especially considering that in 
Chilean society other factors could favour earnings of people with better social 
connections. In addition, many other aspects of the modelling were simplified 
which in one respect raises the possibility of solving the model and finally 
obtaining a simple equation that relates levels of assortative mating and 
intergenerational earnings dependency linearly. 
 
Finally, in terms of future research, it would be interesting to analyse 
when and where members of a couple meet, as has been done in other 
international studies mentioned in this research (where the percentage of 
individuals that have found their partner in school has been presented), to see 
for example if individuals that go to university match with other individuals that 
also go to university independent of their background, or if people keep their 
social circles and do not really meet people from different social classes even 
though they share the same classroom. It would also be interesting to analyse 
the fertility effect related to the levels of intergenerational mobility in society, 
which was excluded in this research for reasons of simplicity, in particular, the 
quality-quantity trade-off of children should contribute to understanding the 
process of transmitting socioeconomic characteristics from parents to their 
offspring. 
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